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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
International migration is a complex and dynamic phenomenon with wide-ranging 
implications for the receiving countries. As implied by the title, this doctoral dissertation 
attempts to approach the subject of international migration from different angles and 
perspectives. In particular, each of the three main empirical chapters of this dissertation 
investigates a specific topic of the economic, social and political consequences of 
international migration in the European region. This is in order to highlight the importance of 
multidimensional research that is able to give a bird’s eye view on the theme. 
The introductory chapter first presents some key statistics and figures on the number 
of international migrants in Europe that will improve understanding of the phenomenon. Next, 
so as to position the dissertation in a broader context, a brief summary of the impact of 
international migration on the host countries is provided. The introduction ends with an 
overview of the three empirical studies that compose the main body of the dissertation.  
1.1 Statistics and Trends of International Migration in Europe 
 
As stated in the International Migration Report 2017 published by the United Nations, the 
number of international migrants around the world has continued to grow over the last 
decades, reaching 258 million in 2017. Of this number, according to the most recent 
migration statistics from Eurostat, more than 60 million migrants live in countries that 
currently comprise the European Union, that is, 28-member states, including Norway and 
Switzerland (henceforth Europe). In other words, Europe hosts almost one in four of all 
international migrants. The following table presents the fifteen European countries hosting the 
largest number of international migrants in 2017. Apart from the total number of foreign-
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born, the table includes the number of immigrants coming from countries outside of the 
European region, while both numbers are also expressed as a share of the total population of 
the corresponding country and the total foreign-born population of Europe. 








outside of Europe  
(ii) 
(i)  
as a share of the 
total population of 
the country 
(ii) 
 as a share of the 
total population of 
the country 
(i)  









Germany 12,105,436 7,255,534 14.7% 8.8% 20.0% 12.0% 
United Kingdom 9,293,729 5,680,830 14.1% 8.6% 15.4% 9.4% 
France 8,155,670 5,935,003 12.2% 8.9% 13.5% 9.8% 
Italy 6,053,960 4,216,330 10.0% 7.0% 10.0% 7.0% 
Spain 6,024,698 4,081,245 12.9% 8.8% 10.0% 6.7% 
Switzerland 2,391,480 977,296 28.4% 11.6% 4.0% 1.6% 
Netherlands 2,137,234 1,556,635 12.5% 9.1% 3.5% 2.6% 
Belgium 1,876,726 1,000,229 16.5% 8.8% 3.1% 1.7% 
Sweden 1,783,179 1,242,776 17.8% 12.4% 2.9% 2.1% 
Austria 1,649,008 909,409 18.8% 10.4% 2.7% 1.5% 
Greece 1,250,863 905,244 11.6% 8.4% 2.1% 1.5% 
Portugal 876,300 636,104 8.5% 6.2% 1.4% 1.1% 
Norway 799,797 448,633 15.2% 8.5% 1.3% 0.7% 
Ireland 796,410 195,858 16.6% 4.1% 1.3% 0.3% 
Denmark 668,090 439,690 11.6% 7.6% 1.1% 0.7% 
Europe (Total) 60,465,209 38,295,295 11.5% 7.3% 100% 63.3% 
Source: Self-calculations based on Migration Statistics of Eurostat. 
According to the statistics in the table, international migrants represent 11.5 per cent of the 
total population of Europe. It appears that Germany, UK and France host almost half of the 
total foreign-born population. In addition, we see that nearly two thirds of international 
migrants who live in European countries come from regions outside of Europe. 
Although the stock of international migrants provides a clear picture of the existing 
situation in Europe, net migration flows (immigrants minus emigrants) help us to understand 
how this phenomenon will develop in the future. In his book, Exodus, Collier (2013) devotes 
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a full chapter to why immigration accelerates. The author argues that the income gap between 
developed and developing societies, the economic prosperity of the country of origin and the 
size of diaspora in the host country are the three main determinants of international migration. 
Similarly, Goldin et al. (2011) claim that worldwide we should expect a higher volume of 
international migrants in the next decades. Their argument is based not only on the growing 
supply factors of migration, such as wider global inequality and economic growth in less 
developed regions, both of which motivate and enable people to relocate, but also on the 
increasing demand for both low- and high-skilled labour force from rich countries. Table 1.2 
below shows annual net migration statistics for Europe in the time period 2007-2016. 




(plus Norway & 
Switzerland) 
EU-15 
(plus Norway & 
Switzerland) 
Acceding 
countries in 2004 
(Ten countries) 
Acceding 
countries in 2007 
(Bulgaria & Romania) 
Acceding 
countries in 2013 
(Croatia) 
2007 1,645,735 2,037,592 74,071 -474,822 8,894 
2008 1,351,902 1,459,527 68,088 -181,940 6,227 
2009 820,358 944,322 4,171 -129,023 888 
2010 872,296 1,018,166 -75,832 -65,783 -4,255 
2011 826,180 902,396 -19,504 -52,661 -4,051 
2012 1,008,338 1,041,715 -5,473 -23,999 -3,905 
2013 1,882,603 1,961,806 -59,324 -14,995 -4,884 
2014 1,217,761 1,254,438 -3,906 -22,551 -10,220 
2015 1,954,305 2,024,646 -1,619 -50,777 -17,945 
2016 1,318,652 1,403,993 5,197 -68,087 -22,451 
Total 12,898,130 14,048,601 -14,131 -1,084,638 -51,702 
Source: Self-calculations based on Migration Statistics of Eurostat. 
We note that during the decade 2007-2016, Europe added about 13 million migrants to its 
population or, put differently, 1.3 million, on average, per annum. This number is even 
higher, exceeding 14 million migrants, when we focus only on the member countries of the 
EU-15, including Norway and Switzerland. The reason for this is the large outflow of 
migrants from the most recently acceding countries that are less economically powerful and 
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developed. These migrants go mainly to the rest of Europe due to the regime of free labour 
mobility that followed their accession.  
As the above statistics indicate, the phenomenon of international migration to the 
countries of Western and North Europe is a growing issue. Considering also the recent 
refugee crisis and the fact that the number of asylum applications in Europe has increased 
considerably over the last few years, reaching a high of about 1.3 million first-time asylum 
applicants in 2015, we expect the stock of foreigners to rise even more in the near future. 
Therefore, examining the consequences of international migration for the main host European 
countries is a subject of vital interest and importance.  
1.2 Implications of International Migration for Host Countries 
 
No single chapter could fully cover all the effects of international migration for host 
countries, but this section provides a brief overview of these effects in order to understand the 
wider context in which this dissertation is situated.  
Economic Implications: With respect to the economic consequences, immigration has a 
significant impact on the labour market by affecting the potential wages and the employment 
opportunities of natives. On one hand, immigration may depress the wages and decrease the 
job opportunities of unskilled natives or those workers for whom migrants’ labour can be 
considered a possible substitute (Card, 2001; Borjas, 2003; Card, 2005; Dustman et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, immigration can have a positive effect on the average wage of native 
workers, as many of them benefit from task specialization and skill complementarities among 
natives and immigrants (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Docquier et al., 
2013; Peri, 2014). 
Besides immigrants’ profound impact on the labour market, international migration 
has important fiscal consequences for host countries due to the redistributive effects of taxes 
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and benefits. The fiscal impact of immigration depends on the contributions the immigrants 
pay and the public benefits they receive through their participation in the social security and 
welfare system of the host country (Lee and Miller, 2000; Card et al. 2007; Dustman et al., 
2010; Rica et al., 2013). Furthermore, immigration can benefit the economy of host countries 
through trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). International migration favours trade and 
FDI by reducing bilateral transaction costs. More specifically, immigrants increase bilateral 
trade flows and FDI by facilitating communication and information exchanges among firms 
or by lowering set-up costs in the destination country (Gould, 1994; Rauch and Trindade, 
2002; Lewer and Van den Berg, 2009; Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010; Kugler and Rapoport, 
2011). 
Finally, international migration may affect the economy of host countries by 
increasing their cultural diversity. In some respects, diversity can be beneficial and enrich a 
country’s economy. Greater diversity brings greater variety of skills Lazear (1999), leads to 
higher levels of creativity (Page, 2008) and generates knowledge spillovers (Glaeser et al., 
1992; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007). Therefore, through cultural diversity, international 
migration can enhance innovation and increase productivity, both at the micro/firm (Parrotta 
et al., 2014b; Kemeny and Cooke, 2017a; Mitaritonna et al., 2017) and the macro/country 
level (Niebuhr, 2010; Sparber, 2010; Ozgen et al., 2011; Peri, 2012; Bellini et al., 2013). 
However, cultural diversity can generate potential costs for the economy. Communication 
problems and cooperation difficulties derived from linguistic and other intercultural barriers 
(Lazear, 1999; Richard et al., 2002), as well as lower trust among culturally different 
individuals (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), might lead to a poor group performance. Thus, 
past research has shown that workforce diversity in terms of ethnicity could have a negative 
or non-effect on firm productivity (Parrotta et al., 2014a; Trax et al., 2015). Similarly, at a 
country level, in some cases, ethnic diversity and polarization are found to decrease economic 
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growth and development (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; 
Ratna et al., 2009). 
Social Implications: Apart from the important economic effects, large-scale immigration has a 
wide range of social impacts on host countries. In respect of the labour market, international 
migration not only affects the wages and employment opportunities of native workers but also 
alters the occupational division of labour. Immigrant employment changes the ethnic division 
of labour in the host country, as foreign workers are overrepresented in some specific sectors, 
but it can also lead to new occupational niches (Foner, 2012). Moreover, some previous 
research has indicated that increases in local immigrant labour supply are positively 
associated with native internal migration decisions (Borjas, 2006). Thus, massive immigration 
may induce natives to relocate because of the depression of their wages or a decrease in 
employment opportunities. 
Nevertheless, natives may respond to immigration by relocating because of several 
other immigrant-related issues. For instance, an argument often invoked against immigration 
is that immigrants increase crime in the country. Across Europe, for a few reasons, foreigners 
are highly overrepresented in prisons (Collier, 2013). Therefore, public discussion of social 
problems, such as high crime rates or other security threats, stereotypically associated most 
often with new immigration, can cause natives to relocate to other places. Furthermore, 
international migration influences the local society by changing the composition of the host 
country’s population. The demographic impact of international migration is not only caused 
by immigrant inflows, but also by relatively high fertility levels of immigrants along with the 
fact that many of them are in their procreative age. Therefore, immigrants can act as a 
solution to a declining and ageing population in the host country (Lutz and Scherbov, 2007). 
However, some natives are likely to be concerned about ‘compositional amenities’ associated 
with the presence of common language, religion and customs in their neighbourhoods, 
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schools or workplaces due to increasing immigration (Card et al., 2012). In addition, existing 
literature has revealed some evidence that ethnically mixed countries are correlated with 
inferior public goods provision (Alesina et al.,1999; La Porta et al. (1999). 
Moreover, as already mentioned, international migration increases society’s diversity.  
From the social perspective, diversity brings many benefits and advantages but can also be 
problematic (Collier, 2013). Multicultural societies provide a great variety of goods and 
services that offer numerous choices to the local population. Moreover, cultural pluralism 
enables different values and beliefs to coexist, which implies that positive aspects of one 
culture may be adopted by others, thus establishing a better society. However, cultural 
distance between natives and immigrants may also negatively influence the public attitude. 
The different values and perceptions held by people coming from other ethnic backgrounds 
can be perceived as a threat to the national identity and culture of the native population 
(O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007). Finally, past research has also 
shown that immigration-driven diversity can erode social capital in host societies by 
decreasing the level of social cohesion and by reducing generalized social trust (Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2002; Putman, 2007; Hooghe, 2007; Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010). Thus, ethnic 
diversity has been found sometimes to be positively associated with lower-quality institutions 
and inefficient governments (Mauro, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003). 
Political Implications: International migration may also have political implications in the host 
countries. Immigration can affect the political scene of the host country through the political 
mobilization of the immigrant population, or through the political reaction of native people to 
immigrants. Previous research has revealed that individuals in ethnically heterogeneous 
communities show lower trust in local government, local leaders and media, as well as less 
confidence in their own political influence. As a result, they participate less in voting 
(Putnam, 2007). However, they are found to have more interest and knowledge about politics 
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and to participate more actively in protests and social reform groups. Nevertheless, some 
scholars argue that the direction and strength of the relationship between immigration-
generated diversity and collective endeavours is not a given but is conditioned by the 
institutional arrangements and the policies of each society (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010). 
On the part of immigrant groups, immigration can influence the political conditions in 
the host country through immigrants’ imported ideology and political engagement. The 
ideological predispositions of immigrants in the country of origin are highly associated with 
the ideology they assert in the host country, in terms of both intensity and directionality 
(Wals, 2013). In addition, naturalization fosters immigrants’ political integration 
(Hainmueller et al., 2015). By becoming citizens, immigrants gain voting rights and thus they 
are eligible to participate in all types of elections. However, the political engagement of the 
immigrant population is not exclusively restricted to electoral voting but enables them to 
achieve executive political positions and high levels of influence (Vermeulen et al., 2014). 
When it comes to political participation rates, immigrants seem to behave differently from 
native-born citizens. On one hand, an immigrant might be less likely to vote or to become 
politically engaged due to lack of critical resources such as education, income or social 
networks (Jones-Correa, 2001). On the other hand, past research has indicated that some 
minorities have a higher propensity to vote and participate in groups than natives, in order to 
preserve their identity and promote their political and civil rights (Alesina et al., 2000). 
Variation in political participation, however, is noticed not only between immigrants and 
natives but also among different immigrant groups, both in respect of the country of origin 
and time spent in the new host country (De Rooij, 2012).  
It is also true that the host country’s political life might be affected by the political 
mobilization of the native population against immigrants. The economic and social impacts of 
immigration on the host countries play an important role in determination of natives’ attitudes 
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toward immigrants (Mayda, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009), 
which in turn can affect their political preferences and voting behaviour. Thus, apart from 
responding to the growing concentration of immigrants by ‘voting with their feet’ and 
relocating, as previously suggested, natives may tend to support organized political 
movements against immigration. In addition, natives’ attitudes toward immigration can be 
also indirectly shaped or manipulated by politics (Norris, 2005). Populist radical right parties 
have been defined in the literature by their anti-immigrant framing of contemporary political 
issues, with immigrants often the scapegoats for problems such as crime, access or quality 
concerns regarding welfare state provisions, high unemployment or other economic malaise, 
as well as domestic security threats, including terrorism (Williams, 2006). Therefore, public 
opinion on immigration might be just as instrumentally shaped by the anti-immigrant rhetoric 
of some political actors. As the existing empirical literature suggests, the increasing 
immigration to European countries has a significant effect on electoral support of political 
parties with strong anti-immigrant views and agendas (Lubbers et al., 2002; Otto and 
Steinhardt, 2014; Halla et al. 2017; Harmon, 2017). 
1.3 Overview of the Studies in the Dissertation 
 
This doctoral dissertation consists of three empirical studies (Chapters 2-4), each of which 
examines a specific aspect of the economic, social and political impact of international 





1.3.1 Chapter 2: Cultural diversity and economic performance: The moderating role of 
trust 
 
In Chapter 2, we examine empirically how cultural diversity affects the economic 
performance of European regions. The findings of past research on the impact of cultural 
diversity on a society’s economic performance have been mixed. On the one hand, some 
scholars argue that the existence of culturally heterogeneous groups is favourable for 
societies. Beneficial skill complementarities, the generation of new ideas and knowledge 
spillovers derived from cultural diversity can lead to higher levels of innovation, positively 
affect creativity and increase macroeconomic productivity (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; 
Niebuhr, 2010; Sparber, 2010). On the other hand, previous research has shown that cultural 
diversity may also generate potential costs. Communication difficulties and cooperation 
problems, as well as conflicts of preferences among cultural groups, can prove damaging to 
economic performance (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Ratna et al., 
2009). Other potentially negative characteristics of culturally heterogeneous societies include 
the sub-provision of public goods, lower spending on the common good, inefficient 
government and lower quality institutions (Alesina et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Therefore, the main question would appear to concern 
what it is that determines whether the economic outcomes of cultural diversity are positive or 
negative. 
In this chapter, we attempt to address this issue by investigating the role of generalized 
social trust as a moderator in the relationship between cultural diversity and economic 
performance. According to established theory, generalized trust is one of the main 
components of social capital that facilitates coordination among people (Coleman, 1990; 
Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). Thus, we propose that the effects of cultural diversity on 
regional economic performance will be positively moderated by the level of generalized 
social trust. We also examine whether the impact of cultural diversity on regional economic 
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performance is affected by the level of trust individuals have in their public institutions. Trust 
in institutions can moderate the aforementioned relationship by raising the likelihood of trust 
in others, facilitating civic and political engagement and reinforcing people’s compliance with 
rules (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Levi, 1998; Greif, 1993; Tyler, 1998). Therefore, we argue that 
trust in institutions might be a prerequisite for expanding interaction and enhancing 
cooperation among strangers, or among individuals who lack information. 
Our hypotheses are tested on a dataset of 74 regions from 12 European countries for 
the period between 2004 and 2012, with two-year gaps. The economic performance of each 
region is measured by the regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The data were 
supplied by the European Regional Database of Cambridge Econometrics. Our cultural 
diversity variable consists of a component that measures the share of foreigners over total 
population and a component which captures the diversity among foreigners. We used data 
from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) elaborated by Eurostat to calculate this variable. To 
measure the level of generalized social trust and trust in institutions in regions of Europe, we 
used data provided by the European Social Survey (ESS). Finally, information about the 
control variables was collected by the European Regional Database of Cambridge 
Econometrics and Regional Statistics Database of Eurostat. 
The results of our empirical analysis indicate that it is not the size of a foreign 
population (share of foreigners) that is important, but the wider variety of that population 
(foreigners diversity), which is positively associated with regional income. We also find that 
in regions with a low level of generalized social trust, the benefits of foreigners’ diversity are 
absent; while in regions with a high level of generalized social trust, the benefits of 





1.3.2 Chapter 3: Immigrants’ Origin and Skill level as Factors in Attitudes toward 
Immigrants in Europe 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how national attitudes toward immigrants are 
affected by the characteristics of the immigrants living within the same geographic region. Much 
existing research on Western Europe and beyond has tended to investigate the phenomenon of 
immigration by linking attitudes toward immigrants to the individual characteristics of those 
holding particular viewpoints, whether positive or negative (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and 
Sinnott, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Pardos-Prado, 2011). However, this chapter examines 
the impact of regional factors on European attitudes towards immigrants by placing weight on 
the traits of the immigrants themselves.  More specifically, we evaluate the extent to which 
origin (EU/Non-EU) and skill level (low/highly-educated) of immigrants living in a given region 
drive public sentiment to be more or less anti-immigrant.  
To date, a few studies at European level have emerged that consider the characteristics 
of the immigrant population as determinative. Most of these studies show that the origin of 
immigrants plays an important role in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes, with higher ethnic 
distance between natives and immigrants generating more negative attitudes (Dustmann and 
Preston, 2007; Green et al., 2010; Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Bridges and Mateut, 2014). These 
findings seem to be driven more by cultural concerns and less by economic considerations. 
However, there are mixed results about the impact of immigrants’ skill level on the attitude of 
natives toward them (Schneider, 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 
2012; O’Connell, 2011). Based on the existing literature, we expect that anti-immigrant attitudes 
increase when economic conditions decline, as suggested by economic competition theory. 
Second, we argue that cultural difference correlates negatively with attitudes toward immigrants 
and attitudes become more negative as cultural difference increases, which is consistent with 
conflict and identity theory. Third, we suppose that increasing contact with immigrants produces 
more positive attitudes toward them, as predicted by contact theory. 
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Our analysis utilizes data from the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the 
European Social Survey (ESS) over the period 2004-2012, from 78 regions of 16 European 
countries. The dependent variable, anti-immigrant attitudes, is measured using the respondents’ 
answers to three different questions about immigration in the ESS. We use explanatory variables 
at two different levels, the individual and the regional. While the focus is on regional level 
determinants, we use individual level data in order to control for the more idiosyncratic factors of 
individual anti-immigrant attitudes. Our regional indicators are computed from the EU-LFS and 
for our individual-level predictors we use survey data from the ESS. Finally, data on regional 
control variables are provided by the Regional Database of Cambridge Econometrics and the 
Regional Statistics Database of Eurostat.  
The empirical results indicate that the proportion of foreigners in a given region does 
not appear to be a significant factor in shaping attitudes toward immigration. However, when 
we distinguish between different groups of immigrants, we find that immigrants’ origin seems 
to play a key role.  In addition, although we do not find any significant direct effect of 
immigrants’ skill level, as measured by level of educational attainment, in shaping attitudes 
toward them, our empirical results reveal some evidence that immigrants’ skill level might 
interact with the size of immigrant population to influence the portrayal of immigrants in the 
minds of natives. In particular, we find that the positive effect of the total share of foreigners 
on natives’ attitudes toward immigrants, with respect to the country’s economy and culture, is 
stronger in regions where the percentage of low-educated immigrants is higher.  
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Immigration and electoral support for the radical right: Evidence from 
Dutch municipalities 
 
The last chapter of the dissertation empirically examines the impact of international 
immigration on political outcomes in the Netherlands. More precisely, in this chapter we 
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investigate how the stock of immigrants and the immigrant inflows to Dutch municipalities 
affect electoral support for the radical right parties in the country. 
The existing literature distinguishes between economic and non-economic channels 
through which are determined both the attitude of individuals towards immigrants and thus 
demand for the radical right. As described in the previous chapter, public opinion on 
immigration seems to be shaped by both labour market conditions and welfare system 
characteristics (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Hanson et al. 2007; Dustmann and Preston, 
2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009), and by social or cultural factors within the local 
community (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Additionally, natives’ attitudes 
toward immigrants, which in turn determine their political preferences and voting behaviour, 
can be also indirectly shaped or manipulated by politics (Norris, 2005). Radical right parties 
often target immigrants as the cause of several problems such as high unemployment, 
increasing crime rates or other security threats such as terrorism (Williams, 2006). Therefore, 
public attitudes on immigration might be instrumentally shaped by the anti-immigrant rhetoric 
of some political actors. Consequently, supply-side factors, such as the skill of political actors 
in associating immigration with many of the problems of society, can determine the extent to 
which public demand for the radical right is developed.   
Previous research has shown that both stock and inflows of immigrants (in terms of 
country of birth or nationality) are positively associated with electoral support for radical right 
parties (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Becker and Fetzer, 2016; Halla et al., 2017; Harmon, 
2017). In addition, much of the prior empirical research has found that the type of immigrants 
(e.g. Western/Non-Western) significantly affects voting in favour of the radical right (Gerdes 
and Wadensjö, 2010; Mendez and Cutillas, 2014; Brunner and Kuhn, 2018). Our work 
contributes to the growing literature on immigration and political preferences by providing 
empirical evidence from the Netherlands. Additionally, in this chapter we differentiate 
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ourselves from previous empirical research by exploring and comparing the short-term effect 
of immigration (immigrant inflows) and its longer-term impact (immigrant stock) on the vote 
share of the radical right. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this work is the only empirical 
study of the related literature that distinguishes first- and second-generation immigrants. 
We use a panel dataset that covers 338 Dutch municipalities for which we observe the 
outcomes of national elections held in the Netherlands in 2003, 2006, 2010 and 2012. Our 
data are drawn from two different sources. First, we use information on election results in 
Dutch municipalities from the Electoral Council (Kiesraad). Our second source of data is the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of the Netherlands from where we collected demographic 
data and the other socio-economic information use to construct our control variables. The 
results of this chapter indicate that, although an increase in the share of foreign-born 
immigrants within a municipality does not increase the vote share of the radical right, 
increases in immigrant inflows have a positive and statistically significant effect on voting in 
support of radical right parties. This finding implies that is not so much the longer-term effect 
of immigration but its short-term impact that is important for explaining anti-immigrant 
voting. Our empirical analysis leads to several other findings including that the share of 
second-generation immigrants negatively affects anti-immigrant votes, while similarly to 
previous studies, cultural distance between natives and immigrants is a significant 




Chapter 2  
Cultural diversity and economic performance: 






Cultural diversity in the European area has been increasing in recent years as an inevitable 
consequence of international migration. The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate 
the relationship between cultural diversity and economic performance in 74 regions of 12 
European countries. The results of previous studies on the effect of culturally heterogeneous 
groups on a society’s economic performance have been mixed. In an effort to help explain 
these contradictory findings in past research, we introduce the concept of generalized social 
trust as a moderator in this relationship. In addition, we examine the moderating role of 
individuals’ trust in institutions. Our empirical results indicate that it is not the size of a 
foreign population (share of foreigners) that is important, but the wider variety of that 
population (foreigners diversity), which is positively associated with regional income. We 
also find that in regions with a low level of generalized social trust, the benefits of foreigners’ 
diversity are absent; while in regions with a high level of generalized social trust, the benefits 











Almost one fourth of all international migrants worldwide live in Europe.1 According to the 
Migration and Migrant Population Statistics published by Eurostat in 2017, Europe hosts 
more than 60 million migrants from around the world. This number represents 11.5 per cent 
of the total population of Europe, with nearly two thirds of international migrants coming 
from regions outside of Europe. During the decade 2007-2016, Europe added around 13 
million migrants to its population, in other words 1.3 million on average per annum. In 
addition, the number of asylum applications in Europe has increased considerably over the 
last few years, reaching a high of about 1.3 million first-time asylum applicants in 2015.  
As the above statistics clearly indicate, the phenomenon of immigration to European 
countries is an ongoing reality. Since cultural diversity in the area has been increasing in 
recent years as an inevitable result, examining its consequences is a subject of vital interest 
from both a sociological and an economic perspective. The findings of the existing literature 
on the effect of cultural diversity on a society’s economic performance have been mixed, 
however. On the one hand, some scholars argue that the existence of culturally heterogeneous 
groups is favourable for societies. Beneficial skill complementarities, the generation of new 
ideas and knowledge spillovers derived from cultural diversity can lead to higher levels of 
innovation, positively affect creativity and increase macroeconomic productivity (Ottaviano 
and Peri, 2006; Niebuhr, 2010; Sparber, 2010).  
On the other hand, previous research has shown that cultural diversity may also 
generate potential costs. Communication difficulties and cooperation problems, as well as 
conflicts of preferences among cultural groups, can prove damaging to economic performance 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Ratna et al., 2009). Other potential 
negative characteristics of culturally heterogeneous societies include the sub-provision of 
                                                             
1 All statistics on migration in Europe concerns the current composition of the European Union (28 member 
states) including also Norway and Switzerland. 
18 
 
public goods, lower spending on the common good, inefficient government and lower quality 
institutions (Alesina et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).  
The main question, therefore, would appear to concern what determines whether the 
economic outcomes of cultural diversity are positive or negative. In an attempt to contribute 
to an answer for this ‘riddle’, this study empirically investigates the role of generalized social 
trust as a moderator in the relationship between cultural diversity and economic performance. 
According to established theory, generalized trust is one of the main components of social 
capital that facilitates coordination among people (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 
1995). We also examine whether the impact of cultural diversity on regional economic 
performance is affected by the level of trust individuals have in their public institutions. Trust 
in institutions can moderate the aforementioned relationship by raising the likelihood of trust 
in others, facilitating civic and political engagement and reinforcing people’s compliance with 
rules (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Levi, 1998; Greif, 1993; Tyler, 1998).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review and 
provides the theoretical background from which our hypotheses are derived. Section 3 
explains the research model specification and describes our dataset. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results of our study. Finally, Section 5 provides a discussion and conclusion. 
2.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
 
Arriving at a clear definition of culture has been a controversial academic issue for decades, 
and the term ‘cultural diversity’ can accordingly be interpreted many different ways. The 
definition of cultural diversity we use in this paper refers to the existence of various groups of 
people in a region as defined by diverse ethnic or racial backgrounds, religions, customs and 
traditions or languages. Due to the broad definitions of cultural diversity that exist, different 
operationalizations have been used in the literature to capture the same construct. In the next 
section, we explain how we measured cultural diversity based on previous empirical research. 
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Finally, although cultural diversity is a major issue for both society and the economy, the 
existing literature on its overall impact is inconclusive. Cultural diversity has been shown to 
be both beneficial and harmful to economic life through its various mechanisms.  
2.2.1 The benefits of cultural diversity 
 
We will start by looking at the benefits. First, from the perspective of micro-level 
mechanisms, cultural diversity can boost productivity through the skill complementarities that 
arise between individuals. Lazear (1999) argues that a multicultural group leads to greater 
productivity at the firm level by widening the pool of skills and providing strong 
complementarities among the group’s members. Moreover, according to the literature, 
immigrants, especially the highly educated, can play an important role in promoting not only 
skill diversity and complementarities, but also task specialization (Peri and Sparber, 2009; 
Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). In addition Prat (2002), applying team theory, suggests that when 
the agents’ actions are substitutes it is optimal for a team to be heterogeneous.  
Second, greater diversity within a group can increase people’s ability to address 
complicated problems and devise better solutions (Page, 2008). People from different cultural 
groups have been exposed to different experiences; they have developed different 
perspectives and are thus more likely to follow different heuristics when dealing with a 
problem.  Hong and Page (2001) found that a group of diverse individuals can provide 
optimal solutions to difficult problems by presenting different perspectives and using 
alternative ways to solve them.  
Third, interaction among people of diverse backgrounds may not only promote the 
creation of new ideas, but also generate knowledge spillovers (Glaeser et al., 1992; Audretsch 
and Keilbach, 2007). Berliant and Fujita (2008) developed a microeconomic model of 
knowledge production through the interaction of individuals in which population 
heterogeneity was an essential factor. Moreover, Williams and O'Reilly (1998) conducted a 
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review of 40 years of research on demography and diversity in organizations based on 
information and decision theory and revealed that ethnic diversity can increase creativity and 
enhance decision-making.  
A considerable number of empirical studies have revealed a positive relationship 
between cultural diversity and economic performance at both the micro- and macroeconomic 
levels. Using firm-level data from the US, Ghosh et al. (2014) showed that skilled foreign-
born workers have a positive impact on firms’ labour productivity and profits. Similar 
findings were reported by Kemeny and Cooke (2017a), who indicate that immigrant diversity 
in US workplaces has a positive impact on worker productivity. Furthermore, using micro-
level data on French firms, Mitaritonna et al. (2017) found that an increase in firms’ 
immigrant employment leads to an increase in their productivity. Regarding the effect of 
cultural diversity on firm innovation, Parrotta et al. (2014b) have stated that, based on data 
from Denmark, worker diversity in terms of cultural background favours a firm’s patenting 
activity. 
At a macro-level, Peri (2012) showed that foreign workers are positively associated 
with total factor productivity in US states. Moreover, in their empirical analysis of 
metropolitan areas in the US, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) found that a multicultural urban 
environment increases the productivity of US-born workers. Using data from US cities, 
Kemeny and Cooke (2017a) suggest that immigrant diversity generates significant positive 
productivity spillovers; while Sparber (2010) argues that racial diversity increases the 
macroeconomic productivity of US cities, as well. Bellini et al. (2013) confirm the positive 
effect of cultural diversity on productivity, providing evidence from European regions. 
Similarly, the results of Suedekum et al. (2014) indicate that cultural diversity raises local 
productivity in the German labour market.  
21 
 
With regard to the impact of diversity on innovation, Niebuhr (2010) shows that the 
existence of a culturally diverse workforce increases R&D activity in German regions. 
Meanwhile, employing data on 170 European regions, Ozgen et al. (2011) suggest that, 
beyond a certain threshold, immigrant diversity has a positive impact on patent applications. 
In addition, previous research has revealed that the existence of culturally heterogeneous 
groups in a society seems to enhance entrepreneurship. Using data from German regions, 
Audretsch et al. (2010) showed a positive relationship between cultural diversity and 
technological start-ups. Moreover, Marino et al. (2012) found that ethnic diversity facilitated 
entrepreneurship in the financial and business services industry in Denmark.  
Beyond that, several studies have analysed the role of immigrants in enhancing trade 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) by reducing bilateral transaction costs. More specifically, 
the empirical findings from the literature suggest that immigrants increase bilateral trade 
flows and FDI by facilitating communication and information exchanges among firms or by 
lowering set-up costs in the destination country (Gould, 1994; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; 
Lewer and Van den Berg, 2009; Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010; Kugler and Rapoport, 2011). 
In a recent empirical study, Ottaviano et al. (2015) found that immigrants had a positive 
impact on country-specific exports from the UK. Meanwhile, in their meta-analysis of this 
literature, Genc et al. (2011) argue that an increase in the number of immigrants in a country 
by 10 per cent increases the volume of trade by about 1-2 per cent.  
Finally, using data from 195 countries, Alesina et al. (2016a) found that both the share 
of foreign-born population and the degree of diversity among foreigners were positively 
associated with a country’s GDP per capita. Nevertheless, focusing on genetic diversity 
(measured as the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population are 
genetically different), Ashraf and Galor (2013a, b) found an inverse u-shaped relationship 
with per capita income. Two additional empirical papers have analyzed regional data from 
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Europe, in an approach similar to that of the present study, to explore the link between 
cultural diversity and economic performance. First, Brunow and Brenzel (2011) found that a 
culturally diverse population had a positive impact on regional income, while Dohse and Gold 
(2014) also concluded that European regions with higher levels of cultural diversity 
experienced greater economic performance. 
2.2.2 The costs of cultural diversity 
 
At the same time, cultural heterogeneity can generate potential costs for the economy. When a 
group of people shares diverse cultural characteristics, individuals are likely to face 
communication problems and may find it difficult to cooperate effectively because they hold 
different values and perspectives (Lazear, 1999; Richard et al., 2002). Moreover, these 
communication and cooperation difficulties derived from linguistic and other intercultural 
barriers may also hinder the transfer and sharing of knowledge between people. In addition, 
according to the literature, greater diversity can result in lower trust and weaker social ties 
among individuals (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007). Therefore, cultural 
diversity can decrease the level of integration and social cohesion of a group, which in turn 
negatively affects individual performance (O'Reilly et al., 1989; Milliken and Martins, 1996).  
In a review of research on diversity in organizations, Williams and O'Reilly (1998) 
argue that according to similarity/attraction and social categorization theories, ethnic and 
racial diversity exerts a negative impact on group processes by creating more communication 
problems and increasing conflicts. Furthermore, in an empirical study on firms’ competitive 
moves, Hambrick et al. (1996) found that heterogeneous top management teams take slower 
action than homogenous ones and may not respond to competitors’ moves properly. Other 
recent empirical studies at a firm level also revealed that cultural diversity may have a 
negative or non-effect on firm performance. Using a dataset from Danish firms, Parrotta et al. 
(2014a) showed that workforce diversity in terms of ethnicity has a negative effect on firm 
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productivity, while Trax et al. (2015) found that a higher level of foreign workers did not 
enhance plant-level productivity in Germany.  
At a macroeconomic level, the empirical results of past research indicate that cultural 
heterogeneity can prove damaging to the economic performance of societies (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005; Easterly and Levine, 1997). Providing data from 48 states in the US, Ratna et 
al. (2009) showed that racial diversity decreased economic growth, while Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005) used data from 138 countries to demonstrate that ethnic polarization 
negatively affects economic development. In addition, cultural diversity can generate a 
conflict of preferences among cultural groups, which in turn can lead to less spending on the 
common good. Alesina et al. (1999) showed that ethnically heterogeneous societies spend less 
on productive public goods such as education and infrastructure (see also Alesina et al. 
2016b). Moreover, La Porta et al. (1999) confirm that ethnolinguistically diverse countries are 
correlated with inferior public goods provision, while Esteban et al. (2012) found that ethnic 
polarization and fractionalization are positively associated with conflict over public and 
private goods, respectively. In extreme cases cultural diversity can even trigger violent 
conflicts (e.g., civil wars) that have profound negative consequences for societies (Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).  
Finally, cultural heterogeneity within a society is sometimes offered as an explanation 
for inefficient government and lower-quality institutions. Mauro (1995) suggests that 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is negatively correlated with institutional efficiency. La Porta 
et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) reported similar findings, arguing that cultural diversity 
can cause poor government performance. When the specific role played by institutions was 
taken into account in empirical studies, however, it noticeably influenced the results. For 
instance, according to Collier (2000), ethnic diversity is extremely detrimental to economic 
growth in cases of dictatorship but not in democracies. Likewise, previous research has found 
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that cultural heterogeneity does not damage economic growth, or only to a limited extent, in 
cases where good institutions exist or the quality of government is controlled for (Alesina et 
al., 2003; Easterly, 2001). 
Consequently, the first issue of this study will be to examine whether the economic 
outcomes of cultural diversity in European regions are positive or negative. Additionally, in 
an attempt to partly reconcile the contradictory findings of the literature, we will explore 
whether the effect of cultural diversity on regional economic performance is determined by 
the levels of generalized social trust or trust individuals have in institutions. 
2.2.3 The role of generalized trust 
 
Generalized social trust can refer to trust in complete strangers or in fellow citizens outside 
one’s social network. The level of trust that people show in other people with whom they are 
not familiar can moderate the relationship between cultural diversity and economic 
performance in a society. Distinguished scholars have emphasized the importance of trust in 
society, designating it one of the main components of social capital that facilitates coordinated 
action (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). Indeed, La Porta et al. (1997) have 
empirically supported this assertion by finding that trust promotes cooperative behaviour in 
large organizations.  
At the societal level, generalized trust may encourage cooperation among different 
actors by reducing the costs of economic interactions. According to Levi (1998), the higher 
the level of trust between potential partners, the lower the need for contracts and written 
commitments and the lower the cost of investment in information gathering and monitoring. 
In addition, social trust may spur people on to become involved in their local communities. 
The presence of interpersonal trust can prompt civic engagement on the part of individuals 
and their participation in social activities (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Uslaner, 2002). Therefore, 
generalized social trust can influence life in heterogeneous societies by facilitating the 
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interaction between people coming from culturally different backgrounds. Building on the 
theory of groups, we argue that generalized trust might be a necessary precondition to reaping 
the benefits of cultural diversity. If people in a society trust one another, then the skill 
complementarities and knowledge spillovers between cultural groups can materialize more 
easily, resulting in higher levels of creativity and productivity (Lazear, 1999; Glaesar et al., 
1992; Feldman and Audretsch, 1999). In addition, when people have high levels of 
generalized social trust, it can alleviate the communication and cooperation problems deriving 
from cultural diversity, reducing the negative effects on economic performance. 
Consequently, we propose that the effects of cultural diversity on regional economic 
performance will be positively moderated by the level of generalized social trust,2 arriving at 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Generalized social trust positively moderates the relationship between cultural 
diversity and regional economic performance. More specifically, the benefits of cultural 
diversity will become apparent in regions where generalized social trust is high. 
2.2.4 The role of institutional trust 
 
Another type of trust that seems to be vitally important and may affect the relationship 
between cultural diversity and economic performance is institutional trust. The term 
‘institutional trust’ refers to the trust people have in political and social institutions, such as 
their country’s parliament, the legal system or the police. On one hand, individuals’ trust in 
institutions is related to generalized social trust, in the sense that both involve putting trust in 
strangers. Previous research reveals that generalized social trust and trust in political 
institutions are positively correlated at the aggregate level of societies (Newton and Norris, 
2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Newton and Zmerli, 2011). Indeed, our correlation matrix 
                                                             
2 Additionally, we examined the mediating role of generalized trust in this relationship. However, our results did 
not show any significant correlation between cultural diversity and the level of trust in a region.  
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reveals a strong positive correlation of 0.82 between generalized social trust and institutional 
trust.  
On the other hand, trust in institutions differs from generalized social trust in that the 
latter is associated with individual traits, social and demographic characteristics and first-hand 
experiences, while the former is more a reflection of the institutions’ trustworthiness. The 
level of institutional trust in a society is therefore less determined by personal characteristics 
at the individual level than by the quality and performance of the institutions themselves 
(Newton, 1999; Newton and Norris, 2000). Consequently, although generalized social trust 
and institutional trust seem to be highly correlated, their impact on the relationship we are 
examining might be different. 
The question, then, is how institutional trust might moderate the effect of cultural 
diversity on economic performance. Levi (1998) argues that in many cases interpersonal trust 
is based on individuals’ trust in institutions that protect the trustee. Thus, trustworthy 
institutions can encourage social trust, which in turn leads to more cooperative societies and 
productive economies (Fukuyama, 1995; Levi, 1998; Levi and Stocker, 2000). In addition, 
similarly to social trust, trust in institutions can promote individuals’ civic and political 
engagement. Some scholars claim that when people show trust in political institutions, they 
are more likely to become involved in voting and other political activities (Levi and Stocker, 
2000). Finally, trust in institutions that enforce the law may have significant implications for 
citizen compliance with regulations. Institutional trust can not only decrease the incentives for 
corruption, but also enhance cooperation and people’s willingness to obey the rules that foster 
economic growth (Greif, 1993; Levi and Sherman, 1997; Tyler, 1998).  
Therefore, we argue that trust in institutions might be a prerequisite for expanding 
interaction and enhancing cooperation among strangers or individuals who lack much 
information by raising the likelihood of trust in others, facilitating civic and political 
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engagement and reinforcing people’s compliance with the rules. Consequently, we propose 
that the effects of cultural diversity on regional economic performance will be positively 
moderated by the level of trust that individuals show in institutions. Thus, we hypothesize 
that: 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional trust will positively moderate the relationship between cultural 
diversity and regional economic performance. More specifically, the benefits of cultural 
diversity will become apparent in regions where institutional trust is high. 
The research model of our study is schematically represented in the following figure. 







Note: The figure presents the impact of cultural diversity on regional economic performance. The relationship 
between cultural diversity and economic performance is moderated by both the level of generalized social trust 
and individuals’ trust in institutions. 
2.3 Methodology 
 
2.3.1 Model specification 
 
The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between cultural 









and individuals’ trust in institutions as moderators in this relationship. Thus, the following 
linear3 regression model is estimated: 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑰𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑻𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑰𝑽𝒊𝒕 × 𝑻𝑹𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜸𝒋𝑿𝒋𝒊𝒕
𝑴
𝒋=𝟏 + 𝝁𝒕 + 𝝁𝒓 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕,  (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes regional economic performance, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of cultural diversity 
and 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 measures the level of social and institutional trust, respectively, in region i at time t. 
Moreover, 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 is a set of control variables at the regional level, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term of 
Equation (1), which captures all other determinants of regional economic performance. In 
addition, this model accounts for time-specific effects that affected all regions equally during 
the years of analysis (e.g., the global economic crisis) by estimating time fixed effects, 𝜇𝑡. 
Finally, we also include region fixed effects, 𝜇𝑟, to control for unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity at the regional level, such as formal institutional structures. 
2.3.2 Variables and data description 
 
The level of analysis used in this study is the NUTS-1 regional level.4 The advantage of 
NUTS-1 over a lower regional level is that it controls for strong spatial interdependencies that 
exist between regions. We do, however, use information at the NUTS-2 regional level in 
cases when the NUTS-1 level corresponds to an entire country, as with Finland, Norway and 
Portugal, or when the NUTS-1 level is geographically too large to be of use, as in the case of 
Sweden. Taking into consideration the availability of data on the dependent and main 
independent variables, our dataset eventually covered the period from 2004 to 2012, with 
two-year gaps. We exploited data for this time span on 74 regions in 12 European countries. 
                                                             
3 An alternative specification that included a quadratic term for diversity was used to check the non-linear effect 
of cultural diversity on regional performance. However, the effect turned out to be statistically insignificant, and 
it was hence excluded from the model. 
4 Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) of the EU classifies countries into regions according to 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. NUTS is divided into three hierarchical levels, with the NUTS-
3 level representing a more detailed classification of regions and NUTS-1 a broader one. 
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Table 2.1 provides information about the countries and regions observed in this study. Here 
follows an analytical description of each variable included in our model. 
Table 2.1 Regions Observed 









































































Notes: The NUTS-2 level is used in the cases of Finland, Norway and Portugal where the NUTS-1 level 
corresponds to the whole country and data at the NUTS-2 level are available. The NUTS-2 level is also 
used in the case of Sweden where the NUTS-1 level is geographically too large to be of use. For the 
Netherlands data are available only at the country level (NUTS-0). The two autonomous regions of 
Portugal, the Azores and Madeira, are excluded. 
 
- Regional economic performance 
The current economic performance of each region is measured by the regional Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. GDP per capita is one of the most significant indicators 
of economic strength and prosperity in any region. The data were supplied by the European 
Regional Database of Cambridge Econometrics. This dataset updates and adjusts regional 
economic accounts data provided by Eurostat and various other sources. Regional GDP per 
capita data are measured in purchasing power parities and expressed as a per cent of the EU-
25 average.  
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- Cultural diversity 
We used data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) elaborated by Eurostat to measure the 
cultural diversity of European regions at the NUTS-1 level.5 The LFS is a large household 
survey about labour market features conducted for all the member states of the European 
Union (EU). It has been conducted since 1983, with the sample size increasing as countries 
acceded to the EU. The LFS data provide quarterly information about labour participation, as 
well as other individual and demographic characteristics. Moreover, the survey includes not 
only the active labour force, but all people age 15 and older residing in private households. 
For most of the EU-28 regions, LFS provides information on the nationality and 
country of birth of each respondent from 2004 onwards. Following Dohse and Gold (2014), 
we created seven broad groups of origin,6 first according to individuals’ nationality and then 
according to their country of birth as an additional robustness analysis.7 However, the 
demographic information received from the household survey does not represent the entire 
region in every case. The LFS thus provides an individual weighting factor for each 
interviewee to make the survey representative of the total regional population. Taking into 
account the weighting factors, then, cultural diversity was calculated as described below. 
The most frequently used index in the literature to measure cultural diversity is the 
index of fractionalization. The fractionalization variable is defined as one minus the 
Herfindahl index of group shares, and therefore, cultural diversity, 𝐷𝐼𝑉, is calculated as: 





                                                             
5 Other empirical studies that have used LFS data include Brunow and Brenzel (2011) and Dohse and Gold 
(2013, 2014). 
6 EU-28, Other Europe, Northern Africa and Middle East, Other Africa, Asia, Australia and Northern America, 
Latin America. 
7 Because LFS does not provide information about individuals’ country of birth for the German regions, we 
estimate an alternative diversity specification based on country of birth as an additional robustness analysis.  
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where 𝜋𝑖𝑗is the proportion of group j (j=1…N) over the total population. In our case, the 
number of groups is equal to eight, which is the sum of the group of natives and the seven 
broad groups of foreigners. The fractionalization index is interpreted as the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals in a region will belong to different cultural groups with 
respect to their nationality. 
In addition, following Alesina et al. (2016a), we decompose our cultural diversity 
variable 𝐷𝐼𝑉 into a component that measures the share of foreigners over total population 
(𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒) and a component which captures the diversity among foreigners (𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑣). Foreigners’ 
diversity (𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑣) is computed using the fractionalization index again, but this time the 
calculation is restricted over the seven broad groups of foreigners mentioned above. Thus, the 
cultural diversity variable 𝐷𝐼𝑉 can be expressed as:8 
𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 2 ∗ 𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 ∗ (1 − 𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒) + (𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)2 ∗ 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑣. 
This decomposition allows us to distinguish between the size of the foreign population in each 
region, irrespective of the foreigners’ cultural backgrounds, and the diversity arising from the 
variety and the relative size of foreign groups. 
- Generalized social trust 
To measure the level of generalized social trust in regions of Europe, we used data provided 
by the European Social Survey (ESS). The purpose of the survey is to assess the individual 
beliefs and attitudes, as well as the social behavioural patterns and demographic 
characteristics, of citizens all over Europe. The ESS is a cross-national survey that has been 
carried out every two years since 2002 in face-to-face interviews across European countries. 
A minimum number of 1500 interviews are conducted for each country, or 800 interviews in 
                                                             
8 See Alesina et al. (2016a) for a more analytical explanation of the algebra behind this mathematical expression. 
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countries where the population is under 2 million, after discounting for design effects.9 The 
survey sample consists of individuals age 15 years and older living in private households. 
However, each round of surveys does not always cover every country.  
The question used in the ESS to measure the level of generalized social trust in the 
European regions we were interested in is: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?’ Answers are 
rated on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 denotes that ‘you can't be too careful’ and 10 means 
that ‘most people can be trusted’. The indicator of regional generalized trust used in our 
model is the weighted average of responses for each region. The phrasing of the survey 
question is general enough that it allows respondents to express their attitude towards people 
outside their immediate network (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). The 
question is therefore a reasonable proxy for capturing the level of generalized social trust in 
European regions. However, as Knack and Keefer (1997) mention, individuals in low-trust 
societies may have more interpersonal transactions with familiar people, such as family and 
friends, than with strangers, compared to inhabitants of high-trust communities. According to 
the authors, if the interviewees interpret the question in such a way as to answer only about 
the people with whom they transact, then it will decrease variation in the measure of 
generalized social trust. 
- Institutional trust 
As we did for generalized social trust, we used data provided by the European Social Survey 
(ESS) to measure the regional trust in institutions. The variable of institutional trust is a 
composite indicator that is calculated as the average of three separate variables that measure 
the level of people’s trust in a country’s parliament, legal system and police force, 
respectively. More specifically, the questions used in the ESS for this are: ‘How much do you 
                                                             
9 More information about the sampling methods and weighting techniques of the survey can be found on the 
ESS’s website, www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
33 
 
personally trust your country’s parliament/legal system/police force?’ The variables range in 
value from 0 to 10, where 0 denotes that people do not trust their institutions at all, while 10 
means that they have complete trust in them. 
- Control variables 
Apart from the main independent variables presented above, we also used a set of control 
variables at the regional level in our empirical analysis. More explicitly, following the prior 
literature (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Bellini et al., 2013; Dohse and Gold, 2014), we included 
the population density of a region as a demographic control variable. In addition, share of 
active population was used to capture the effect of employment structure. Moreover, to 
account for differences in human capital that may affect regional income, we included the 
share of highly educated population in each region. Finally, other employment structure and 
innovation variables – such as the number of total hours worked per employee, share of 
employment in the industrial sector and number of patent applications per million inhabitants 
were used as additional controls in a robustness analysis. Information about the control 
variables was collected by the European Regional Database of Cambridge Econometrics and 
Regional Statistics Database of Eurostat. Table 2.2 provides brief descriptions of the variables 












Table 2.2 Descriptions of Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variable   
GDP per capita Regional Annual Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita in €2005 
constant price in thousands 
European Regional Database 
of Cambridge Econometrics 
 
 
Explanatory variables   
Share of Foreigners Share of foreign population over total 
population based on individuals’ 
nationality 
EU Labour Force Survey, 
Eurostat; Own calculations 
 
Foreigners Diversity Fractionalization index of foreigners’ 
population group shares based on 
individuals’ nationality 
EU Labour Force Survey, 
Eurostat; Own calculations 
 
Cultural Diversity Fractionalization index of overall 
population group shares based on 
individuals’ nationality 
EU Labour Force Survey, 









Weighted average regional score on the 
survey question ‘Most people can be 
trusted or you can't be too careful’ 
ranging from 0 to 10 
 
Average of three separate regional 
scores on the survey questions ‘How 
much do you personally trust your 
country’s parliament/legal 
system/police force?’ ranging from 0 to 
10 









Population Density (log) Number of people living per square 
kilometre in a region 
 
European Regional Database 





Share of both employed and 
unemployed, but not economically 
inactive, people as a percentage of the 
total regional population 
European Regional Database 
of Cambridge Econometrics 
Qualification controls   
Tertiary Education Share of economically active population 
with tertiary education 
Regional Statistics Database 
of Eurostat 
Additional controls   
Hours Worked Number of total hours worked per 
employee in all sectors in thousands 
European Regional Database 
of Cambridge Econometrics 
 
Industry Share Share of employment per industry 
sector 
European Regional Database 
of Cambridge Econometrics 
 
Patent Applications Number of patent applications per 
million inhabitants with 2-year lag 






2.4.1 Fixed effects estimates  
 
Table 2.3 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables under study. Table 
2.4 presents the fixed effects estimates of the effects of generalized trust, institutional trust 
and cultural diversity on regional GDP per capita, as well as the moderating effects of 
generalized and institutional trust. We estimated all models with robust standard errors 
clustered at the regional level to account for possible heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
of error terms. Model 1, including control variables only, indicates that regional economic 
performance is negatively affected by population density. The estimated effects of the active 
population and the share of highly educated population on regional GDP per capita appear to 
be insignificant. In Models 2-5, the variables of generalized trust, institutional trust, cultural 
diversity and share of foreigners, along with foreigners’ diversity, are respectively added into 
the initial model. The coefficient for generalized trust is insignificant, while institutional trust 
has a positive and statistically significant association with regional income. More specifically, 
a one standard deviation higher institutional trust translates into a 469.2 euro increase in 
annual GDP per capita. In Model 4 the variable of cultural diversity does not appear to be 
statistically significant, but when it is replaced in Model 5 by the share of foreigners and 
diversity among the foreign population, the latter seems to have a positive effect on regional 
performance. The coefficients suggest that a one standard deviation increase in foreigners’ 
diversity causes regional GDP per capita to rise by 181.6 euros. When we estimate the effects 
of both types of trust jointly with cultural diversity in Models 6 and 7, as well as with share of 
foreigners and foreigners’ diversity in Models 8 and 9, the size and significance of the 
estimated coefficients remain quite similar. 
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Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) GDP per capita 29.80 12.05 5.66 77.57 1.00 
           
(2) Share of Foreigners 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.30 0.45 1.00 
          
(3) Foreigners Diversity 0.66 0.10 0.20 0.80 0.16 0.01 1.00 
         
(4) Cultural Diversity 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.47 0.45 0.99 0.03 1.00 
        
(5) Generalized Trust 5.18 0.92 2.82 6.95 0.59 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 1.00 
       
(6) Institutional Trust 5.39 0.85 1.61 7.20 0.64 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.82 1.00 
      
(7) Population Density -2.02 1.55 -5.71 1.97 0.08 0.58 0.02 0.58 -0.43 -0.25 1.00 
     
(8) Active Population 0.51 0.04 0.37 0.60 0.39 0.11 0.34 0.13 0.28 0.33 0.03 1.00 
    
(9) Tertiary Education 28.56 7.39 9.00 52.70 0.66 0.38 0.11 0.38 0.54 0.51 0.13 0.27 1.00 
   
(10) Hours Worked 1.58 0.18 0.95 2.01 -0.42 -0.11 -0.05 -0.13 -0.26 -0.50 0.04 -0.23 -0.21 1.00 
  
(11) Industry Share 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.32 -0.35 -0.39 -0.22 -0.39 -0.04 -0.01 -0.23 -0.11 -0.46 0.05 1.00 
 




Table 2.4 Fixed Effects Estimates 
Dependent Variable:  
GDP per capita 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
          
Population Density -21.392*** -21.392*** -21.217*** -21.744*** -21.236*** -21.745*** -21.452*** -21.238*** -20.850*** 
 (4.986) (4.991) (5.001) (5.621) (5.697) (5.610) (5.599) (5.682) (5.636) 
Active Population 10.981 10.982 12.452 11.003 11.751 11.005 12.464 11.757 13.393 
 (9.518) (9.511) (9.608) (9.527) (9.549) (9.518) (9.610) (9.537) (9.669) 
Tertiary Education 0.023 0.023 0.020 0.025 0.033 0.025 0.021 0.033 0.031 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.042) (0.046) (0.043) 
Generalized Trust  -0.001    -0.002  -0.007  
  (0.164)    (0.161)  (0.163)  
Institutional Trust   0.552***    0.551***  0.577*** 
   (0.156)    (0.156)  (0.155) 
Cultural Diversity    0.932  0.934 0.623   
    (3.312)  (3.280) (3.155)   
Share of Foreigners     2.223   2.232 1.804 
     (6.075)   (5.992) (5.863) 
Foreigners Diversity     1.816**   1.816** 2.086** 
     (0.843)   (0.843) (0.860) 
Constant -20.902 -20.898 -24.122 -21.752 -22.524 -21.742 -24.685 -22.502 -25.704 
 (12.239) (12.532) (12.441) (13.528) (13.746) (13.803) (13.547) (14.004) (13.747) 
Number of Regions 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Observations 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 
R-squared 0.473 0.473 0.498 0.473 0.480 0.473 0.498 0.480 0.508 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models include region and year fixed effects.
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Table 2.5 summarizes the fixed effects estimates of our interaction effects. The first 
two models of the table test for the moderating impact of generalized and institutional trust, 
respectively, on the cultural diversity effects. However, the estimated coefficients for the 
interaction terms are found to be statistically insignificant. In Models 3 and 4, we examine the 
moderating role of generalized and institutional trust on the share of foreigners and 
foreigners’ diversity effects. The inclusion of the interaction terms adds explanatory power to 
previous models. The results of Model 3 show that the interaction effect of generalized trust 
and share of foreigners seems to be insignificant. However, the interaction between 
generalized trust and foreigners’ diversity is found to be positive and strongly statistically 
significant, at the 1 per cent level, suggesting therefore that our first hypothesis is partly 
confirmed.  
More explicitly, our results indicate that at low levels of generalized social trust (one 
standard deviation below the mean), increasing foreigners’ diversity from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean does not seem to 
significantly affect income. Nevertheless, at high levels of generalized social trust (one 
standard deviation above the mean), increasing foreigners diversity from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with an 
increase in annual income per capita of nearly 2.9 per cent, or in other words 842 euros.  
Similar to this are our findings in Model 4 about trust in institutions, which suggest 
that our second hypothesis is also partly supported. In particular, we found that at low levels 
of institutional trust (one standard deviation below the mean), increasing foreigners’ diversity 
from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean does 
not have a significant impact on income. At high levels of institutional trust (one standard 
deviation above the mean), however, increasing foreigners diversity from one standard 
39 
 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean increases annual income 
per capita by almost 2.7 per cent, or 805 euros. 
Finally, in Model 5 both types of trust interactions are considered simultaneously in 
the same regression. Our results show that the effect size of the institutional trust and 
foreigners’ diversity interaction drops substantially and loses its significance when the 
corresponding interaction term of generalized trust is also introduced into the model. This 
result indicates that the impact of institutional trust works through the mechanism of 
generalized trust, which confirms what we suggested in Section 2.4, where we argue that 
individuals’ trust in institutions might foster social trust in others. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present the predictive margins with 95% confidence interval for 
foreigners’ diversity between low and high generalized social trust and institutional trust, 
respectively. The graphs illustrate that the positive effect of foreigners’ diversity on economic 
performance is stronger in regions with higher trust in other people and higher trust in 




Table 2.5 Interaction Effects Estimates 
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
      
Population Density -22.030*** -21.529*** -20.401*** -20.011*** 19.676*** 
 (5.678) (5.575) (5.569) (5.500) (5.592) 
Active Population 11.105 12.612 13.078 15.825* 15.973* 
 (9.526) (9.624) (9.385) (9.324) (9.250) 
Tertiary Education 0.024 0.019 0.028 0.021 0.028 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) 
Generalized Trust -0.100  -1.719***  -1.913*** 
 (0.255)  (0.607)  (0.936) 
Institutional Trust  0.460**  -0.952** 0.347 
  (0.230)  (0.374) (0.675) 
Cultural Diversity -2.726 -3.160    
 (7.817) (10.251)    
Share of Foreigners   -6.035 -5.665 -8.311 
   (13.457) (16.904) (17.044) 
Foreigners Diversity   -10.555*** -9.875*** -12.065*** 
   (3.892) (3.448) (3.967) 
Cultural Diversity X Generalized Trust 0.773     
 (1.814)     
Cultural Diversity X Institutional Trust  0.737    
  (1.832)    
Share of Foreigners X Generalized Trust   1.730  0.417 
   (3.150)  (3.565) 
Foreigners Diversity X Generalized Trust   2.444***  2.368* 
   (0.850)  (1.302) 
Share of Foreigners X Institutional Trust    1.433 1.623 
    (3.113) (3.593) 
Foreigners Diversity X Institutional Trust    2.253*** 0.431 
    (0.659) (1.079) 
Constant -21.880 -24.401 -12.674 -16.876 -13.772 
 (13.874) (13.840) (13.470) (13.286) (13.460) 
Number of Regions 74 74 74 74 74 
Observations 370 370 370 370 370 
R-squared 0.473 0.498 0.496 0.522 0.534 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models include 




Figure 2.2 Margins Plot of Generalized Trust and Diversity among Foreigners 
 





2.4.2 Robustness checks 
 
To test the robustness of our empirical findings, we re-ran the previous regressions with 
additional control variables, different subsamples and an alternative diversity specification. 
Table 2.6 reports all the robustness checks that were performed. The first two columns of the 
table present the results according to specifications of Models 3 and 4 of Table 2.5, using the 
total number of hours worked per employee, share of employment in the industrial sector and 
number of patent applications per million inhabitants, with a two-year lag, as extra control 
variables. Our results appear to be robust against the inclusion of additional controls. 
Furthermore, the next two columns of the table exclude the outliers (Brussels, Inner London 
and Oslo), while the following four exclude the richest 10 per cent and the 10 per cent of 
regions with the highest share of foreigners of our sample, respectively. Finally, in the last 
two columns of the table, we recalculate the share of foreigners and foreigners’ diversity, 
based this time on individuals’ country of birth. Table 2.6 shows that our results hold for the 
various subsamples, when we include additional control variables and when we specify 





Table 2.6 Robustness to Additional Controls, Different Subsamples and an Alternative Diversity Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable:  
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Foreigners 10% 























































































































        




        
 


























Number of Regions 74 74 71 71 66 66 66 66 58 58 
Observations 370 370 355 355 330 330 330 330 290 290 
R-squared 0.570 0.580 0.510 0.555 0.541 0.565 0.487 0.513 0.423 0.442 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models include the control variables presented in previous tables. In Models 9 and 10 the 
regions of Germany have been excluded since information about individuals’ country of birth was not available. 
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2.4.3 Endogeneity and the instrumental variable 
 
Although we aim to investigate the relationship between cultural diversity and economic 
performance, we cannot be sure of establishing a causal link from the former to the latter. Our 
analysis might suffer from reverse causality, given that richer regions attract a larger flow of 
immigrants than other regions and are therefore more culturally diverse. We attempt to tackle 
this endogeneity issue by applying an instrumental variable (IV) estimation approach. Our 
potentially endogenous share of foreigners and foreigners’ diversity measures need to be 
replaced with proxies correlated with the observed variable but not otherwise correlated with 
regional income. The existing literature proposes an instrument that satisfies the properties 
mentioned above, based on the ‘shift-share’ methodology first applied by Card (2001) and 
widely used since in relevant studies (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Sparber, 2010; Bellini et al., 
2013; Suedekum et al., 2014). The main idea behind this method is that new entrant 
immigrants tend to settle close to where other immigrants from their native country already 
live. However, due to a lack of information on the historical distribution of immigrants by 
group of origin we were only able to build such an instrument for the total share of foreigners, 
not for the foreigners’ diversity variable. Nevertheless, it would be reasonable to assume here 
that any positive economic shock in a region should attract foreigners (of the seven broad 
groups of countries) to the same degree10 and thus the foreigners’ diversity variable could be 
considered as exogenous. 11 
To compute the predicted share of foreigners in a region following the ‘shift-share’ 
methodology we use the region’s share of foreigners in 1998 and attribute the average growth 
rate of the share of foreigners in the country to which the region belongs.12 For example, to 
                                                             
10 Similarly, in their study Ottaviano and Peri (2006) argue that: “...productivity shocks which attract workers 
into a city should attract the US-born and the foreign-born by the same degree” [pages 29-30]. 
11 As an additional robustness check of endogeneity, an alternative approach follows in which diversity among 
foreigners is also considered as endogenous. 





construct the predicted share of foreigners in region 𝑖 of country 𝑗 in 2008, we first calculate 






Then, we continue by calculating the attributed share of foreigners in region 𝑖 in 2008 as: 
(𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)̂ 2008 = (𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)1998  [1 + (𝑔𝑗)1998−2008
] 
An analogous procedure is applied to compute the predicted share of foreigners in each region 
for each year. Since our instrument is built using the historical distribution of immigrants, we 
can assume that it is exogenous to country-specific economic shocks of that period. The first 
two columns of Table 2.7 report the first and second stage estimates of the IV regressions. 
The first-stage regression results present large Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistics indicating 
that our instrument is a strong predictor of the actual share of foreigners. Finally, our IV 
regression results show that the effect of foreigners’ diversity on regional GDP per capita 
remains positive and strongly statistically significant and is moderated by both the level of 
generalized trust and individuals’ trust in institutions. 
Additionally, we applied a novel method first proposed by Lewbel (2012) as an 
alternative robustness check for endogeneity.13 In his study Lewbel presents a new technique 
for obtaining identification in models with endogenous or mismeasured regressors.  The 
method works by exploiting model heteroscedasticity to construct instruments as simple 
functions of the available regressors. In Lewbel’s approach, identification is achieved by 
having a vector of variables that are uncorrelated with the covariance of heteroskedastic 
errors. Considering the errors to be heteroskedastic and 𝑋 a vector of observed exogenous 
                                                             
13 For a more detailed explanation of this method, see Lewbel (2012), and for its implementation in Stata 




regressors, each endogenous variable is regressed on the 𝑋 vector. Then the generated 
instruments can be constructed as follows: 
𝑍 = (𝑋 − ?̅?) ∙ 𝜖 
where ?̅? is the mean of 𝑋 and 𝜖 is the vector of residuals from the first-stage regression of 
each endogenous variables on all exogenous regressors. 
Models 3-6 of Table 2.7 present the estimates of the IV regressions based on Lewbel’s 
method. For the ease of comparison with the ‘shift-share’ methodology presented earlier, in 
Models 3 and 4 foreigners’ diversity is considered as an exogenous variable, while in the last 
two models of the table it is treated as endogenous. The results of Models 3 and 4 show that 
the magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficients of both interaction terms remain 
almost unaffected. Furthermore, testing for the significance of the endogenous regressors in 
the structural equation, the statistic of Anderson-Rubin Wald test, which is robust to the 
presence of weak instruments, suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis that  the 
coefficients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero. In addition, using the 
Sargan-Hansen test, we failed to reject the null hypothesis (p>0.05) for the validity of the 
over-identifying restrictions for both of our models. Finally, the Davidson-MacKinnon test of 
exogeneity failed to reject the null hypothesis, thus supporting the consistency of our 
estimates. The results of Models 5 and 6, where foreigners’ diversity is considered as an 
endogenous variable, are similar. While we cannot establish a full validity of generated 





Table 2.7 Instrumental Variable Regressions 
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Second Stage       
Population Density -21.435*** -22.124*** -17.968*** -18.511*** -19.549*** -17.756*** 
 (7.417) (7.234) (6.651) (6.396) (6.350) (6.540) 
Active Population 18.379** 22.139** 12.973 15.520* 13.667 15.741* 
 (9.036) (9.040) (9.015) (9.047) (9.125) (8.883) 
Tertiary Education 0.029 0.027 0.016 0.016 0.021 0.012 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) 
Generalized Trust -1.306*  -1.784***  -2.207**  
 (0.685)  (0.655)  (0.976)  
Institutional Trust  -0.805  -0.864**  -0.979 
  (0.606)  (0.434)  (0.693) 
Share of Foreigners -5.722 -8.440 -22.369 -3.430 -38.087 -14.615 
 (18.206) (24.947) (24.733) (26.762) (26.068) (29.467) 
Foreigners' Diversity -8.991** -9.094** -10.685*** -10.240*** -11.155* -10.261** 
 (4.065) (4.387) (3.954) (3.510) (5.706) (4.102) 
Share of Foreigners X Generalized Trust -0.081  2.798  6.960  
 (3.868)  (5.361)  (5.443)  
Foreigners' Diversity X Generalized Trust 2.105**  2.452***  2.650**  
 (0.886)  (0.856)  (1.258)  
Share of Foreigners X Institutional Trust  0.932  -0.171  1.347 
  (3.987)  (4.910)  (5.383) 
Foreigners' Diversity X Institutional Trust  2.098**  2.288***  2.313*** 
  (0.817)  (0.662)  (0.734) 
Observations 355 355 370 370 370 370 
Number of Regions 71 71 74 74 74 74 
R-squared 0.517 0.549 0.488 0.519 0.485 0.517 
First Stage       
Predicted Share of Foreigners 0.765*** 0.795***     
 (0.285 ) (0.259)     
Predicted Share of Foreigners X Generalized Trust 0.570***      
 (0.151)      
Predicted Share of Foreigners X Institutional Trust  0.517***     
  (0.189)     
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 10.21 11.10     
Anderson-Rubin Wald statistic   55.68 170.99 156.47 238.33 
Sargan-Hansen statistic   18.58 24.56 33.43 35.50 
Davidson-MacKinnon statistic   1.26 0.41 1.73 0.57 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In Models 1 and 2 the regions of Hungary 






2.5 Discussion and conclusions 
 
The current study empirically examines the impact of cultural diversity on economic 
performance in 74 regions of 12 European countries. In an effort to help explain the mixed 
findings in previous research, we start by investigating the moderating role of generalized 
trust in this relationship. According to past research, the level of trust people have in others is 
considered one of the main components of social capital, facilitating coordinated action and 
encouraging cooperative behaviour. Building on group theory, we argue that generalized 
social trust might be a necessary precondition to reaping the benefits of cultural diversity. 
Thus, we propose that the effect of cultural diversity on regional economic performance will 
be positively moderated by the level of generalized trust in a society.  
Additionally, we examine the moderating role of individuals’ trust in institutions on 
this relationship. Based on the existing literature, we argue that trust in institutions might be a 
prerequisite to enlarging interactions and enhancing cooperation among strangers by 
encouraging trust in other people, facilitating civic and political engagement on the part of 
individuals and reinforcing people’s compliance with the rules. Finally, we hypothesize that 
cultural diversity has an impact on regional income, which is positively moderated by the 
level of institutional trust. 
Our empirical results reveal a positive relationship between foreigners’ diversity and 
regional economic performance in line with prior research (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Alesina 
et al., 2016a). More specifically, when comparing our findings to those of a previous study 
conducted in European regions by Bellini et al. (2013), we can confirm that diversity among 
foreigners has a positive and strongly significant effect on regional GDP per capita. However, 
contrary to past studies at the European regional level (Bellini et al., 2013; Brunow and 
Brenzel, 2011; Dohse and Gold, 2014), we did not find strong evidence that the share of 




in all those studies was the same and we extracted data from the same sources as Brunow and 
Brenzel (2011) and Dohse and Gold (2014), the fact that our data set and level of analysis 
differed from those other studies could explain the different findings. 
In summation, we found that it is not the size but the wider variety of the foreign 
population that is positively associated with regional income. These findings are consistent 
with the argument we presented in Section 2 that cultural diversity could be beneficial to 
economic performance: first, through skill complementarities developed among different 
individuals; second, because of alternative heuristics that people coming from different 
backgrounds follow to address complicated problems; and finally, due to the creation of new 
ideas and knowledge spillovers generated from the interaction of culturally diverse groups.  
Some may find it surprising, though, that neither the relative size of the foreign 
population nor the overall cultural diversity in a region matters, only the diversity among 
foreigners. One plausible explanation for this could be related more to the structure and 
composition of the regional population and less to synergies and complementarities among 
the various groups of people in a region. For instance, when the majority of foreigners in a 
region have the same ethnic background, they are more likely to flock together and build their 
own local communities. Sometimes, the cultural distance between native populations and 
foreigners causes varying degrees of segregation; in more extreme cases, religious or other 
ideological differences that are particularly salient might spur polarization between groups. 
By contrast, when foreigners come from a wide variety of origins, they are much less likely to 
cluster and have stronger incentives to integrate into the local society. At the same time, the 
perceived threat from out-of-group foreigners might be weaker for the native population since 
the different ethnic groups are all small in size, which also increases opportunities for contact 




The facets mentioned above facilitate the assimilation of foreigners into host regions 
and could explain why it is the greater diversity in foreign populations and not their relative 
size that leads to higher regional economic performance. Some clear implications emerge 
from these findings. First, it seems necessary that those responsible for policy making in 
European regions promote cultural pluralism and encourage entry of a mixture of foreigners 
from different ethnic backgrounds. This could be accomplished by, for instance, providing 
incentives to different groups of foreigners to relocate and then interspersing them more 
smoothly throughout their host societies, rather than allowing the concentration of a few large 
minorities isolated in social ghettos. In addition, European governments could adopt a more 
efficient, proactive policy of considering the type of immigrants that integrate into each 
region, with a view to enriching the diversity among the foreign population. Although these 
are plausible interpretations of our findings as related to the structure of regional populations, 
future research may be needed to investigate this further. 
With regard to the interaction effects of our analysis, we found that in regions with 
low levels of generalized social trust, the benefits of foreigners’ diversity were absent, while 
in regions with high levels of generalized social trust, the benefits were significant. Therefore, 
we suggest that the positive effect of foreigners’ diversity on regional economic performance 
is apparent only in regions where the level of generalized social trust is high. Our empirical 
results partly confirm those of Kemeny (2012), which is, to the best of our knowledge, the 
only previous study to examine the moderating role of generalized trust in the relationship 
between cultural diversity and economic performance. Similar to our findings, Kemeny 
(2012) argues that individuals benefit more from the productivity spillovers that arise from 
cultural diversity when they live in cities with higher levels of generalized trust. However, our 
results differ in the sense that generalized trust positively moderates the relationship between 




In addition, we show that individuals’ trust in institutions positively and significantly 
moderates the same relationship. More specifically, our results showed that in regions with 
low levels of institutional trust, the benefits of foreigners’ diversity were insignificant, but in 
regions with high levels of institutional trust, the benefits of foreigners’ diversity were 
apparent. Thus, we argue that foreigners’ diversity has a positive impact on regional 
economic performance only in regions where the individuals’ trust in institutions is high. 
Considering that individuals’ trust in institutions actually reflects the quality and performance 
of those institutions (Newton, 1999; Newton and Norris, 2000), our findings are consistent 
with those of Kemeny and Cooke (2017b), who found that in US cities with high levels of 
inclusive institutions, the benefits of immigrant diversity were positive and significant. 
Consequently, our empirical results indicate that both the level of trust that people 
place in strangers and the trust that individuals have in political and social institutions can 
play an important role in catalysing the potential benefits of foreigners’ diversity. One 
straightforward policy recommendation we can draw from these findings is that culturally 
heterogeneous regions of Europe need to encourage individuals’ trust in other people in order 
to reap the benefits of diversity. Past research provides evidence that a high level of 
generalized trust is associated with less corruption (La Porta, 1997), better education systems 
and less ethnically fragmented societies (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Leigh, 2006). We 
would therefore recommend that decision makers prevent corruption in public organizations, 
invest in education and promote the efficient integration of foreigners into local communities. 
At the same time, policy makers in European regions are advised to encourage people’s trust 
in public institutions by, for instance, improving the general credibility of their country’s 





Of course, our empirical analysis is not without limitations. First, we have assumed 
here that all of the cultural groups we defined are equidistant to one another. Some could 
argue, however, that important dissimilarities exist between certain cultures compared to 
others. Therefore, an interesting extension of this study would be to find a way to account for 
cultural distances between cultural groups and control for the degree of their integration. In 
addition, further research could be conducted to explore how our results might vary across 
different segments of the labour force, especially broken down according to skill level. 
Finally, the fact that our analysis is based on data from 74 European regions suggests that our 
results may not be entirely representative for other geographical areas, which limits the 
generalizability of our findings.  
To conclude, although the present analysis may suffer from certain limitations, the 
research outcomes of this study not only make an important contribution to the empirical 

















Chapter 3  
Immigrants’ Origin and Skill level as Factors in Attitudes toward 







The issue of immigration, and policy responses to it, is driving key political debates in most 
European countries. A growing backlash appears to be manifest on several levels including 
the attitude of individual members of the public, organized political parties or factions, and 
governmental policy. While existing research has tended to examine public attitudes toward 
immigrants with a focus on the individual characteristics of those holding the views (e.g. age, 
gender, education), few studies have considered characteristics of the immigrants themselves 
as a driving factor in attitudes toward immigration. This study examines characteristics of 
immigrants as independent variables, differentiating immigrants’ origin (EU/non-EU) and 
immigrants’ skill level (low/highly-educated). It utilizes data from the European Labour Force 
Survey (EU-LFS) and the European Social Survey (ESS) to evaluate the extent to which 
characteristics of immigrants drive anti-immigrant public sentiment. This investigation finds 
that for immigrants living in a European region, their origin is a significant determinant of 
attitudes toward immigration. In addition, our empirical results do not reveal any significant 
direct effect of immigrants’ skill level on attitudes toward them. Nevertheless, we find some 
moderating effect between the size and the skill level of immigrant population in shaping 







Immigration poses a significant policy-making challenge for advanced industrial countries in 
the 21st Century. Civil wars and conflicts along with economic underdevelopment, instability, 
and political corruption are among the many factors driving ethnic nationals to seek relocation 
in foreign lands. Several factors have made Western Europe among the top destinations for 
immigrants. These include democratic political stability, relative prosperity and higher 
standards of living, comparatively sizable social welfare states, perceived social opportunity, 
and central geographic location relative to many areas that emigrants presently flee. 
Governments across the advanced industrial world, and especially those of Western Europe, 
have confronted rising tides of immigration in recent years amidst a backdrop of increased 
public resentment of immigrants entering their societies. This has made the challenge of 
policy response especially difficult.   
This study examines public attitudes toward immigrants in 78 European regions. Much 
existing research on Western Europe and beyond has tended to investigate the phenomenon of 
immigration by linking attitudes toward immigrants to the individual characteristics of those 
holding particular viewpoints, whether positive or negative (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and 
Sinnott, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Pardos-Prado, 2011). However, this study flips the 
focus by turning attention to the characteristics of immigrants living in a European region. 
Using existing theories regarding how economic conditions, cultural identity frameworks, and 
interaction or contact with immigrants may affect perceptions of and attitudes toward them, 
this paper differentiates itself from much of the past literature by placing weight on the traits 
of the immigrants themselves as highly determinative of attitudes toward immigration. We do 
this in our analysis by controlling for individual traits such as age, gender, or employment 





This study builds on previous empirical research that examines the impact of regional 
factors on European attitudes towards immigrants (Schlueter and Wagner, 2008; Rustenbach, 
2010; Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Bridges and Mateut, 2014; Weber, 2015) and attempts to 
investigate how the characteristics of immigrants drive public sentiment to be more or less 
anti-immigrant.  Utilizing data from the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the 
European Social Survey (ESS) over the period 2004-2012, we evaluate the extent to which 
origin (EU/Non-EU) and skill level (low/high-educated) of immigrants living in a given 
region affect natives’ attitudes toward them. Our work is similar to the study conducted by 
Markaki and Longhi (2013), yet we differentiate ourselves from the authors in several ways, 
primarily by distinguishing non-EU immigrants into six broad groups of origin which is the 
main empirical contribution of this study. 
Our results indicate that the proportion of foreigners in a given region does not appear 
to be a significant factor in shaping attitudes toward immigration. However, when we 
distinguish between different groups of immigrants, we find that immigrants’ origin seems to 
play a key role.  In addition, although we do not find any significant direct effect of 
immigrants’ skill level as measured by level of educational attainment in shaping attitudes 
toward them, our empirical results reveal some evidence that immigrants’ skill level might 
interact with the size of immigrant population to influence the portrayal of immigrants in the 
minds of natives. 
3.2 Factors Shaping the Attitudes of Natives toward Immigrants 
 
Traditionally, it is the person holding the attitude who has been the focus of attempts to 
account for attitudes toward immigrants. The individual factors shaping their attitudes has 
been the subject of study. Much conventional wisdom expects that one’s attitudes are shaped 
primarily by demographic factors such as one’s age or gender, social factors including one’s 




that manifest themselves in cultural protectionism and racial prejudice. Much debate has 
played out over the relative weight of contextual factors in absolute conditions where 
economic versus socio-cultural or socio-political factors are weighed against one another 
(Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and 
Yun 2013; Rydgren 2007). Here crime, economic prosperity, and other social milieu variables 
are tested in relation to attitudes toward immigrants. Some studies have moved away from 
demographics and contextual factors or added to those in order to consider transitory and 
variable beliefs that individuals hold, in other words how certain attitudes held, in turn, affect 
attitudes toward immigrants (Rustenbach 2010; Masso 2009). For instance, trust in 
government and trust in other people can be considered for how they affect attitudes toward 
immigrants. 
Politics has become a key focus in recent decades with perceptions superseding 
individual and contextual conditions as driving factors in shaping negative attitudes. Often 
shaped by politics, perceptual factors tend to include expectations of threat (typically 
extending well beyond actual threat prospects), prejudice and racism, or scapegoating where 
subjects look for someone or something to blame as a target of their generally unrelated anger 
and frustration. Scholars argue that attitudes are shaped instrumentally by political actors 
rather than existing in isolation. Such work examines the role of political actors in structuring 
or manipulating attitudes toward immigrants and some work contends that political parties 
and interest groups have played a large role in shaping public attitudes. Norris (2005) refers to 
the way political parties and interest groups have shaped public discourse and the debate 
surrounding immigration as the supply side factor driving anti-immigrant attitudes. She argues 
that party agency, in framing the immigration issue, has often proven more important 
empirically than the demand side despite the fact that the latter has received greater emphasis 




individual conditions of individuals that motivate them to be anti-immigrant.  Populist radical 
right-wing parties have been defined in the literature by their anti-immigrant framing of 
contemporary political issues with immigrants often the scapegoats for problems such as 
crime, access or quality concerns regarding welfare state provisions (including health care, 
housing and education), high unemployment or other economic malaise, and domestic 
security threats including Islamic terrorism (Williams 2006, 60). The politics surrounding 
attitudes to immigration occupies a significant place in the literature, with particular focus on 
the political parties and other actors that use tactics aimed at shaping public attitudes toward 
immigrants.   
Existing scholarship provides several competing frameworks for understanding the 
way that attitudes toward immigrants are shaped, both directly by individual conditions and 
local context but also indirectly by politics and intermediate ideology or values.    
3.2.1 Competition Theory / Economic determinants 
 
Competition theory suggests that economic conditions drive attitudes toward immigrants as 
natives react to economic changes in various ways (Malchow-Moeller et al. 2008; Huber and 
Oberdabernig 2015; Kazaqi 2015; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Schneider 2008; Strabac and 
Listhaug 2007). A common notion is that economic downturn fuels anti-immigrant sentiment 
(Facchini and Mayda 2008; Goldstein and Peters 2014; Hatton 2016). The view that 
immigrants are a burden on a state’s ability to provide welfare benefits, or that they drain 
welfare states and extract a disproportionate share of limited resources, has been evaluated as 
a driving factor in negative attitudes toward immigrants (Facchini and Mayda 2009). Labour 
market threat has been considered, as some studies evaluate the extent to which natives appear 
to view immigrants as their main competition for scarce jobs (Kunovich 2013). Some work in 
this area has considered the difference that the level of education and skill level of the attitude 




3.2.2 Conflict Theory / Identity and Values determinants 
 
The idea that race and racial prejudice drives some people toward visceral negative attitudes 
toward immigrants has also been evaluated in the literature. This theory tends to reflect a 
clash of cultures logic, whereby individuals recognize in-group and out-group markers 
differentiating people according to race and physical features, religious practices and customs, 
and distinctive traditions or observable cultural practices. It holds that observable difference 
leads to discrimination and often animosity between groups with a preference for their own 
race (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2016; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Pehrson and Green 
2010; Malhotra 2013). Some work in this area has drawn upon Ronald Inglehart’s logic in 
asserting post-industrial society changes (1990) to account for conditions of economic 
prosperity being correlated with increasing levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in many 
instances – a paradox given the logic of economic condition and competition theory 
arguments that suggest the opposite. Such work claims that economic prosperity and security 
can lead to a focus on identity and culture, or to more emphasis on political preferences and 
ideology, in structuring attitudes, especially negative attitudes, toward immigrants (O’Connell 
2005; Pardos-Prado 2011). This logic is used, for instance, to account for advanced industrial 
societies currently appearing to be prone to the rise of radical-right wing parties and 
increasing anti-immigrant sentiment. 
3.2.3 Contact Theory / Interaction determinants 
 
Contact theory holds that direct experience and interaction between the national population 
and the immigrants that it hosts tends to build bridges and lead to common understandings. 
Some contingencies for contact theory have been tested, such as effects of national versus 
regional effects (Kauffman and Harris 2015; Weber 2015), region or city size (urban vs. mid-
range population, vs. small / rural) as a factor (Barone et al. 2014), and the role of size and 




Schlueter and Wagner 2008; Barone et al. 2014). Notably, some studies have drawn decisive 
conclusions that contradict contact theory, suggesting instead that interaction with immigrants 
breeds resentment rather than harmony or is not strong enough to overcome other driving 
factors that produce anti-immigrant sentiment (Careja 2016; Karreth et al. 2015). 
3.3 Theoretical considerations and related empirical research 
  
This study situates itself among those studies investigating whether certain characteristics of 
immigrants affect public attitudes toward them. In particular, we contribute to the literature on 
attitudes formation by evaluating the extent to which the origin and the skill level of 
immigrants drive public sentiment to be more or less anti-immigrant. To date, a few studies at 
European level have emerged that consider the characteristics of the immigrant population as 
determinative. Most of these studies show that origin of immigrants plays an important role in 
explaining anti-immigrant attitudes, with higher ethnic distance between natives and 
immigrants generating more negative attitudes. These findings seem to be driven more by 
cultural concerns and less by economic considerations. However, the results about the impact 
of immigrants’ skill level on natives’ attitudes toward them are mixed. Below, we summarize 




Table 3.1 Summary of findings of related studies 
Study Level Data Source Sample Concluding Findings 
 




ESS (round 1, 2, 3) 
 
21 Countries 
A higher proportion of non-national workers in the respondent’s occupation, makes natives have a more 
negative attitude towards the arrival of same-race immigrants. However, immigrants from a different race 
are found to be perceived as a greater threat with respect to the country’s culture. 
 
Dustmann and Preston (2007) 
 
Country 




Opposition to further immigration is strongly associated with the origin of the immigrant. The more 
ethnically distinct the immigrant population is, the stronger the anti-immigrant attitudes about economic, 
welfare and cultural concerns. 
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009) Country ESS (round 1) 21 Countries 
Natives have stronger exclusionary views about the admission and allocation of rights towards 
immigrants of non-European origin than about immigrants of European origin. 
Scheepers et al. (2002) Country 
Eurobarometer Survey 
15 Countries 
A higher proportion of Non-EU citizens in a country increases natives’ opposition to civil rights for legal 
migrants as a response to perceived ethnic threat. 
Schneider (2008) Country ESS (round 1) 22 Countries 
A larger immigrant population of non-western origin increases the average perceived ethnic threat in a 
country. Yet, this effect is not linear, as the quadratic term of the variable is found to be negative and 
statistically significant.  However, the share of immigrants with low levels of education relative to the 
total population is not found to be a significant predictor. 
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) Country ESS (round 1) 22 Countries 
Highly-educated individuals are more likely to favour immigration regardless of the origin of immigrants 
(European/Non-European) and their skill level (low/high). 
Facchini and Mayda (2012) Country ESS (round 1) 21 Countries Unskilled natives are more in favour of highly skilled immigrants than skilled natives are. 
O’Connell (2011) Country ESS (round 1) 20 Countries No significant evidence that highly skilled natives feel threatened by highly skilled immigrants. 
Schuelter and Wagner (2008) Regional ESS (round 1) 22 Countries 
A larger size of the regional non-national workforce increases both intergroup contact and perceived 
group threat at the NUTS-2 regional level. 
Rustenbach (2010) Regional ESS (round 1, 2) 15 Countries 
The regional number of immigrants does not seem to affect natives’ attitudes towards immigration at the 
NUTS-2 regional level. 
Weber (2015) Regional EVS (wave 4) 15 Countries 
The regional proportion of immigrants has no significant impact on perceived threat of immigration at the 
NUTS-2 regional level. However, when respondents are grouped into a lower (NUTS-3) or a higher 
(NUTS-1) regional level, then the results indicate that a higher percentage of immigrants in the region 
decreases perceived group threat. 




No significant evidence that a higher total share of foreigners has an impact on anti-immigrant attitudes 
in the regions of Austria (NUTS-2), Germany (NUTS-1) and Switzerland (NUTS-2). Nevertheless, an 
increasing immigration from Non-Western countries leads to more negative attitudes toward immigrants, 
but only between natives with right-wing political ideology. 
Green et. al (2010) Municipal ESS (round 1) Switzerland 
A higher proportion of Northern/Western European immigrants increases intergroup contact which in 
turn indirectly decreases anti-immigrant attitudes. 
Markaki and Longhi (2013) Regional ESS (round 1, 2, 3, 4) 24 Countries 
A higher percentage of immigrants in the region (NUTS-1) increases the probability that the native 
population perceives immigrants as a threat to the country’s economy, culture and quality of life. These 
negative attitudes towards immigration are driven by the number of non-EU immigrants in the region. 
Finally, a higher proportion of immigrants with low education is found to decrease the perceived 





At country level, drawing data on 21 European countries from the ESS, Bridges and 
Mateut (2014) find that fears over labour market competition, captured by the proportion 
of non-national workers in the respondent’s occupation, lead natives to have more negative 
attitudes towards the arrival of same race immigrants. However, immigrants from a 
different race are found to be perceived as a greater threat with respect to the country’s 
culture. Furthermore, using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey and 
distinguishing between immigrants from four different regions of origin, Dustmann and 
Preston (2007) argue that opposition to further immigration is strongly associated with the 
origin of the immigrant. More specifically, the authors show that the more ethnically 
distinct the immigrant population is the stronger the anti-immigrant attitudes about 
economic, welfare and cultural concerns. 
The findings presented by Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009), who also use data 
on 21 countries from the ESS, confirm that public attitudes towards inclusion of 
immigrants in European societies are influenced by the ethnic origin of immigrants. In 
particular, according to the authors, when it comes to admission and allocation of rights 
natives have stronger exclusionary views towards immigrants of non-European origin than 
immigrants of European origin. Similarly, employing cross-national data from the 
Eurobarometer survey on 15 countries of the EU, Scheepers et al. (2002) show that, as a 
response to perceived ethnic threat, having a higher proportion of Non-EU citizens in a 
country does increase natives’ opposition to legal migrants being afforded civil rights. 
Additionally, in order to provide a contextual explanation of cross-national 
differences in anti-immigrant attitudes, Schneider (2008) uses data on 22 European 
countries from the first round of the ESS. The results of his contextual analysis show that 




important factor in shaping natives’ attitudes towards immigration. In particular, the author 
shows that having a larger immigrant population with non-western origin increases the 
average perceived ethnic threat in a country. However, this effect is not linear as the 
quadratic term of the variable is found to be negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that above a threshold level, the average perception of ethnic threat decreases 
with an increasing share of non-western immigrants. To the contrary, the share of low-
educated immigrants relative to the total population, used by the author to test the 
hypothesis of economic competition between immigrants and natives, is not found to be a 
significant predictor.  
Using data from the same sample, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) find that high-
educated individuals are more likely to favour immigration regardless of the origin of 
immigrants (European/Non-European) and their skill level (low/high). According to the 
authors, this occurs because people with higher education levels are generally less racist 
and more open to cultural diversity, but they are also more likely to believe that 
immigrants benefit the country’s economy. However, drawing data from the first round of 
the ESS too, Facchini and Mayda (2012) conclude that unskilled natives are more in favor 
of highly skilled immigrants than skilled natives are. Yet, another study, conducted by 
O’Connell (2011) and using the same source of data, does not find any significant evidence 
to support that highly skilled natives feel threatened by highly skilled immigrants. 
According to the author, this can be explained by the fact that there is no direct labour 
competition between the two groups. 
There have been a few more studies that, like our own, examine natives’ attitudes 
toward immigrants at the European regional level. With respect to the impact of the size of 
the immigrant population on attitudes toward immigration, the results of this research seem 




data from the first round of the ESS, Schuelter and Wagner (2008) find that the greater the 
size of the regional non-national workforce, the greater both intergroup contact and 
perceived group threat. Yet, Rustenbach (2010), who draws data from the same source, 
concludes that number of immigrants in a region does not appear to affect natives’ attitudes 
towards immigration. Similarly, using data from the European Value Survey (EVS) but at 
the same regional level (NUTS-2), Weber (2015) shows that the regional proportion of 
immigrants has no significant impact on perceived threat from immigration. However, 
when respondents are grouped into a lower (NUTS-3) or a higher (NUTS-1) regional level, 
then the results indicate that a higher percentage of immigrants in the region decreases 
perceived group threat. 
Similar to the country level research, some other empirical studies attempt to 
investigate whether the origin or the skill level of immigrants affect anti-immigrant 
attitudes at European regional level. Employing data from regions of Austria (NUTS-2), 
Germany (NUTS-1) and Switzerland (NUTS-2), Karreth et al. (2015) do not find any 
significant evidence to support that a higher total share of foreigners has an impact on anti-
immigrant attitudes. Nevertheless, they show that an increasing immigration from non-
Western countries leads to more negative attitudes toward immigrants, but only among 
natives with right-wing political ideology. Moreover, using information from the ESS for 
Swiss municipalities, Green et al. (2010) note that a higher proportion of Northern/Western 
European immigrants increases intergroup contact which in turn indirectly decreases anti-
immigrant attitudes. These findings confirm the hypothesis of the authors that the presence 
of ‘culturally similar’ immigrants from rich countries should diminish negative attitudes 
towards immigration. However, a high proportion of Muslim immigrants in a Swiss 
municipality is found to increase the perceived threat of immigration. In addition, also 




immigrants in the region increases the probability that the native population perceives 
immigrants as a threat to the country’s economy, culture and quality of life. Their 
empirical results reveal that these negative attitudes towards immigration are driven by the 
number of non-EU immigrants in the region. Finally, contrary to the labour market 
competition theory, the authors find that a higher proportion of immigrants with low 
education decreases the perceived economic threat of immigration. 
Our research is influenced by the fact that attitudes toward immigrants cannot be 
adequately explained by economic factors, social factors, political factors, racial prejudice 
or even the attitude-holder’s own milieu, when these are taken in isolation. Instead, all of 
these seem to come together and interact to generate anti-immigrant attitudes in much the 
same way that voting studies have long been frustrated by a lack of clear causal factors 
driving the outcome. We assert, therefore, that no single theory with corresponding 
discrete variables captures what is happening and can account for anti-immigrant 
sentiment, but rather each contributes an aspect of it. For this reason, we build our models 
in the analysis drawing variables from each of the three theoretical approaches discussed 
before, also following the design of the few existing studies mentioned above in the 
literature review where attitudes toward immigrants are shaped not only by individual 
conditions of the attitude-holder but also by the characteristics of the immigrants. 
Several assumptions from the existing literature inform our analysis. First, we may 
observe that economic conditions correlate positively with attitudes toward immigrants so 
that better economic conditions correspond to more positive attitudes toward immigrants, 
as suggested by economic competition theory. Second, we expect that cultural difference 
correlates negatively with attitudes toward immigrants whereby attitudes become more 
negative as cultural difference increases, which is consistent with conflict and identity 




attitudes toward them, as predicted by contact theory. We do not set out to test these 
theories, however their logic and assumptions inform our framework and understanding of 
anti-immigrant attitudes including how we determine variables for our models.  
3.4 Data and Methods 
 
We use explanatory variables at two different levels, the individual and the regional. Our 
central research questions focus on regional level factors that shape attitudes held by 
natives toward immigrants living within the same geographic region. In particular, we 
investigate how origin and skill level of immigrants within a given region affect native 
attitudes toward them. While the focus is on regional level determinants, we use individual 
level data in order to control for the more idiosyncratic factors of individual anti-immigrant 
attitudes. We do present the individual level determinants in summary form but treat it as a 
step in controlling for factors that could offset our regional level focus. 
The structure of our investigation combines individual-level information with 
regional-level data from a number of sources. In particular, for our dependent variables and 
individual-level predictors we use survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS). In 
addition, regionally aggregated indicators are computed from the European Union Labour 
Force Survey (EU-LFS). Finally, data on regional control variables are provided by the 
Regional Database of Cambridge Econometrics and the Regional Statistics Database of 
Eurostat.  
We restrict our sample to five rounds (2004-2012) of the ESS and focus on 
respondents from 78 regions of 16 European countries. This choice has been forced by the 
limited available information on the proportion of foreign population by group of origin at 
the regional level. However, the regions observed in the study host, on average, 
approximately 80 per cent of the foreign population living in the European Union (EU) 




sample participated in all five rounds of the ESS, we also include in our analysis those 
countries that participated in only some of them.  
The regional level we use is based on the Nomenclature of Units for Territorial 
Statistics (NUTS) of the EU which classifies countries into regions according to 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The NUTS are divided into three 
hierarchical levels, where the NUTS-3 level represents a more detailed classification of 
regions and NUTS-1 level a broader one. We use data at the NUTS-1 level at which 
regions are geographically large enough to minimize any potential bias due to self-
selection of natives in their location choices (Dustmann and Preston, 2001).14 However, the 
NUTS-2 level is used in those cases where the NUTS-1 level corresponds to the whole 
country and data at the NUTS-2 level are available.  
Finally, because this study examines natives’ attitudes towards immigrants, we 
exclude from the sample all individuals without national citizenship and those who were 
born outside the country. Nevertheless, similarly to Markaki and Longhi (2013) we include 
in the analysis ethnic minorities and second-generation immigrants, but controlling for 
both, to capture differences between individuals who have immigrant background and 
those who have not. Table 3.2 presents the structure of the pooled cross-sectional sample. 
 
  
                                                             
14 It is more likely that those natives who dislike immigrants will respond to an increasing concentration of 





Table 3.2 Pooled cross-sectional sample 
Country (ID) Regions  NUTS-Level Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Total 
Austria (AT) 3 NUTS-1 1420 1557 - - - 2977 
Belgium (BE) 3 NUTS-1 1276 1349 1300 1266 1388 6579 
Cyprus (CY) 1 NUTS-1 - 661 754 541 602 2558 
Czech Republic (CZ) 1 NUTS-1 1561 - 1461 1755 1225 6002 
Germany (DE) 16 NUTS-1 2089 2114 2140 2286 2324   10953 
Denmark (DK) 1 NUTS-1 1232 1252 1369 1325 1377 6555 
Spain (ES) 7 NUTS-1 987 1272 1549 1277 - 5085 
Finland (FI) 3 NUTS-2 1527 1484 1712 1471 1912 8106 
France (FR) 8 NUTS-1 - 1540 1591 1331 1499 5961 
Greece (GR) 4 NUTS-1 1405 - 1234 1330 - 3969 
Hungary (HU) 3 NUTS-1 876 1041 986 1095 1378 5376 
Netherlands (NL) 1 NUTS-0 1467 1516 1387 1463 1495 7328 
Norway (NO) 7 NUTS-2 1391 1333 - 1275 1345 5344 
Portugal (PT) 5 NUTS-2 978 1128 1187 1184 1202 5679 
Sweden (SE) 3 NUTS-1 1358 1233 1270 1170 1440 6471 
United Kingdom (UK) 12 NUTS-1 1408 1732 1762 1682 1543 8127 
Total 78 
 
  18975   19212    19702   20451   18730   97070 
Notes: The NUTS-2 level is used in the cases of Finland, Norway and Portugal where the NUTS-1 level corresponds to the whole 
country and data at the NUTS-2 level are available. For the Netherlands data are available only at the country level (NUTS-0). The 
two autonomous regions of Portugal, the Azores and Madeira, are excluded. For Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic and Greece, ESS 
does not provide information for the missing rounds. For Norway (Round 4), Spain (Round 6) and France (Round 2) there are too 
many missing observations in our dataset that the samples could not be representative of the entire regions for that particular year 
and thus we exclude them from our analysis. 
 
3.4.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable, anti-immigrant attitudes, is measured using the respondents’ 
answers to three different questions in the ESS. More specifically, we construct our 
dependent variable based on the following questions: 
 “Would you say it is generally bad or good for the country's economy that people 




 “Would you say that the country's cultural life is generally undermined or 
enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” 
 “Is the country made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here 
from other countries?” 
To evaluate attitudes toward immigrants the questions use a scale that ranges from 
0 to 10. The original question items are reverse recoded so that higher values indicate 
greater anti-immigrant attitudes. The three distinct measures allow us to compare natives’ 
attitudes towards immigrants in relation to, respectively, the country’s economy, culture 
and life in general.  Alternatively, we argue that these measures represent the economic, 
cultural and overall perceived threat of immigration. For summary statistics on the average 
regional attitudes towards immigrants see Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3 Dependent variables summary statistics  
Dependent Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average Regional Economic Threat 5.17 .722 3.23 7.19 
Average Regional Cultural Threat 4.47 .909 2.51 7.20 
Average Regional Overall Threat 5.30 .741 3.15 7.65 
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the average regional attitudes towards 
immigrants in our three models. The number of observations for all variables is N=349. 
 
 
3.4.2 Individual predictors 
 
We build our individual-level independent variables based on the existing empirical 
literature on attitudes towards immigration (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; 
Rustenbach, 2010; Facchini and Mayda, 2012; Markaki and Longhi, 2013).  
The first set of individual-level predictors consist of the demographic background 




individuals in two main categories is included. One category comprises respondents under 
25 years old and the other those who are more than 60 years old. We also add controls for 
individuals who have one or both parents born abroad, and for those who belong to an 
ethnic minority. In addition, we include dummy variables for people who live in big cities, 
suburbs of big cities and rural areas to compare them with those who are residents of small 
cities or towns.  
The education level of respondents is measured using two binary indicators, one for 
people with primary education (ISCED 0-1) and another for those who have tertiary 
education (ISCED 5-6). Labour market characteristics are operationalized using various 
dummies: whether the person is employed or unemployed, whether she or he has 
supervisory duties, whether the respondent has ever been a member of a union, and finally 
whether the person has ever worked abroad.  
With regard to a household’s economic situation and general satisfaction with the 
country’s economy two additional variables are used. The first is a dummy variable that 
indicates whether people find it difficult or not to cope with their current income while the 
second one measures how dissatisfied respondents feel with the present condition of the 
economy in the country using a scale ranging from 0 to 10. Furthermore, a set of social 
indicators are added that measure how religious the respondents are, how important it is to 
them to follow traditions and customs, how much trust they show in others and, as a proxy 
for an area’s security, how safe they feel walking alone in their neighborhood after dark. 
Finally, our analysis includes a variable which evaluates the political ideology of the 
person based on their self-placement on a left-right scale. Table 3.4 provides summary 





Table 3.4 Individual level summary statistics  
Individual Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Demographic Features     
Male .497 .499 0 1 
Under 25 years old .078 .268 0 1 
Over 60 years old .286 .452 0 1 
Big City Resident .191 .393 0 1 
Suburbs of Big CityResident .133 .340 0 1 
Rural Area Resident .359 .480 0 1 
Foreign Parent(s) .062 .242 0 1 
Belong to Minority .017 .129 0 1 
Qualification Level     
Primary Education .138 .345 0 1 
Tertiary Education .286 .452 0 1 
Labour Market Characteristics     
Employed .583 .493 0 1 
Unemployed .038 .191 0 1 
Supervisor Duties .307 .461 0 1 
Member of a Union .494 .499 0 1 
Have Worked Abroad .042 .202 0 1 
Economic Indicators     
Difficult to Cope on Income .198 .398 0 1 
Dissatisfied with Economy 5.32 2.50 0 10 
Social Indicators     
Trust in Others 5.32 2.36 0 10 
Religious 4.32 2.95 0 10 
Feel Safe in Dark .796 .402 0 1 
Believe Traditions are Important .717 .450 0 1 
Political Affiliation     
Right-wing Ideology 5.10 2.16 0 10 
Note: The above table presents summary statistics for all individual level variables 







Table 3.5 Correlation matrix of individual level variables 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25)
(1) Economic Threat 1.00
(2) Cultural Threat 0.62 1.00
(3) Overall Threat 0.65 0.69 1.00
(4) Male -0.06 0.02 0.00 1.00
(5) Under 25 years old -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 1.00
(6) Over 60 years old 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.18 1.00
(7) Big City Resident -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 1.00
(8) Suburbs of Big CityResident -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.19 1.00
(9) Rural Area Resident 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.36 -0.29 1.00
(10) Foreign Parent(s) -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.05 1.00
(11) Belong to Minority 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.13 1.00
(12) Primary Education 0.13 0.16 0.15 -0.01 -0.08 0.31 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.00 1.00
(13) Tertiary Education -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.01 -0.10 -0.12 0.09 0.06 -0.10 0.01 -0.00 -0.25 1.00
(14) Employed -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 0.07 -0.04 -0.58 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.26 0.20 1.00
(15) Unemployed 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.11 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.22 1.00
(16) Supervisor Duties -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 0.18 -0.11 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.18 0.06 -0.06 1.00
(17) Member of a Union -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 0.06 -0.18 0.10 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.10 0.01 -0.05 0.07 1.00
(18) Have Worked Abroad -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.02 1.00
(19) Difficult to Cope on Income 0.18 0.17 0.19 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.14 -0.17 -0.16 0.17 -0.14 -0.09 -0.01 1.00
(20) Dissatisfied with Economy 0.30 0.27 0.31 -0.07 -0.05 -0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.13 -0.13 -0.07 0.10 -0.08 -0.16 -0.02 0.30 1.00
(21) Trust in Others -0.30 -0.32 -0.34 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.13 0.19 0.09 -0.06 0.07 0.14 0.02 -0.22 -0.38 1.00
(22) Religious 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.16 -0.08 0.18 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.00 0.03 0.17 -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.01 1.00
(23) Feel Safe in Dark -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 0.21 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.12 -0.00 -0.02 -0.10 0.10 0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.15 -0.18 0.20 -0.05 1.00
(24) Believe Traditions are Important 0.08 0.11 0.09 -0.06 -0.10 0.14 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.29 -0.05 1.00




3.4.3 Regional predictors 
 
To investigate the effect of regional factors on natives’ attitudes toward immigrants we 
also utilize regional-level variables in our analysis. The regional indicators are aggregates 
of individual-level data derived from the EU-LFS. We merge the regional-level 
information from the EU-LFS with the individual-level dataset of the ESS to examine the 
impact that the share of the foreign population has on natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes. 
The EU-LFS provides information on the nationality and country of birth of each 
respondent. This information can be used to measure the foreign and foreign-born 
population in each region respectively. The foreign population consists of people who have 
a different nationality from that of their current country of residence, while the foreign-
born population includes all those who have migrated from their country of birth to another 
host country. Both measures have pros and cons and therefore it is difficult to find a 
perfect measure to identify the size of the regional ‘outgroup’ population (Coenders, 2001). 
This is probably the reason that some previous studies in the literature have used the 
regional percentages of foreign-born (Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Weber, 2015), while 
other studies prefer to use the proportions of non-nationals in a region (Schlueter and 
Wagner, 2008; Bridges and Mateut, 2014). 
Measures based on nationality are not totally comparable over regions of different 
countries, due to differences in citizenship regimes. By contrast, the percentage of foreign-
born is comparable over regions, although it is still a very rough measure as it could cover, 
for example, nationals born abroad of native parents. Moreover, since it does not consider 
how long the foreign-born individuals have been living in the host country, the latter 
measure includes people who, although born abroad, are fully naturalized citizens of their 





Another crucial difference between the two measures is that the share of foreign-
born does not take into account the second-generation immigrants. Yet, the share of 
foreign nationals, can include those individuals who even if they were born in the host 
country still retain their home nationality. However, for individuals with dual or multiple 
nationalities who hold the nationality of the country of residence, the EU-LFS reports only 
that one. Otherwise, the first answer of the respondent is taken into account. Thus, the 
share of foreign nationals in our dataset cannot truly capture the second-generation 
immigrants either. 
Table 3.6 summarizes by country the share of individuals in our sample who, 
according to the EU-LFS dataset, are classified as foreigners, based first on their country of 
birth, next on their nationality and finally on both criteria. Across all the countries of our 
sample, the number of people born abroad is much higher than those in the other two 
columns of the table. Apparently, those who are classified as foreigners according to their 
nationality are fewer because a high number of immigrants have been naturalized over the 
years. However, this column also includes those second-generation immigrants who still 






Table 3.6 Classification of individuals as foreigners 
Country (ID) Country of birth Nationality Both criteria 
Austria (AT) 13.98 9.91 8.25 
Belgium (BE) 12.07 8.30 6.70 
Cyprus (CY) 16.77 14.39 13.33 
Czech Republic (CZ) 2.38 0.88 0.84 
Denmark (DK) 7.62 4.73 3.96 
Finland (FI) 2.76 1.70 1.46 
France (FR) 10.35 5.11 4.71 
Germany (DE) - 8.25 - 
Greece (GR) 6.69 6.25 5.19 
Hungary (HU) 1.72 0.57 0.53 
Netherlands (NL) 10.15 3.72 3.03 
Norway (NO) 9.00 4.92 4.55 
Portugal (PT) 6.30 2.95 2.72 
Sweden (SE) 15.19 5.28 4.88 
Spain (ES) 11.36 9.57 9.14 
United Kingdom (UK) 10.91 6.61 6.25 
Notes: This table presents the share of individuals by country in our sample that, according 
to the EU-LFS, are classified as foreigners based on their country of birth, nationality and 
on both criteria. 
 
For some countries such as Greece, where it is quite difficult for immigrants to 
acquire national citizenship, the overlap between the foreign nationals and foreign-born is 
quite high. On the contrary, for countries such as Sweden or Netherlands which are 
characterized by high levels of naturalization, the share of those born outside the country is 
about three times larger than the share of foreign nationals.  
Consequently, for the reasons mentioned above, we choose to calculate the share of 
foreign population in each region on the basis of both individuals’ nationality and country 
of birth.15 By focusing on both criteria simultaneously we actually measure all persons 
born abroad who have not yet been naturalized, and thus are likely to be more salient in 
affecting current attitudes of natives toward immigration. However, we also use the 
separate shares of foreign nationals and foreign-born as alternative measures, the results of 
which are presented in the robustness analysis section that follows. 
                                                             
15 Because the EU-LFS lacks information for Germany on individuals born abroad, we measure the share of 




In a similar fashion to previous studies (Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Weber, 2015), 
apart from the total share of foreigners in a region we also compute the proportions of EU 
foreigners and those from countries outside the EU. However, attitudes toward immigrants 
might be affected by the composition of the non-EU foreigners in the country, due to 
significant cultural and socioeconomic status differences among them. Therefore, the main 
contribution of this study is that we additionally distinguish the non-EU foreigners into six 
broad groups of origin16: Other Europe, Middle East & North Africa, Other Africa, East & 
South Asia, North America & Australia and Latin America.17  
In order to measure the direct effect of foreigners’ skill level on natives’ attitudes 
toward immigrants, the proportions of economically active foreigners with primary or 
lower secondary education and with tertiary education are included in our model. In 
addition, we include interaction terms between the share of foreigners in a region and the 
proportion of them with primary or lower secondary education as well as with tertiary 
education, in order to capture any potential moderating effects between the size of and the 
skill level of immigrant population. Finally, in line with previous literature (Rustenbach, 
2010; Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Weber, 2015) we add controls for the unemployment 
rate at the regional level as well as a measure of regional economic performance, using the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of each region as a proxy for the latter. Table 
3.7 provides summary statistics for regional-level variables and Table 3.8 presents the 
corresponding correlation matrix.  
  
                                                             
16 We categorize the foreign population of our sample into seven broad groups of origin following Dohse and 
Gold (2014). 
17 For those few individuals in the EU-LFS dataset who are foreign nationals and born outside the host 
country but whose nationality does not match with their country of birth, we choose to categorize them into a 
group of origin according to the nationality they hold. We argue that a different nationality indicates that the 
individual has been naturalized in a country other than his/her country of birth or reveals some preference of 
the person to be identified as a member of that nation and its culture Therefore, we suggest that in this case, 




Table 3.7 Regional level summary statistics  
Regional Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
% Total Foreigners 4.59 3.73 .225 25.20 
% EU Foreigners 1.93 1.87 0 15.58 
% Non-EU Foreigners 2.66 2.24 .035 12.74 
% Other Europe .973 1.29 0 10.51 
% Middle East & Northern Africa .475 .557 0  4.56 
% Other Africa .297 .521 0 3.69 
% East & South Asia .462 .637 0 4.99 
% Northern America & Australia .106 .161 0 1.82 
% Latin America .344 .991 0 8.41 
% Foreigners with low qualifications 30.80 13.55 5.27 66.39 
% Foreigners with high qualifications 27.45 9.53 5.22 60.77 
% Unemployment 7.60 3.63 2.60 28.6 
GDP per capita (000s) 28.07 11.66 5.54 77.57 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for regional level indicators and controls 



















Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Economic Threat 1.00
(2) Cultural Threat 0.62 1.00
(3) Overall Threat 0.65 0.69 1.00
(4) % Total Foreigners -0.05 0.02 -0.02 1.00
(5) % EU Nationals -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.89 1.00
(6) % Non-EU Nationals -0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.92 0.64 1.00
(7) % Other Europe -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.50 0.30 0.59 1.00
(8) % Middle East & Northern Africa -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.63 0.54 0.60 0.12 1.00
(9) % Other Africa -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.35 0.17 0.44 -0.08 0.18 1.00
(10) % East & South Asia 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.65 0.69 0.50 0.13 0.26 0.19 1.00
(11) % Northern America & Australia -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.43 0.38 0.40 0.13 0.07 0.34 0.56 1.00
(12) % Latin America -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.40 0.17 0.53 -0.11 0.37 0.29 -0.02 -0.01 1.00
(13) % Non-Nationals with low qualifications -0.00 0.03 0.07 0.22 0.03 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.25 -0.17 -0.24 0.26 1.00
(14) % Non-Nationals with high qualifications -0.07 -0.11 -0.14 -0.08 0.12 -0.24 -0.38 0.01 -0.07 0.19 0.23 -0.16 -0.55 1.00
(15) % Unemployment 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.06 -0.05 0.14 0.01 0.16 0.06 -0.13 -0.19 0.28 0.29 -0.25 1.00




3.4.4 Multilevel model 
 
To analyze differences in natives’ attitudes toward immigrants across regions we follow a 
multilevel approach similarly to previous studies (Rustenbach, 2010; Weber, 2015). Because 
each of our three dependent variables is an 11-category ordinal variable where the different 
categories are evenly spaced, we treat all of them as continuous. Thus, we estimate the 





𝑗𝑡𝛾 + 𝐹𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 × 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡𝛿 + 𝐹𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑗𝑡𝜃 + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑖 indicates respondents, 𝑗 indicates regions within which respondents are nested and 𝑡 
indicates year. The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. 𝑋
′ 
is a vector that contains variables summarizing the individual characteristics of the 
respondents and 𝑍′ is a vector which contains variables that summarize the regional 
indicators. The interaction terms 𝐹𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 × 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡 and 𝐹𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑗𝑡 capture any 
moderating effect between the total share of foreigners19 in a region 𝐹𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 and the 
proportion of them with primary or lower secondary education 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡 as well as with tertiary 
education 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑗𝑡, respectively. Region-specific effects 𝑢𝑗, year-specific effects 𝜂𝑡 and 
unobserved individual effects 𝑖𝑗𝑡 are also included in this two-level mixed model. Regional 
random effects are used to adjust for correlations across observations within the same region. 
Year-specific effects are treated as fixed to control for unobserved effects of time.  
We run a multilevel regression on each dependent variable. In each case, four different 
model specifications are estimated. The first model specification includes only the individual-
level predictors. The following three contain, apart from the regional control variables, 
                                                             
18 Additionally, we also checked the non-linear effect of the shares of foreigners on anti-immigrant attitudes but 
we did not find any significant evidence for that. 
19 We estimate the interaction effect only for the total share of foreigners, because the average cohort size of the 





respectively the total share of foreigners, the shares of EU and non-EUs and the share of 
foreigners by each specific group of origin in a region. Finally, all model specifications are 
estimated by using the -mixed- command in the statistical analysis software package Stata14. 
Our work is similar to that conducted by Markaki and Longhi (2013), as both studies 
examine the impact of contextual factors, and more specifically characteristics of the 
immigrant population, on anti-immigrant attitudes in European regions. Moreover, we draw 
the data for our empirical analysis from the same sources (ESS and LFS) as described above. 
In addition, like these authors we estimate three different models corresponding to the three 
types of threat from immigration, the economic, the cultural and the overall. Finally, again 
following Markaki and Longhi (2013), we use individual-level information provided by the 
LFS to construct the regional indicators of immigrant characteristics. 
Yet we differentiate ourselves from the authors in several ways. First, with respect to our 
sample, although we include in our analysis respondents from a smaller number of European 
regions than Markaki and Longhi (2013)20, we use data from more recent rounds of the ESS. 
Second, in their study the authors decide to recode the ESS dependent variables which are 
measured on a scale from 0 to 10 into binary variables. However, we prefer not to alter the 
original variables in order not to lose the valuable information that they contain. Moreover, 
our study differs by distinguishing non-European immigrants living in a region into six 
different groups of origin as mentioned above, and this is our main empirical contribution to 
the literature. In addition, as discussed earlier in this section, we choose to measure the share 
of the foreign population in a region based simultaneously on both individuals’ nationality 
and country of birth. This is contrary to Markaki and Longhi (2013) who use the share of 
foreign-born residents in their analysis. Furthermore, with respect to the modelling strategy, 
the authors follow a two-step modelling technique by first estimating the models at the 
                                                             




individual level and then attempting to explain any regional differences in a second stage. 
Nevertheless, as previous studies have done (Rustenbach, 2010; Weber, 2015), we apply a 
multilevel model to analyze differences in natives’ attitudes toward immigrants across 
regions. Finally, we extend our analysis by including an interaction term in our model to 
capture any moderating effect between the size and the skill level of immigrant population. 
3.5 Empirical results 
 
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 report the estimated effects of individual and regional variables on the 
three different measures of anti-immigrant attitudes, respectively. In what follows, we refer to 
the empirical findings of these models as the results of the economic, cultural and overall 
threat models respectively. The results of individual and regional predictors are presented 
separately in this section.  
3.5.1 Individual characteristics 
 
We introduce individual level factors as controls to allow focus on regional level determinants 
as discussed in the description of our methods. We present a summary of those findings here.  
Our individual level findings are consistent overall with what other studies have found 
(Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Rustenbach, 2010; Facchini and Mayda, 2012; 
Markaki and Longhi, 2013).  
With respect to demographic features, males have a greater negative attitude towards 
immigrants than females do in relation to culture and quality of life overall, and a lesser anti-
immigrant attitude than females with regard to a country’s economy. Furthermore, older 
people have a more negative opinion on immigration than the youth population, although age 
does not present itself as a significant predictor in the economic threat model. In addition, we 
find that individuals with one or both parents born outside the country and those who belong 




background variables reveal that respondents living in big cities exert less negative attitudes 
towards immigrants than those living in small cities or towns, while the results are opposite 
for the residents of rural areas.  
As we expected, our results show that individuals educated to primary level have 
stronger anti-immigrant attitudes than those with a tertiary level of education.  Regarding 
labour market characteristics, the empirical findings are mixed across the different models. 
The employment status of individuals does not appear to be statistically significant, neither in 
the cultural threat nor in the overall threat model. However, the respondents who are 
employed seem to believe that immigrants might be bad for the country’s economy. Similarly, 
although being a union member currently or in the past is not an important predictor in the 
overall threat model, the variable has a negative and statistically significant effect on anti-
immigrant attitudes in relation to economy and culture. Moreover, having a permanent job 
contract does not play an important role in explaining natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. 
Nevertheless, managers and senior officials or people who shoulder supervisory 
responsibilities are clearly less negative toward immigrants, while the opposite is true for 
those in elementary occupations. Additionally, the respondents who have worked abroad for a 
period of more than six months during the last ten years are found to carry less negative 
attitudes toward immigrants across all the models.  
With regard to economic indicators, our empirical results in all three models indicate 
that people who find it more difficult to cope with their present income and those who feel 
more dissatisfied with the current condition of the economy in their country have higher anti-
immigrant attitudes. The results move in the opposite direction for those who are more 
religious, feel safe in the dark and believe that most people can be trusted.  Finally, we find 




measuring the importance of following traditions and customs. The same holds in case of an 
individual’s political affiliation with the right. 
Table 3.9 Individual determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes  
Individual Variable 
   Economic 
      threat 
          Cultural 
threat 
Overall 
 threat  
 
Fixed-effects     
Demographic Features    
 
Male -.153***  (.026) .211***  (.036)   .104***  (.026)  
Under 25 years old -.005        (.045)        -.139***  (.033) -.180***  (.041)  
Over 60 years old  .007        (.029)  .281***  (.034)   .223***  (.034)  
Big City Resident -.168***  (.038) -.170***  (.045) -.136***  (.034)  
Suburbs of Big CityResident -.025        (.035)         -.063*      (.034) -.011        (.028)  
Rural Area Resident  .145***   (.030)        .148***  (.034)   .143***  (.033)  
Foreign Parent(s) -.311***   (.055)  -.378***  (.055)  -.329*** (.062)  
Belong to Minority -.204***   (.075)       -.233***  (.078) -.387***  (.109)  
Qualification Level    
 
Primary Education  .428***  (.043)   .480***  (0.52)  .340***  (.045)  
Tertiary Education -.767***  (.028)  -.786***  (0.32) -.622***  (.038)  
Labour Market Characteristics    
 
Employed  .050*      (.027)       .026***  (.032)  -.006       (.028)  
Unemployed  .115**    (.055)         -.047        (.063)   .014        (.053)  
Supervisor Duties -.107***  (.022)  -.110***   (.024) -.079***  (.023)  
Member of a Union -.104***  (.023)  -.101***  (0.30)  -.038*** (.024)  
Have Worked Abroad -.247***  (.045)  -.125***  (.036)  -.155*** (.036)  
Economic Indicators    
 
Difficult to Cope on Income  .211***  (.030)   .176***  (.038)  .216***  (.033)  
Dissatisfied with Economy  .222***  (.007)   .138***  (.010)   .173***  (.008)  
Social Indicators    
 
Trust in Others -.174***  (.005)  -.189***  (.007) -.183***  (.006)  
Religious -.024***  (.005)  -.023***  (.006) -.031***  (.005)  
Feel Safe in Dark -.429***  (.034)  -.492***  (0.40) -.525***  (.028)  
Believe Traditions are Important  .199***  (.027)   .280**    (.034)  .193***  (.030)  
Political Affiliation    
 
Right Ideology  .128***  (.011)   .186***  (.014)  .156***  (.012)  
Constant  4.93        (.105)          4.10        (.114)   5.03        (.095) 
 
Random-effect Parameters    
 
Individual variance component      4.24  (.084)  4.69  (.122)  3.77  (.067)  
Regional variance component      .184  (.027)  .423  (0.61) .160  (.033)  
Log-likelihood       -200,639 -206,282       -195,577  
Observations         95,099  95,314 95,260  
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard 
errors, clustered by region, are presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0 .05, ***p ≤ 0 .01. Our 
estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the ESS. All regressions in this 




3.5.2 Regional determinants 
 
The primary focus of this investigation is on the regional level. More specifically, the study 
focuses on those factors shaping the attitudes held by natives toward immigration that are 
conditioned by the origin and the skill level of immigrants living within the same region. 
Table 3.10 reports the empirical results of the regional determinants. 
 As the variance components at the bottom of the table show most of the variance of 
natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes is explained by individual level factors. This is similar to 
previous studies (Rustenbach, 2010; Weber, 2015). For instance, in the third specification of 
our economic threat model, where we distinguish between different groups of immigrants, the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is r=0.055 [0.247/(0.247+4.24)]. This indicates that 5.5 
per cent of the total variance of the dependent variable is due to regional differences, which 
offers empirical support for applying a multilevel model. The ICC for the corresponding 
specification of the cultural threat and overall threat models is r=0.084 and r=0.042 
respectively. This suggests that the observed variance of the dependent variable in these 
models can be attributed to differences at the regional level by 8.4 per cent and 4.2 per cent 
respectively. Therefore, while natives’ attitudes toward immigrants can mainly be explained 
by individual characteristics, the regional factors seem to play an important role as well. 
The first specification of each model includes the total share of foreigners in a region. 
At the regional level, the total share of foreigners does not present itself as a significant factor 
in any of our models. The second specification of each model distinguishes between EU and 
non-EU foreigners. In the economic threat model, the regional percentage of EU foreigners 
has a negative impact and is found to be statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. More 




perceived economic threat by 0.59 percentage points.21 The coefficient of this variable is 
almost fifty per cent larger and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in the cultural 
threat model; while in the overall threat model the effect of the percentage of EU foreigners is 
a bit larger in magnitude than in the economic threat model and statistically significant at the 
5 per cent level.  
To the contrary, the proportion of non-EU foreigners in the economic threat model has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes at the 5 per cent level. 
More specifically, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of non-EU foreigners in 
the region increases the perceived economic threat of immigration by 0.43 percentage points. 
The size effect of this variable is more than fifty per cent larger and statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level for the perceived cultural threat of immigration. However, the number of 
non-EU foreigners in the region does not seem to increase the overall perceived threat of 
immigration at any level of significance. 
Furthermore, the third model specification in the table separates non-EU foreigners into 
six broad groups of origin. This further distinction allows us to take into account any possible 
influence on attitudes derived from cultural or socioeconomic status differences between the 
native population and various groups of foreigners. Our empirical results indicate that 
proportions of non-EU foreigners by group of origin explain anti-immigrant attitudes in more 
detail and provide us with useful information. In particular, we find that natives living in 
regions with higher percentages of foreigners coming from European countries outside of the 
EU are more likely to believe that the cultural life in their country is undermined. Our 
estimated coefficient suggests that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of 
Europeans other than EU living in the region increases perceived cultural threat by 0.76 
percentage points. This effect is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. However, we 
                                                             
21 If changing the independent variable by one unit, the dependent variable changes by γ (coefficient) units. 
Thus, a one percentage point increase in the regional percentage of EU foreigners decreases the perceived 




do not find any significant impact of this group of foreigners in the economic threat and 
overall threat models. 
Additionally, our findings show that the presence of a larger-sized foreign population 
from the Middle East and North African countries in a given region increases the perceived 
economic threat of immigration. A one percentage point increase in the percentage of Middle 
East and North African foreigners increases anti-immigrant attitudes in the region with 
respect to economy by more than 2 percentage points. The results for the same foreign group 
in the cultural threat model are similar. Finally, the regional category Other African has a 
positive impact on anti-immigrant attitudes with respect to perceived undermining of a 
country’s culture. The coefficient of this group is a bit smaller than that of Middle East and 
North African foreigners and it is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The Other 
African foreign group is the only one found to have a positive and statically significant effect 
at the 10 per cent level in the overall threat model. Consequently, the results confirm our 
expectation that cultural distance and different values increase anti-immigrant attitudes.   
Our findings concerning the skill level of immigrants do not reveal any significant 
direct effect of immigrants with high-level qualifications on anti-immigrant attitudes. 
Nevertheless, the last specification of our first model shows that immigrants with low-level 
qualifications have a small but statistically significant effect on natives’ attitudes towards 
immigrants with respect to the country’s economy. However, the proportion of low-educated 
immigrants in a region does not seem to have any significant effect on anti-immigrant 
attitudes in the rest of the models. 
With regard to our control variables, we find no evidence that regional GDP per capita 
is significantly associated with anti-immigrant attitudes. Our results regarding the 
unemployment rate at the regional level are mixed. Although we find that a higher 




results indicate that in the cultural threat model the regional unemployment rate has a negative 
and strongly statistically significant effect on attitudes toward immigrants. In the overall 
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   .165 
   (.036) 
Log-likelihood -200,587  -200,578     -200,566 -206,259   -206,242 -206,224 -195,569 -195,562    -195,548 
Observations   95,099     95,099  95,099   95,314   95,314   95,314   95,260    95,260      95,260 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, are 
presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0 .05, ***p ≤ 0 .01. Our estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the 




Finally, Table 3.11 presents the moderating effects between the size and the skill level 
of the immigrant population for each of our three dependent variables. As already mentioned 
above, we estimate an interaction effect only for the total share of foreigners in a region 
because the average cohort size of the rest of the foreign groups becomes too small to allow 
us a further separation. Our results do not reveal a significant moderating effect between the 
share of foreigners in a region and the proportion of them with tertiary education in any of our 
models. However, we find that the proportion of low-educated immigrants positively 
moderates the effect of the total share of foreigners on natives’ attitudes toward immigrants 
with respect to the country’s economy, at the 1 percent level of significance.  
In particular, our results indicate that when the proportion of low-skilled immigrants in 
a region is low (one standard deviation below the mean) increasing the total share of 
foreigners from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the 
mean decreases perceived economic threat by 5.3 per cent. On the contrary, when the 
proportion of low-skilled immigrants in a region is high (one standard deviation above the 
mean) our results indicate that increasing the total share of foreigners from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean increases perceived 
economic threat by 4.0 percent. 
 Similarly, in the cultural threat model we find a significant moderating effect, at the 5 
per cent level, between the total share of foreigners in a region and the proportion of them 
with primary or lower secondary education. More specifically, our results show that when the 
proportion of low-skilled immigrants in a region is low (one standard deviation below the 
mean) increasing the total share of foreigners from one standard deviation below the mean to 
one standard deviation above the mean decreases perceived cultural threat by 2.7 percent.  On 
the other hand, when the proportion of low-skilled immigrants in a region is high (one 




foreigners from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the 
mean increases perceived cultural threat by 2.9 per cent. 
 
Table 3.11 Interaction effect between immigrant values and the skill level of immigrants 
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Log-likelihood -200,566 -206,248 -195,565 
Observations 95,099 95,314 95,260 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered 
by region, are presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0 .05, ***p ≤ 0 .01. Our estimations use both design and 




Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the predictive margins with a 95 percent confidence interval for 




lower secondary education, for the economic threat and cultural threat models respectively. 
The graphs illustrate that the positive effect of the total share of foreigners on anti-immigrant 
attitudes, with respect to the country’s economy and culture, is stronger in regions where the 
percentage of low-educated immigrants is higher. However, we do not find any significant 
moderating effect between the size and the skill level of the immigrant population in the 
overall threat model. 
 
















3.5.3 Robustness analysis 
 
To further evaluate the robustness of our main results we also conduct some sensitivity tests. 
First, we estimate alternative model specifications by including additional control variables. 
In our model we introduce generalized social trust and institutional trust at the regional level 
as proxies of informal and formal institutions in regions respectively. Each variable is used in 
a separate specification and by replacing the variable of GDP per capita, which controls for 
the regional economic performance, due to multicollinearity. Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix present the results with alternative control variables. Our estimates do not change 
much and remain significant after the inclusion of alternative controls. 
In addition, following Bridges and Mateut (2014) we exclude from our sample the 
respondents of the regions with the most and least negative attitude toward immigrants. More 




Akershus (NO1) in the economic threat model, the regions of Central Greece (GR2) and 
Helsinki, South Finland and Aland (FI1820) in the cultural threat model, and finally, the 
regions of Central Greece (GR2) and East Sweden (SE1) in the overall threat model, as they 
appear to be the most anti-immigration and pro-immigration regions respectively. We find 
that our results do not alter much when we exclude from our analysis the respondents of these 
regions. Table A3 in the Appendix reports these results. 
Finally, as mentioned in the data and methods section, we additionally measure the 
regional foreign population, first based only on individuals’ nationality and second based only 
on their country of birth. Comparing with our initial measure of foreign population, the share 
of foreign nationals also includes those individuals who, even if they were born in the host 
country, still hold only their home nationality. Therefore, the measure based on individuals’ 
nationality, even if not perfect, could capture some aspect of the second-generation 
immigrants that might affect anti-immigrant attitudes. As Table A4 in the Appendix shows, 
the results of this measure, although slightly less strong in magnitude in some cases, are quite 
similar to those presented before. In addition, Table A5 in the Appendix reports the 
coefficient estimates based on individuals’ country of birth.22 Although the size of some of the 
coefficients and their statistical significance differ a bit from those of Table 3.9, the results 
based on this measure do not change much either.  
 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate factors affecting national attitudes toward 
immigrants based on the characteristics of the immigrants living in the region.  To do so, we 
combine data from the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the European Social 
                                                             
22 Our empirical findings partly confirm those of Markaki and Longhi (2013), who use the same measure and 




Survey (ESS) over the period 2004-2012, from 78 regions of 16 European countries. The 
theories suggest several explanations for natives’ attitudes toward immigrants.   First, 
economic competition theory contends that anti-immigrant attitudes increase when economic 
conditions decline.  Second, conflict theory proposes cultural distance and different values 
between immigrants and nationals generate more negative attitudes toward immigrants. Third, 
contact theory competes with conflict theory in maintaining that more interaction with 
immigrants who have different values causes nationals to have less negative attitudes toward 
them.  Using these three theories, we then develop models to explore key factors that shape 
attitudes toward immigrants.    
Our empirical results show that the total share of foreigners is not a significant 
predictor in any of our models. These findings are consistent with the empirical studies of 
Rustenbach (2010) and Karreth et al. (2015). Neither study found evidence that the regional 
proportion of immigrants has an impact on anti-immigrant attitudes. However, the results of 
previous research are mixed. Some studies show that a larger population of immigrants in the 
region increases perceived threats (Schlueter and Wagner 2008; Markaki and Longhi 2013) in 
contrast to others which find that the perceived threat from immigrants decreases with the 
percentage of immigrants present at regional level (Weber 2015).  
Moreover, we find that a higher regional percentage of EU foreigners decreases the 
natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes in both economic and cultural threat models. As the EU 
foreigners mainly represent the highly-educated immigrants in a region, these findings could 
be explained by economic theory which suggests that natives might favour highly-skilled 
immigration that benefits the country’s economy. However, we find that the proportion of 
highly-skilled immigrants in a region has no significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes. 
Thus, some other plausible economic explanations of these findings could be that there are 




welfare state. In addition, since the EU foreigners have values more similar to those of 
natives, allowing them to integrate better into the social life of host communities, our findings 
can also be supported by conflict theory.  
Furthermore, the results of our analysis support our assumption that where immigrants 
to a region come from outside the EU both the perceived economic and cultural threat from 
immigration increase, with the latter threat perceived to be greater.  These results are 
consistent with the findings of Markaki and Longhi (2013). Moreover, our results indicate that 
greater cultural distance between nationals and immigrants living in the region produces 
stronger negative attitudes toward immigrants.   Perceptions of cultural distance or difference 
in common values may derive from observed physical difference or from more ideological 
and behavioral differences, including religious beliefs and practices. In particular, our 
findings show that natives living in regions with higher percentages of foreigners coming 
from European countries outside of the EU are more likely to believe that the cultural life in 
their country is undermined. Additionally, we find that a larger-sized foreign population from 
the Middle East and North African countries increases both the perceived economic and 
cultural threat from immigration. Considering that the Middle East and North African foreign 
group geographically represents the Muslim communities, these findings are similar to those 
of Green et al. (2010) who find that a high proportion of Muslim immigrants in a Swiss 
municipality increases the perceived threat from immigration. Finally, the foreign group Other 
African has a positive impact on anti-immigrant attitudes with respect to perceived 
undermining of a country’s culture but also on overall life satisfaction. 
Regarding the skill level of immigrants, our findings do not reveal any significant 
direct effect of immigrants with high-level qualifications on anti-immigrant attitudes. 
Similarly, in his empirical analysis about Western Europe, Weber (2015) finds that the 




the perceived threat of immigration. However, we find some evidence that immigrants with 
low-level qualifications have a small but statistically significant effect on natives’ attitudes 
towards immigrants with respect to country’s economy. Therefore, we confirm the results of 
Markaki and Longhi (2013) who also find that a higher proportion of immigrants with low 
education decreases the perceived economic threat of immigration in European regions. A 
plausible explanation for this finding could be that immigrants with low qualifications might 
be perceived by the natives more as a cheap labour force rather than as a substitute for their 
own low-skilled segment.  
Nevertheless, the proportion of low-educated immigrants in a region does not seem to 
have any significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes in the rest of the models. Thus, our 
findings are partly consistent with those of Schneider (2008) who found that, in European 
countries, a higher percentage of low-educated immigrants does not increase the negative 
attitudes of natives towards immigration. Finally, our empirical results reveal some 
moderating effects between the size and the skill level of the immigrant population. More 
specifically, we find that the positive effect of the total share of foreigners on natives’ 
attitudes toward immigrants, with respect to the country’s economy and culture, is stronger in 
regions where the percentage of low-educated immigrants is higher.  
An important insight from our study emerges in the finding that the origin of 
immigrants living in a European region appears to be key in natives’ attitudes toward 
immigration. A higher proportion of EU foreigners in a region decreases anti-immigrant 
attitudes while a larger non-EU foreign population is found to increase them. By looking at 
the proportion of non-EU foreigners in a region in a finer grain, where we are able to separate 
them according to region of origin, we discern a hierarchy in terms of the preferability of 
foreigners from one region relative to those of another region. We find Middle East and North 




communities, to elicit the most negative attitudes toward immigrants. This 
suggests that a greater degree of perceived cultural distance and difference proves decisive in 
shaping anti-immigrant attitudes. In other words, Muslims are perceived as more divergent in 
values from European attitude-holders than are Asians or Latin Americans. The more that the 
values of the immigrants present in a region diverge from those of the nationals of that region, 
the more an immigrant threat is perceived and this produces a stronger anti-immigrant 
attitude.   
Of course, this study is not without limitations. First, as described before in the data 
and methods section, using the EU-LFS data we are not able to actually measure the second-
generation immigrants, neither by the share of foreign-born nor by the share of foreign 
nationals in a region. However, many second-generation immigrants are not fully integrated 
into the local communities and might be discriminated against although they have been 
naturalized. Moreover, our study examines anti-immigrant attitudes without focusing on a 
specific segment of the native population. Thus, an interesting extension of this work will be 
to examine cross-level interaction effects and investigate how origin or skill level of 
immigrants interacts with the education level, employment status or political affiliation of 
natives. Finally, following the main results of this study, future work may examine degrees of 
cultural distance and identify the factors that comprise cultural differences.  It may be 
interesting to know if it is ideology, traditions, experiences, religious practice or other traits 
that prove most important in the mind of the attitude holder who perceives cultural distance.  
More in-depth knowledge of the immigrant traits that drive anti-immigrant attitudes could 
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Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, are 
presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0 .05, ***p ≤ 0 .01. Our estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the 
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   -.178*** 
    (.062) 
   -.171*** 
   (.062) 
      -.166*** 
      (.059) 
-.174*** 
  (.061) 
   -.157*** 
(.061) 
   -.150*** 





  -.209*** 
   (.038) 
Constant       5.81 
    (.348) 
     5.77 
   (.343) 
       5.74 





  5.04 
  (.328) 
6.28 
(.196) 
  5.12 
 (.178) 
   6.17 
   (.211) 
Random-effect 
parameters 
         
Individual var. 
component 
      4.24 
    (.083) 
      4.24 
    (.083) 
        4.24 











   3.76 
   (.068) 
Region var. 
component 
      .243 
    (.052) 
      .269 
    (.058) 
       .281 











   .158 
   (.032) 
Log-likelihood -200,570  -200,562     -200,551 -206,246   -206,231 -206,215 -195,538 -195,533    -195,521 
Observations   95,099     95,099  95,099   95,314   95,314   95,314   95,260    95,260      95,260 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, are 
presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0 .05, ***p ≤ 0 .01. Our estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the 









































  .003 
(.018) 





     -.059** 
   (.029) 
 -.056* 
(.031) 
    -.088*** 
(.032) 
   -.081*** 
 (.031) 
   -.062** 
  (.027) 
   -.060** 
   (.026) 
% Non-EU 
Foreigners 
     .043** 
   (.019) 
      .064** 
(.026) 
   .019 




  .039 
(.029) 
     .074*** 
 (.025) 
    .025 
   (.024) 
% Middle East 
& Northern 
Africa 
     .217** 
(.091) 
      .243** 
  (.099) 
      .144* 







     .177* 
  (.108) 
      .149* 
   (.082) 
% East & 
South Asia 
  -.062 
(.064) 
   -.031 
  (.078) 
    -.073 










    .268 
  (.223) 
     .077 










     -.004 




   -.005 




       -.006* 




   -.001 




     -.002 
    (.002) 
      -.051 
  (.055) 
 
      -.003 




   .000 
  (.002) 
 
     
 
   -.000 
   (.002) 
  -.048 
   (.051) 
 
      -.001 




     -.002 
    (.003)  
    -.001 
   (.003) 
       -.001 
(.003) 
   -.002 
  (.003) 
     -.001 
    (.003) 
      -.001 
     (.003) 
    .001 
(.002) 
    .002 
(.002) 
   .003 
   (.002) 
% 
Unemployment 
    .034*** 
    (.010) 
 
    .034*** 
   (.009) 
 
       .032*** 
      (.009) 
-.023*** 
  (.007) 
   -.023*** 
(.007) 
   -.024*** 





   -.011 
   (.007) 
GDP per capita 
(000s) 
     .001 
    (.007) 
    .002 
   (.007) 
       .000 
      (.008) 
  -.002 
  (.007) 
    -.000 
(.007) 
     -.005 
  (.008) 




  -.001 
   (.006) 
Constant       4.85 
    (.268) 
     4.80 
   (.277) 
       4.87 





  4.40 
  (.238) 
5.10 
(.159) 
  5.06 
 (.167) 
   5.12 
   (.179) 
Random-effect 
parameters 
         
Individual var. 
component 
      4.24 
    (.083) 
      4.24 
    (.083) 
        4.24 











   3.76 
   (.068) 
Region var. 
component 
      .209 
    (.040) 
      .244 
    (.049) 
       .254 











   .137 
   (.030) 
Log-likelihood -199,332  -199,324     -199,310 -203,854   -203,837 -206,224 -192,879 -192,873    -192,858 
Observations   93,248     93,248  93,248   90,599   90,599   90,599   92,264    92,264      92,264 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, are 
presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0 .05, ***p ≤ 0 .01. Our estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the 









































  .004 
(.017) 





     -.046* 
   (.025) 
 -.045* 
(.026) 
    -.081*** 
(.029) 
   -.076*** 
 (.028) 
   -.057** 
  (.025) 
   -.053** 
   (.024) 
% Non-EU 
Nationals 
     .043** 
   (.019) 
      .066*** 
(.025) 
   .023 




  .045 
(.028) 
     .078*** 
 (.024) 
    .037 
   (.024) 
% Middle East 
& Northern 
Africa 
     .199** 
(.090) 
      .222** 
  (.090) 
    .115 







     .177* 
  (.099) 
      .148* 
   (.084) 
% East & 
South Asia 
  -.073 
(.063) 
   -.039 
  (.076) 
    -.088 










    .258 
  (.209) 
     .076 










     -.005 




   -.005* 




       -.006** 




   -.001 




     -.002 
    (.003) 
      -.049 
  (.055) 
 
      -.003 




   .000 
  (.002) 
 
     
 
   -.000 
   (.002) 
  -.046 
   (.050) 
 
      -.001 




     -.002 
    (.003)  
    -.001 
   (.003) 
       -.006 
(.003) 
   -.002 
  (.003) 
     -.001 
    (.003) 
      -.001 
     (.003) 
    .001 
(.002) 
    .002 
(.002) 
   .002 
   (.002) 
% 
Unemployment 
    .034*** 
    (.009) 
 
    .033*** 
   (.009) 
 
       .032*** 
      (.009) 
-.024*** 
  (.007) 
   -.024*** 
(.006) 
   -.025*** 





   -.010 
   (.007) 
GDP per capita 
(000s) 
     .000 
    (.006) 
    .001 
   (.006) 
       .000 
      (.006) 
  -.004 
  (.007) 
    -.002 
(.007) 
     -.008 
  (.008) 




  -.004 
   (.006) 
Constant       4.88 
    (.257) 
     4.83 
   (.265) 
       4.89 





  4.46 
  (.247) 
5.17 
(.174) 
  5.12 
 (.182) 
   5.17 
   (.195) 
Random-effect 
parameters 
         
Individual var. 
component 
      4.24 
    (.083) 
      4.24 
    (.083) 
        4.24 











   3.76 
   (.068) 
Region var. 
component 
      .207 
    (.039) 
      .241 
    (.048) 
       .244 











   .164 
   (.035) 
Log-likelihood -200,586  -200,578     -200,564 -206,259   -206,241 -206,223 -195,570 -195,563    -195,548 
Observations   95,099     95,099  95,099   95,314   95,314   95,314   95,260    95,260      95,260 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, are 
presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0 .05, ***p ≤ 0 .01. Our estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the 









































  .007 
(.015) 
  -.007 
(.011) 
  
% EU  
Foreign-born 
     -.058* 
   (.030) 
 -.050 
(.031) 
    -.090*** 
(.031) 
   -.079*** 
 (.031) 
   -.064** 
  (.026) 
   -.060** 
   (.026) 
% Non-EU 
Foreign-born 
     .034** 
   (.014) 
      .052*** 
(.020) 
   .019 




  .035 
(.029) 
     .059** 
 (.025) 
    .027 
   (.022) 
% Middle East 
& Northern 
Africa 
     .086* 
(.046) 
      .126** 
  (.052) 
    .049 







     .088* 
  (.070) 
      .099** 
   (.049) 
% East & 
South Asia 
  -.020 
(.043) 
   -.025 
  (.063) 
    -.037 








   .267* 
(.160) 
       .381** 
  (.186) 
     .194 










     -.003 




   -.003 




       -.006** 




    .001 




      .000 
    (.003) 
      -.024 
  (.060) 
 
      -.001 




   .001 
  (.003) 
 
     
 
    .003 
   (.003) 
  -.046 
   (.029) 
 
      -.000 




     -.002 
    (.003)  
    -.001 
   (.003) 
       -.006 
(.003) 
   -.001 
  (.004) 
     -.001 
    (.004) 
      -.002 
     (.004) 
    .003 
(.003) 
    .003 
(.003) 
   .002 
   (.002) 
% 
Unemployment 
    .033*** 
    (.009) 
 
    .031*** 
   (.009) 
 
       .032*** 
      (.009) 
-.025*** 
  (.007) 
   -.027*** 
(.006) 
   -.026*** 





   -.010 
   (.007) 
GDP per capita 
(000s) 
     .000 
    (.006) 
    .001 
   (.006) 
       .000 
      (.006) 
  -.005 
  (.008) 
    -.005 
(.007) 
     -.010 
  (.008) 




  -.005 
   (.007) 
Constant       4.82 
    (.262) 
     4.88 
   (.274) 
       4.89 





  4.52 
  (.280) 
5.09 
(.176) 
  5.14 
 (.180) 
   5.20 
   (.203) 
Random-effect 
parameters 
         
Individual var. 
component 
      4.24 
    (.083) 
      4.24 
    (.083) 
        4.24 











   3.76 
   (.068) 
Region var. 
component 
      .220 
    (.041) 
      .247 
    (.049) 
       .244 











   .158 
   (.034) 
Log-likelihood -200,589  -200,581     -200,564 -206,260   -206,242 -206,224 -195,569 -195,560    -195,547 
Observations   95,099     95,099  95,099   95,314   95,314   95,314   95,260    95,260      95,260 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, are 
presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0 .05, ***p ≤ 0 .01. Our estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the 
ESS. All regressions in this table control for individual characteristics and time fixed effects. For German regions only, due to data 




Chapter 4  
Immigration and electoral support for the radical right: Evidence 







The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the impact of international immigration 
on political outcomes in the Netherlands. More precisely, we investigate how the stock of 
immigrants and the immigrant inflows to Dutch municipalities affect electoral support for the 
country’s radical right parties. Thus, the current study complements previous empirical 
research on individual attitudes towards immigrants and contributes to the growing literature 
on immigration and political preferences by providing empirical evidence from the 
Netherlands. Our dataset consists of 338 Dutch municipalities and covers the four national 
elections that took place in the country during the decade 2003-2012. The results of this study 
indicate that, although an increase in the share of foreign-born immigrants within a 
municipality does not increase the vote share of the radical right, increases in immigrant 
inflows have a positive and statistically significant effect on voting in support of radical right 
parties. Our empirical analysis leads to several other findings, including that the share of 
second-generation immigrants negatively affects anti-immigrant votes, while, in line with 
previous studies, we find that cultural distance between natives and immigrants is a 















Throughout Europe in recent years, a considerable number of ‘extreme-right’ parties, as they 
are most often referred to, have been gaining popularity and influencing the formation of 
public opinion. In France, the far-right ‘Front National’ party of Marine Le Pen scored its 
highest ever percentage of votes when it won through to the second round of the presidential 
elections in the spring of 2017. Shortly before that, at the national elections taking place in the 
Netherlands, the populist radical-right ‘Party for Freedom’ of Geert Wilders came second, 
increasing its previous number of seats in the parliament. Only a few months earlier, in 
summer of 2016, the right-wing populist ‘UK Independence Party’ had managed to play a 
major role in the ‘Brexit’ referendum by promoting itself as a nativist nationalist political 
movement.  
In Italy, the right-wing anti-immigrant parties ‘North League’ and ‘Brothers of Italy’ 
have been among the big winners in the recent general election of 2018, gaining significant 
political power in parliament. The increasing popularity of the xenophobic party ‘Alternative 
for Germany’ in the last German federal elections of 2017 is a further typical example of the 
radical right’s electoral success in Western Europe. In addition, in the same year, the right-
wing populist ‘Freedom Party of Austria’ finished third in the Austrian legislative elections, 
only one parliamentary seat behind the party who came second. In Scandinavia three out of 
four countries, Denmark, Finland and Norway, have formed coalition governments with the 
support of right-wing populist parties, whilst in Sweden the nationalist party ‘Sweden 
Democrats’ impressively jumped to third place at the last general election in 2014.  
The summary of electoral outcomes presented above highlights that the success of 
radical right parties is an ongoing reality in the political landscape of Europe. One way to 
explain this growing phenomenon is to assume that the high concentration of foreigners and 




support for parties with strong anti-immigrant political agendas (Lubbers et al., 2002; Golder, 
2003; Van der Brug and Fennema; 2009). Additionally, others might argue that increasing 
inequality in Western democracies and the economic recession that followed the recent 
financial crisis in many European countries have tended to sharpen the existing negative 
attitudes toward foreigners. They may also have acted to enlarge the perceived threat of 
immigration because of the significant impact of migrants on the labour market and welfare 
state (Card, 2001; Borjas, 2003; Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Dustmann et al., 2010). A more 
complex reasoning attempts to link the increasing popularity of radical right parties with a 
general disaffection from the traditional political system or with the rising trend of 
Euroscepticism and ethnic exclusion in the continent that stems from intensive globalization 
(Norris, 2005; Werts et al., 2013, Hatton, 2016). 
The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the impact of international 
immigration on political outcomes in the Netherlands. More precisely, we investigate how the 
stock of immigrants and the immigrant inflows to Dutch municipalities affect electoral 
support for the radical right parties in the country. Thus, our work contributes to the growing 
literature on immigration and political preferences by providing empirical evidence from the 
Netherlands. Additionally, in this study we differentiate ourselves from previous empirical 
research by exploring and comparing the short-term effect of immigration (immigrant 
inflows) and its longer-term impact (immigrant stock) on the vote share of the radical right. 
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, the current work is the only empirical study of the 
related literature that distinguishes first- and second-generation immigrants. Our dataset 
consists of 338 Dutch municipalities and covers the four national elections that took place in 
the country during the decade 2003-2012.  
The results of this study indicate that, although an increase in the share of foreign-born 




increases in immigrant inflows have a positive and statistically significant effect on voting in 
support of radical right parties. Our empirical analysis leads to several other findings 
including that the share of second-generation immigrants negatively affects anti-immigrant 
votes, while similarly to previous studies, cultural distance between natives and immigrants is 
a significant determinant of the electoral support for the radical right. 
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical background of 
our study and reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes our dataset and explains the 
methods used to perform the analysis. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis. 
Finally, Section 5 provides a discussion of our findings and offers some conclusions. 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
4.2.1 Identify radical right parties 
 
As implied by the previous section, different labels such as ‘extreme-right’, ‘right-wing 
populist’, ‘far-right’ and ‘radical-right’ are used to refer to the same family of parties in both 
the academic and pubic spheres of political discourse. Although an in-depth discussion about 
this battle of terminology is beyond the scope of this study, one question that needs to be 
answered is how the ideology, and thus the classification of a political party, is determined. 
As proposed by Mudde (2007), all members of the populist radical right party family share 
some core ideological features. According to the author, these parties are characterized first 
by a strong nationalist orientation, second by xenophobia, third by an authoritarian attitude 
and finally by a populist rhetoric. 
In this study, we follow Wagner and Meyer (2017) to identify which political parties 
may be classified as radical right in the Netherlands. The authors based their classification on 
information derived from the Manifesto Project23, which analyzes parties’ electoral manifestos 
                                                             




and categorizes them according to their policy preferences and positions. According to 
Wagner and Meyer (2017), there are two parties that may be classified as members of the 
radical right party family for the time period that our sample covers. These parties are the Lijst 
Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV)24. For the rest of this study, we use the 
term ‘radical right’ to refer to these political parties. 
4.2.2 Explanations of voting for radical right parties 
 
There are several demand-side and supply-side explanations of the electoral success of radical 
right parties (Norris, 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Van der Brug and Fennema; 2007 & 2009; 
Golder, 2016). Demand-side explanations focus on individual-level factors that determine 
voting in support of these parties, whereas supply-side explanations highlight the importance 
of a strong party organization and other external factors such as political opportunity 
structures. According to the literature, a ‘demand’ for radical right parties can be generated as 
a reaction to the transition to a post-modern society (Ignazi, 1992). This argument claims that 
support for the radical right can be derived from people with strong conservative moral values 
who are against post-materialist values such as gender equality, sexual freedom and cultural 
pluralism, or from individuals who are opposite to the general trend of globalization.  
Another demand-side explanation of the radical right’s success emphasizes the role of 
ethnic competition between natives and immigrants. First, competition over scarce economic 
sources becomes quite intense when there is an increasing number of immigrants and 
generates strong anti-immigrant attitudes within a society (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; 
Mayda, 2006). These attitudes can become even more negative during periods of economic 
recession, which are characterized by high unemployment or increasing inequality, as the 
local population blame the ‘out-group’ members for the poor economic conditions (Lubbers et 
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al. 2002; Golder, 2003). Second, ethnic competition between natives and immigrants might be 
motivated by differences in social norms and cultural values, including religious beliefs and 
customs. Thus, the socio-cultural aspect of ethnic competition supports the idea that 
immigration can be perceived as a threat to the ethnic identity and social cohesion of the 
native population (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007).  
Finally from the demand-side, the electoral success of radical right parties can be 
explained as a result of strategic voting. This can encourage particular coalition-building 
(Givens, 2005), and is often a protest vote based on the assumption that voters for these 
parties are against the political regime or generally disaffected from the established political 
elites (Van den Brug et al., 2005; Norris, 2005). 
Although sufficient demand is an important prerequisite for the radical right parties to 
succeed, supply-side factors can further explain why some of those parties eventually perform 
better than others. First, internal supply-side explanations include party-specific 
characteristics and organizational features. More specifically, a charismatic leadership or the 
ability of the party to effectively link crucial socio-economic issues, such as security concerns 
and high unemployment, to immigration appears to play a crucial role in the success of radical 
right parties and the consolidation of their political power (Williams, 2006; Mudde, 2007).  
External supply-side explanations focus on exogenous factors, particularly on political 
opportunity (Van den Brug et al., 2005; Mudde, 2007; Golder, 2016). Kitschelt (1995) argues 
that the radical right parties can perform well when the mainstream right parties converge to 
the centre, thereby providing available political space for the radical right to occupy. Electoral 
rules, too, can create favourable political conditions for the emergence of radical right parties. 
Electoral systems that translate votes proportionately into parliamentary seats encourage both 
the formation and success of small political parties such as the radical right (Norris, 2005; 




citizenship regimes and other integration politics can also significantly affect the mobilization 
of radical right parties. Finally, another external factor that might influence the support of 
these parties is their media coverage. The way that the media frames the position of the 
radical right in the public sphere can be critical in determining its electoral success (Mudde, 
2007; Ellinas, 2010; Golder, 2016). 
As presented above, immigration can be part of both demand-side and supply-side 
explanations of the radical right’s success. The subsection that follows provides the 
framework for understanding further how immigration determines the success of radical right 
parties, both directly through the ethnic competition between natives and immigrants and 
indirectly by immigration being used as a scapegoat by political actors. 
4.2.3 Natives’ attitudes towards immigration 
 
The existing literature distinguishes between economic and non-economic channels through 
which are determined both the attitude of individuals towards immigrants and thus demand 
for the radical right. In particular, public opinion on immigration seems to be shaped by both 
labour market conditions and welfare system characteristics (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; 
Hanson et al. 2007; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009), and by social 
or cultural factors within the local community (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). 
Economic theory suggests that immigration has a profound impact on the labour 
market by affecting the potential wages and the employment opportunities of natives. On one 
hand, immigration may depress the wages and decrease the job opportunities of some 
unskilled natives or those workers for whom migrants’ labour can be considered a possible 
substitute (Card, 2001; Borjas, 2003; Card, 2005; Dustman et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
immigration can have a positive effect on the average wage of native workers as many of 




immigrants (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Docquier et al., 2013; Peri, 
2014).  
In addition, because of the redistributive effects of taxes and benefits there are 
important fiscal consequences of immigration in receiving countries. The participation of 
immigrants in the social security system and welfare programs may have significant fiscal 
spillover effects through the contributions that foreigners pay and the public benefits they 
receive (Lee and Miller, 2000; Dustmann et al., 2010; De la Rica et al., 2015). Consequently, 
natives who benefit economically from the presence of immigrants in the country are likely to 
support more open immigration policies, while those who are negatively influenced by them 
tend to prefer the restriction of immigrant inflows (economic competition theory). 
Beside the economic determinants, the literature emphasizes the importance of social 
and cultural factors in shaping public attitudes. Increasing immigration imposes non-
economic negative externalities on the local society by changing the composition of the host 
country’s population. Therefore, natives’ attitudes toward immigrants are likely to be 
influenced by concerns about ‘compositional amenities’ associated with immigrants having 
common language, customs and religion within their neighborhoods or workplaces (Card et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, racial prejudices that claim immigrants are more likely than natives 
to be involved in criminal activities have been a cause for additional security concerns 
(Mayda, 2006). 
Cultural distance between natives and immigrants may also affect individual attitudes 
toward immigration. The different values and perceptions held by people coming from other 
ethnic backgrounds can be perceived as a threat to the national identity and culture of the 
native population (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007). As stated by 
Dustmann and Preston (2001), increasing immigrant inflows can determine individual 




and social interaction with immigrants could eliminate the existing racial prejudices of natives 
(contact theory). But a high concentration of immigrants in local society is also likely to be 
perceived as a threat to ethnic identity and cultural values of the indigenous population 
(conflict theory). 
Additionally, natives’ attitudes toward immigrants, which in turn determine their 
political preferences and voting behaviour, can be also indirectly shaped or manipulated by 
politics (Norris, 2005). Radical right parties often target immigrants as the cause of several 
problems such as high unemployment, increasing crime rates or other security threats such as 
terrorism (Williams, 2006). Therefore, public attitudes on immigration might be 
instrumentally shaped by the anti-immigrant rhetoric of some political actors. Consequently, 
as already suggested, ethnic competition between natives and immigrants can generate a 
direct demand for radical right parties. But at the same time, supply-side factors, such as the 
skill of political actors in associating immigration with many of the problems of society, can 
determine the extent to which public demand for the radical right is developed. In this way, 
the impact of international immigration on the electoral support of radical right parties can be 
seen as a result of inherent interaction between demand and supply factors. This might be a 
plausible explanation for any conflicting findings across case studies from different countries. 
 
4.3 Empirical findings of prior research25 
 
Previous research has shown that in recent decades in Europe the size of immigrant 
population has had a serious impact, in terms of both strength and significance, on radical 
right voting (Lubbers et al., 2002; Davis and Deole, 2017). Several recent empirical studies 
find a significantly positive effect of immigration on the electoral support for radical right 
parties in many European countries. 
                                                             
25 In this subsection, to maintain consistency with the terminology of the literature, we refer to the political 




More specifically, Otto and Steinhardt (2014) find that an increase in the share of 
foreigners, defined by citizenship, within a city district of Hamburg is associated with an 
increase in electoral support for xenophobic extreme right-wing parties. Using data from the 
Austrian regions, Halla et al. (2017) find that the presence in one’s neighborhood of 
immigrants, measured again as residents without Austrian citizenship, has a positive and 
significant effect on votes for the extreme right. Additionally, the authors find that this result 
is driven by the presence of low- and medium-skilled immigrants. Furthermore, Harmon 
(2017) shows a positive and significant effect for changes in the percentages of non-nationals 
in Danish municipalities on changes in the electoral support for the country’s anti-immigrant 
nationalist parties. Similarly, the findings of Gerdes and Wadensjö (2010) for Danish 
municipalities indicate that increases in the share of non-Western immigrants (born outside 
the EU and OECD countries) within a municipality leads to the country’s two anti-
immigration parties winning votes in the local elections.  
Using data from Swedish municipalities, Rydgren and Ruth (2011) also conclude that 
the proportion of foreign-born immigrants is positively related to electoral support for the 
radical right-wing party in the country. However, when the authors distinguish between EU 
and Non-EU immigrants, contrary to their expectations, they do not find any significant 
evidence that a higher proportion of Non-EU immigrants in a municipality increases electoral 
support for the radical right. In their recently published study for Switzerland, Brunner and 
Kuhn (2018) show that the share of culturally different immigrants, based on their country of 
origin, significantly affects voting in favour of that country’s right-wing party, while the 
number of culturally similar immigrants does not seem to be a significant determinant of 
natives’ voting behaviour in Swiss communities. In another study for Spain, Mendez and 




only from African countries, are positively correlated with changes in the ratio of the vote for 
anti-immigration formations in the presidential elections.  
Providing evidence from the municipalities of Italy, Barone et al. (2016) find that a 
higher share of foreign-born immigrants within the municipality increases votes at national 
elections for the centre-right coalition which has a political agenda less favourable to 
immigrants. In addition, the authors show that the positive effect of immigration on anti-
immigrant voting is stronger in those municipalities where religious diversity is stronger. 
Furthermore, using data from the presidential elections that took place in France in 2012 and 
applying a multilevel analysis, Rojon (2013) reveals a positive relationship between the share 
of foreign-born immigrants and the level of support for the extreme-right party ‘Front 
National’, at the departmental level of the country’s administrative divisions. However, 
according to the author, the above relationship turns negative at the level of communes which 
is the lowest administrative level in France. Finally, the results of Becker and Fetzer (2016) 
suggest that a UK district that experiences a large inflow of immigrants from Eastern 
European countries, due to accession of new members states to the EU, experiences a 
significant increase in the vote share of the anti-immigration ‘UK Independence Party’ in 
European parliament elections.  
From the findings summarized in the literature review above, it appears that both stock 
and inflows of immigrants (in terms of country of birth or nationality) are positively 
associated with electoral support for radical right parties. In addition, much of the prior 
empirical research has found that the type of immigrants (e.g. Western/Non-Western) 
significantly affects voting in favour of the radical right. In the case of the Netherlands, to the 




of immigration on electoral support for the radical right.26 Therefore, this study contributes to 
the existing literature by providing empirical evidence from the Dutch municipalities. The 
next section describes the data and methods used in the analysis. 
 
4.4 Data and Methods 
4.4.1 Data description 
 
We use a panel dataset that covers 338 Dutch municipalities for which we observe the 
outcomes of national elections held in the Netherlands in 2003, 2006, 2010 and 2012. Our 
data are drawn from two different sources.  
First, we use information on election results in Dutch municipalities from the Electoral 
Council (Kiesraad). We restrict our attention to the national elections where only Dutch 
nationals are eligible to vote.27 Thus, our dependent variable is the share of votes that the 
radical right parties of the country, LPF in 2003 and PVV in 2006, 2010 and 2012, got in each 
municipality in national elections. 
Our second source of data is the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of the Netherlands 
from where we collected demographic data and the other socio-economic information use to 
construct our control variables. To measure the effect of immigration on election outcomes 
we use demographic data on both immigrant stock and inflows with respect to country of 
birth. Therefore, our main independent variables of interest include the stock of immigrants 
and the number of immigrant inflows, both as a share of total population in each municipality. 
In addition, we distinguish the stock of immigrants between first and second-generation 
immigrants. According to the CBS, a first-generation immigrant is defined as a person born 
                                                             
26 A similar study is that of Koopmans and Muis (2009) which examines the effect of immigration on public 
opinion support for Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Contrary to what the authors expect, they conclude that immigration 
did not affect the opinion polls during the election campaign. 
27 According to the ‘Maastricht Treaty’ of European Union (EU) foreigners from EU countries who are residents 




abroad and having at least one parent born abroad. A second-generation immigrant is any 
person born in the Netherlands having at least one parent born abroad. Moreover, we further 
differentiate between western and non-western immigrants. This categorization of immigrants 
is made by CBS on the basis of their socio-economic and cultural characteristics. In 
particular, CBS counts as western immigrants those persons who come into the Netherlands 
from countries in Europe (excluding Turkey), North America, Oceania, Indonesia and Japan. 
Non-western immigrants are those individuals who migrate from countries in Africa, Latin 
America, Asia (excluding Indonesia and Japan) and Turkey. 
In addition, we introduce a set of control variables in our empirical analysis to account 
for differences between Dutch municipalities. Following previous literature (Gerdes and 
Wadensjö, 2010; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Harmon, 2017), first we use population density 
and share of pensioners as socio-demographic control variables. Moreover, to control for 
differences across municipalities in labour market conditions and the qualification levels of 
citizens, we include the unemployment rate and the percentage of the active and non-working 
population with higher levels of education. Furthermore, the average value of houses in each 
municipality is used as a proxy for its economic prosperity.  
Finally, additional control variables are used as a robustness check. To capture the 
effect of crime on electoral support for the radical right, for each municipality we consider the 
number of suspects detained after a recorded criminal incident. In addition, voter turnout, 
which may affect election results through its disproportionate effect on different parties, is 
included in our robustness analysis. Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables 





Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
 
Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Radical Right Vote share 
 
1,352 9.09 5.46 1.68 38.70 
Total Immigrants share 
 
1,352 13.55 7.81 2.06 52.43 
Foreign-Born share 
 
1,352 6.40 4.49 1.00 36.80 
Second-Generation share 
 
1,352 7.15 3.61 1.06 21.89 
Western Immigrants share 
 
1,352 7.81 4.38 1.01 49.11 
Non-Western Immigrants share 
 
1,352 5.75 5.22 0.47 36.96 
Foreign Born  & Western share 
 
1,352 3.07 2.37 0.38 34.14 
Foreign Born & Non-Western share 
 
1,352 3.32 3.03 0.29 21.03 
Second-Gen. & Western share 
 
1,352 4.73 2.36 0.63 16.58 
Second-Gen. & Non-Western share 
 
1,352 2.42 2.25 0.16 16.25 
Total Immigrant Inflows share 
 
1,352 0.44 0.48 0.00 4.93 
Western Inflows share 
 
1,352 0.25 0.29 0.00 2.53 
Non-Western Inflows share 
 
1,352 0.19 0.27 0.00 4.26 
Pensioners share 
 
1,352 15.67 3.11 6.53 27.70 
Highly-Educated share 
 
1,352 22.36 7.29 0.00 50.00 
Unemployment rate 
 
1,352 4.57 0.96 3.00 10.50 
Population Density (inhabitants per km2) 
 
1,352 776.54 913.50 3.50 5,115.70 
Average House Value (in thousand Euro) 
 
1,352 220.54 75.51 76.00 672.00 
Crime Suspects (per 10,000 inhabitants) 
 
1,352 105.52 37.94 23.00 295.00 
Voter Turnout 
 






4.4.2 Empirical strategy 
 
To empirically investigate the relationship between immigration and electoral support for 
radical right parties in Dutch municipalities we estimate the following linear regression 
model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  
where 𝑖 indicates municipalities and 𝑡 indicates election year (𝑡 = 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012). 
The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the share of valid votes for radical right parties and the 
independent variable of interest 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the share of immigrants over total population or 
alternatively the number of immigrant inflows, occurring during the election year,28 as a share 
of total population. 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables aim to capture economic and other 
socio-demographic differences across municipalities. In addition, the model includes 
municipality fixed effects 𝑣𝑖 to control for all unobserved differences between municipalities 
that remain constant over the years, and time fixed effects 𝜂𝑡 to account for potential cyclical 
trends such as changes in political preferences at the country level. 29 Finally, 𝑖𝑡 represents 
the error term of the regression which captures all other factors that might affect voting for 
radical right parties. 
As we see above, our regression model includes two different measures to capture the 
effect of immigration on the vote share of radical right parties. The first measure is the total 
stock of immigrants that has accumulated over the years in Dutch municipalities and the 
second is the number of immigrant inflows to municipalities during the year of the election. 
Although the two measures are related (r=.53), they assess different aspects of the same 
phenomenon. The difference between them is that the stock variable measures the longer-term 
                                                             
28 For the years 2006, 2010 and 2012 when the national elections took place in the second half of the year, or 
close it, we use the number of immigrant inflows occur during the election year. For the national elections of 
2003 which held in late January, immigrant inflows of the year before the election year are used. 
29 Because to control for municipality-specific effects the use of a linear estimation model is required, we do not 




effects of immigration and the longer-term changes in stock of immigrants, whereas 
immigration inflows can capture the short-term effect of immigration on the electoral support 
for the radical right. As newcomers are more likely to generate stronger negative attitudes 
toward immigration, due to integration and assimilation issues, the two measures might 
generate different results. 
So far, we have indicated that we focus our analysis on the national elections because 
only Dutch nationals are eligible to vote in them. However, immigrants who have been 
naturalized and become Dutch citizens are also allowed to vote in these elections. The fixed 
effects setting of the model presented above allows us to assess variation within Dutch 
municipalities while accounting for stable unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore those 
immigrants who are naturalized, and thus eligible to vote, but who have been residing in the 
same municipality over the study period, will not directly impact the effect of the immigrant 
share on election outcomes. Thus, our fixed effects approach will minimize the potential 
confounding effect of the vote of the naturalized immigrant population that could otherwise 
skew the coefficient estimates. However, our estimates will capture the impact of the group of 
immigrants who obtain Dutch citizenship during the study period. 
4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Fixed-Effects Estimates of Immigrant Stock and Inflows 
 
Table 4.2 reports the correlations of all variables used in the study. Table 4.3 presents the 
fixed-effects estimates of the effects of immigrant stock on electoral support for the radical 
right. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level 
to account for potential heteroscedasticity and within panel serial correlation of the 
idiosyncratic error terms. Model 1 includes control variables only. We see that the share of 




effect, at the two-sided one percent level of significance, on the success of radical right 
parties. More specifically, a one percentage point increase in the share of pensioners within a 
Dutch municipality increases the vote share of the radical right by .449 percentage points. 
Nevertheless, population density and the average value of houses, representing the economic 
prosperity of municipalities, are found to have the opposite effect. The magnitude of these 
estimated effects, however, appears to be negligible. Finally, the estimated impacts of the 
share of highly educated and the unemployment rate appear to be insignificant. A plausible 
explanation of why, contrary to what we would expect, the share of the highly educated 
remains statistically insignificant across all the models, could be the fixed effect setting of our 
model. Since the fixed effects allow us to assess variation within Dutch municipalities, it 
might be possible that the coefficient of the variable is found statistically insignificant due to 
there being little variance in the share of highly educated within a municipality. The same 
might hold for the unemployment rate. 
In Model 2, the share of immigrants’ variable is added to the regression. Nevertheless, 
we do not find any significant relationship between the total share of immigrants living in the 
municipality and electoral support for radical right parties. Models 3 and 4 include instead the 
shares of first- and second-generation immigrants, respectively. Our results show that 
although the share of foreign-born immigrants does not affect the electoral outcomes, the 
share of second-generation immigrants has a negative and strongly significant impact on the 
success of the radical right. More precisely, our estimate indicates that a one percentage point 
increase in second-generation share decreases the vote share of radical right parties by 1.103 
percentage points.  
Furthermore, in Model 5 we differentiate between western and non-western 
immigrants. We find that the share of western immigrants has a strong negative and 




of significance. In particular, a one percentage point increase in the share of western 
immigrants decreases the vote share of radical right parties by .771 percentage points. On the 
contrary, the share of non-western immigrants is found to have a weak but positive impact on 
the success of the radical right with a statistically significant coefficient of .185, at the two-
sided ten percent level of significance. Finally, in Models 6 and 7 we further distinguish the 
western and non-western immigrants into first- and second-generation, respectively. We find 
no significant correlation between the share of foreign-born western immigrants and voting 
for the radical right, although the coefficient has a negative sign. However, the results suggest 
that a one percentage point increase in the share of foreign-born non-western immigrants is 
associated with an increase of .428 percentage points in the electoral support for radical right 
parties. The results in the last column of the table demonstrate that the share of second-
generation non-western immigrants has no significant impact on voting for the radical right, 
while the share of second-generation western ones has a very strong negative and statistically 








Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) Radical Right Vote share 1.00 
                   
(2) Total Immigrants share 0.22 1.00 
                  
(3) Foreign-Born share 0.17 0.97 1.00 
                 
(4) Second-Generation share 0.28 0.96 0.86 1.00 
                
(5) Western Immigrants share 0.25 0.77 0.72 0.78 1.00 
               
(6) Non-Western Immigrants share 0.13 0.85 0.85 0.77 0.32 1.00 
              
(7) Foreign Born  & Western share 0.19 0.75 0.78 0.65 0.93 0.34 1.00 
             
(8) Foreign Born & Non-Western share 0.10 0.85 0.87 0.76 0.34 0.99 0.37 1.00 
            
(9) Second-Gen. & Western share 0.27 0.68 0.55 0.80 0.92 0.25 0.71 0.25 1.00 
           
(10) Second-Gen. & Non-Western share 0.17 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.29 0.99 0.30 0.96 0.23 1.00 
          
(11) Total Immigrant Inflows share 0.07 0.53 0.62 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.54 0.49 0.25 0.35 1.00 
         
(12) Western Inflows share 0.14 0.52 0.60 0.38 0.51 0.35 0.64 0.38 0.29 0.30 0.86 1.00 
        
(13) Non-Western Inflows share -0.03 0.38 0.45 0.26 0.21 0.40 0.26 0.46 0.12 0.30 0.84 0.44 1.00 
       
(14) Pensioners share 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.28 -0.18 0.24 -0.18 0.29 -0.17 0.07 0.13 -0.00 1.00 
      
(15) Highly-Educated share 0.05 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.21 0.30 0.19 0.29 0.20 0.30 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.13 1.00 
     
(16) Unemployment rate 0.20 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.39 0.57 0.38 0.58 0.34 0.55 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.16 0.09 1.00 
    
(17) Population Density 0.11 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.34 0.67 0.32 0.67 0.31 0.66 0.29 0.26 0.23 -0.08 0.35 0.33 1.00 
   
(18) Average House Value 0.21 -0.11 -0.13 -0.07 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 -0.18 -0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.11 -0.11 0.40 0.40 -0.29 -0.11 1.00 
  
(19) Crime Suspects 0.02 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.24 0.68 0.24 0.68 0.20 0.65 0.23 0.16 0.23 -0.26 0.03 0.48 0.47 -0.34 1.00 
 




Table 4.3 Fixed Effects Estimates of Immigrant Shares 
Dependent Variable:  
Radical Right Votes Share 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
Highly-Educated Share .005 .004 .005 .002 .007 .006 .006 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.014) 
Pensioners Share .449*** .392*** .480*** .207* .370*** .448*** .286** 
 (.120) (.122) (.121) (.123) (.118) (.122) (.114) 
Unemployment Rate -.099 -.003 -.154 .289 -.095 -.197 .168 
 (.268) (.247) (.261) (.230) (.248) (.265) (.224) 
Population Density -.004* -.003 -.004* -.001 -.003 -.004* -.002 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Average House Value -.056*** -.056*** -.056*** -.057*** -.052*** -.056*** -.046*** 
 (.007) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.006) (.007) (.006) 
Total Immigrants Share  -.130      
  (.111)      
Foreign-Born Share   .142     
   (.136)     
Second-Generation Share    -1.103***    
    (.248)    
Western Immigrants Share     -.771***   
     (.288)   
Non-Western Immigrants Share     .185*   
     (.109)   
Foreign-Born & Western Share      -.248  
      (.315)  
Foreign-Born & Non-Western Share      .428**  
      (.180)  
Second-Gen. & Western Share       -3.775*** 
       (.661) 
Second-Gen. & Non-Western Share       -.302 
       (.202) 
Constant 10.30*** 12.02*** 9.40*** 18.00*** 15.63*** 10.32*** 26.79*** 
 (3.37) (3.79) (3.54) (3.98) (4.30) (3.73) (4.30) 
Number of municipalities 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 
Observations 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352 
R-squared .879 .880 .880 .884 .882 .880 .892 





Table 4.4 reports the fixed-effects estimates of the impact of immigrant inflows on electoral 
support for radical right parties. For ease of comparison, the first model of the table repeats 
the results from Model 1 of Table 4.3 including only control variables. Model 2 adds to the 
equation the number of immigrant inflows as a share of the total population of each 
municipality. We find that the share of immigrant inflows has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on voting for the radical right, at the two-sided one percent level of 
significance. In particular, our estimate indicates that a one percentage point increase in the 
share of total immigrant inflows increases the vote share of radical right parties by .657 
percentage points. Finally, in Model 3 we distinguish between western and non-western 
immigrant inflows. Our results suggest no significant association between the share of 
western immigrant inflows and electoral support for radical right parties. However, the share 
of non-western immigrant inflows is found to have a strong positive and statistically 





Table 4.4 Fixed Effects Estimates of Immigrant Inflows 
Dependent Variable:  
Radical Right Votes Share 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Highly-Educated Share .005 .006 .006 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Pensioners Share .449*** .497*** .480*** 
 (.120) (.120) (.119) 
Unemployment Rate -.099 -.123 -.139 
 (.268) (.268) (.266) 
Population Density -.004* -.004* -.003* 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Average House Value -.056*** -.056*** -.057*** 
 (.007) (.007) (.008) 
Total Immigrant Inflows Share  .657***  
  (.242)  
Western Immigrant Inflows Share   .076 
   (.445) 
Non-Western Immigrant Inflows Share   1.017** 
   (.424) 
Constant 10.30*** 9.42*** 9.79*** 
 (3.37) (3.37) (3.38) 
Number of municipalities 338 338 338 
Observations 1,352 1,352 1,352 
R-squared .879 .880 .881 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
two-sided t-test. All models include municipality and time fixed effects. 
 
4.5.2 Robustness Checks 
 
To check the robustness of our results we first estimate alternative specifications of our model 
by including additional control variables. We introduce in our model controls for crime and 
voter turnout as described previously in subsection 3.2. Each variable is subsequently added 
to a separate specification, but we also test them jointly.  Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix 
present the results with additional controls. The magnitude and significance level of the 
estimates do not change much indicating that our results are robust to the inclusion of 




Furthermore, as an additional robustness test the outliers are excluded from our 
sample. More precisely, we drop from our dataset the municipalities of Amsterdam, Ruchpen 
and Vaals as they appear to have highly disproportionate shares of immigrants or vote shares 
of radical right parties. Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix report the estimates obtained when 
we exclude the outliers. We see that our results hold also in a subsample that excludes the 
outlier municipalities. Consequently, both robustness checks we perform confirm the validity 
of our estimates. 
Finally, to investigate how our results differ after the agglomeration of Dutch 
municipalities at a higher regional level, we re-run the regression analysis presented in Table 
4.3 and Table 4.4 using data from CBS on the 40 COROP30 regions of Netherlands. We 
observe that in Table 4.3 some of our main explanatory variables, such as the share of 
foreign-born, non-western immigrants, are less significant while some others, such as the 
share of second-generation immigrants and the shares of western and non-western 
immigrants, become statistically insignificant. Similarly, in Table 4.4 the total share of 
immigrant inflows, as well as the shares of western and non-western immigrant inflows, 
although appearing with the expected positive sign, lose their statistical significance. A 
reasonable explanation for these findings is that COROP regions are too large for the effects 
proposed by contact and conflict theory to be observed within these borders, since it is likely 
that people are affected mostly by immigrants living or coming into their municipality and 
into the neighbouring ones.  
4.5.3 Endogenous Location Decisions 
 
Up to this point in our analysis we have not taken into consideration that the location 
decisions of both natives and immigrants are determined by individual preferences and thus 
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are not exogenous. Natives are likely to react against increasing concentration of immigrants 
in their municipality by “voting with their feet” and moving to a different house. If this is the 
case, our results might underestimate the true effect of immigration on voting for radical right 
parties. To address for any potential bias arising from native relocation choices, we estimate a 
model of the internal migration decisions of natives as suggested by Peri and Spaber (2011). 
In their study, the authors introduce a microsimulation methodology to test for native 
displacement due to immigration. Following their approach, we estimate the following model: 
𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽
(𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡−1)
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑁𝑖𝑡 and 𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the number of natives and immigrants respectively, in municipality 𝑖 at 
time period 𝑡, and 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 is the total population of municipality at time 𝑡 − 1. The model is 
estimated using yearly changes between 2000 and 2012. 
Table 4.5 presents our estimated results. As in the studies of Otto and Steinhardt 
(2014) and Halla et al. (2017), for the districts of Hamburg and Austrian regions respectively, 
we do not find any evidence for native displacement because of immigrant concentration. 
However, the results of both of our models indicate a positive and strongly significant 
correlation between immigration and natives’ location choices. A more likely interpretation of 
these findings is that large or booming municipalities tend to attract both immigrants and 
natives (Card, 2007). 
With respect to the location decisions of immigrants, as Otto and Steinhardt (2014) 
clearly state, there are two different trends. On one hand, immigrants are likely to relocate in 
more liberal municipalities that appear to be more open and friendly towards them and avoid 
areas where citizens hold xenophobic attitudes. On the other hand, due to economic constrains 




the core of strong anti-immigrant sentiments. Therefore, since the two effects could offset 
each other any potential bias in our estimation results is expected to be small. 
 
Table 4.5 Natives’ Location Choices 




Explanatory Variable: (𝑰𝒊𝒕 − 𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏)/𝑷𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒕−𝟏 3.931*** 4.539*** 
 (1.112) (1.283) 
Number of municipalities 338 338 
Observations 4,056 4,056 
R-squared .227 .114 
𝐅(𝟏𝟐,𝟑𝟑𝟕) 2.83 2.41 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
two-sided t-test. Both models include municipality and time fixed effects. 
 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of immigration on electoral support for 
radical right parties in the Netherlands. We contribute to the existing literature by providing 
empirical evidence from 338 Dutch municipalities for which we observe the outcomes of 
national elections held in the Netherlands in 2003, 2006, 2010 and 2012.  
Several theories seem to explain how individual attitudes towards immigrants, and 
thus demand for the radical right, is determined. First, economic competition theory suggests 
that natives who benefit from the presence of immigrants in the country are likely to support 
more open immigration policies, while those who are negatively affected by them tend to 
prefer the restriction of further immigration. Second, with respect to social and cultural 
considerations, conflict theory proposes that cultural distance and different values between 
natives and immigrants could be perceived as a threat to ethnic identity of the local 
population. Third, contact theory contends that frequent contact and more interaction with 




them. Finally, some scholars argue that natives’ attitudes toward immigrants, which in turn 
determine their political preferences and voting behaviour, might be instrumentally 
manipulated by the anti-immigrant rhetoric of some political actors. Based on these theories, 
we develop our empirical model to investigate how immigrant stock and inflows affect 
electoral support for the radical right in Dutch municipalities. 
Among existing empirical literature there is none that differentiates between first- and 
second-generation immigrants. Apart from this contribution, as the literature indicates has 
been done before (Gerdes and Wadensjö, 2010; Rydgren and Ruth, 2011; Brunner and Kuhn, 
2018), we also distinguish immigrants according to their ethnic background into western and 
non-western. Our results show that neither increases in the overall immigrant share nor 
increases in the share of foreign-born immigrants within a municipality affect voting for 
radical right parties. Similarly, Mendez and Cutillas (2014) find that increases in the total 
immigrant population within Spanish provinces do not have a significant impact on electoral 
support for the radical right. In addition, Brunner and Kuhn (2018) conclude that the total 
immigrant share does not affect the voting behaviour of Swiss citizens. Yet, previous research 
has found that a higher proportion of foreign-born immigrants (Barone et al., 2016) or an 
increase in the share of non-nationals (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Harmon, 2017;) within a 
municipality or a city district increases anti-immigrant votes. The findings of some other 
studies are similar, showing that the presence of immigrants, defined by citizenship (Halla et 
al., 2017) or country of birth (Rydgren and Ruth, 2011), in one’s area is positively related to 
electoral support for the radical right party in the country. On the contrary, our results indicate 
that an increase in the share of second-generation immigrants within a Dutch municipality has 
a negative and substantial impact on voting for the radical right. This finding can provide 
some support for the contact hypothesis, given that second-generation immigrants generally 




schools or workplaces, therefore eliminating previous discriminatory behaviours and racial 
prejudices. However, another plausible explanation of this result could be that individuals 
with immigrant backgrounds, who obtain Dutch citizenship during the study period and are 
therefore eligible to vote, are much less likely to vote in favour of radical right parties. 
Furthermore, our outcomes point out the importance of the country of origin of 
immigrants. In particular, we find a strong negative effect of growing shares of western 
immigrants on the support for radical right parties while an increase in the share of non-
western immigrants within a municipality increases their electoral success. These findings can 
be explained by conflict theory which puts emphasis on the cultural differences between 
natives and immigrants. In addition, non-western immigrants are more likely to compete in 
the labour market with low-skilled natives who are inclined to vote in favour of the radical 
right, or to depend on welfare state provisions, and thereby generate stronger anti-immigrant 
attitudes toward them. Thus, economic competition theory can provide some additional 
explanations for these findings. 
When we further distinguish the western and non-western immigrants into first- and 
second-generation, we find no significant association between rising concentration of foreign-
born western immigrants and electoral support for radical right parties. However, our results 
suggest that an increase in the share of foreign-born non-western immigrants within a 
municipality leads to a higher share of the vote for the radical right. These findings are in line 
with those of Gerdes and Wadensjö (2010) who find that increases in the shares of non-
western immigrants within Danish municipalities increase the votes of the two anti-
immigration parties of the country. In addition, Mendez and Cutillas (2014) show that within 
Spanish provinces an increase in the foreign-born population, although only those from 
African countries, increases support for the anti-immigration formations of the country. 




in Swiss communities affects voting in favour of the country’s radical right party, while 
culturally similar immigrants have no effect on natives’ voting behaviour. With respect to 
second-generation immigrants, we find that increases in the shares of those of western origin 
have a negative and substantial impact on voting for the radical right.  And to the contrary, an 
increase in the share of second-generation, non-western immigrants within a Dutch 
municipality is not found to have any statistically significant effect. Thus, the overall negative 
effect of growing shares of second-generation immigrants on electoral support for the radical 
right seems driven by the western immigrants. 
Finally, although as stated above we do not find any significant effect of an increase in 
the share of foreign-born immigrants on the vote in support of the radical right, our estimate 
suggests that an increase in immigrant inflows increases the vote share of radical right parties. 
This result implies that is not so much the longer-term effect of immigration but its short-term 
impact that is important for explaining anti-immigrant voting. In other words, it seems to be 
the increase in the number of newcomers, relative to the population size, that poses a greater 
threat to natives, and is in turn reflected in their voting decisions. Moreover, our results 
indicate that the positive effect on electoral support for the radical right of an increase in 
immigrant inflows seems to be driven mainly by the influx of non-western immigrants. This is 
similar to the findings of Becker and Fetzer (2016), which show that a UK district 
experiencing a large inflow of immigrants from Eastern European countries experiences a 
significant increase in the anti-immigration party’s share of the vote. 
The findings of this study might have important implications for immigration policy. 
The Netherlands is a country which is well known for its diverse and multi-ethnic population 
but also for its multicultural approach to immigrant integration (Duyvendak and Scholten, 
2011). However, the Dutch government has a general integration policy framework which 




specific events (Fischler, 2015). Since our results indicate that it is mainly the non-western 
immigrants who lead to an increase in the vote for the radical right in Dutch municipalities, 
policy makers are advised to develop the existing immigration policies in a way that targets 
certain groups of immigrants, primarily those who are culturally different. We argue that this 
could not only facilitate integration of immigrants into Dutch society but also contribute to 
reducing xenophobia in local communities. In addition, as our findings show that increases in 
immigrant inflows lead to an increase in electoral support for radical right parties, we would 
recommend that policy makers reorganize the current system accordingly so as to be able to 
respond effectively to a potential large influx of immigrants in the future. 
Of course, the present study is not without limitations. First, immigrants in this study 
are distinguished, with respect to their country of origin, between western and non-western 
immigrants. However, future work could break down the group of non-western immigrants 
further in order to investigate how our results might vary across different subgroups. For 
example, of particular interest would be attempts to examine the effect on electoral support 
for radical right parties of immigrants coming from Islamic countries, who traditionally have 
strong religious and cultural differences with the native population. Moreover, in terms of 
future research, it would be particularly helpful to systematically theorize and investigate how 
municipality characteristics moderate the impact of immigration on voting behaviour. For 
instance, it would be quite interesting to explore whether the prior political climate of the 
municipality affects the direction or strength of the relation between immigration and the vote 
in favour of the radical right. Since our results seem to be explained by several different 
factors, a further exploration of the mechanisms linking immigration to radical right voting 
can yield important insights into the interpretation of our existing findings. Finally, an 




refugee crisis in Europe, which is not captured in our sample, on the vote share of the radical 
right. 
To conclude, we believe that the research outcomes of this study make a significant 
contribution to the empirical academic literature. At the same time, since important 
implications emerge from these results, our findings could also be a useful tool for policy 





Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
Table A1 Fixed Effects Estimates of Immigrant Shares – Additional Control Variables 
Dependent Variable:  
Radical Right Votes Share 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
Highly-Educated Share .006 .005 .006 .002 .008 .007 .006 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.014) 
Pensioners Share .439*** .378*** .470*** .195* .360*** .441*** .277** 
 (.118) (.121) (.120) (.121) (.117) (.122) (.112) 
Unemployment Rate -.096 .004 -.146 .296 -.089 -.188 .179 
 (.262) (.243) (.257) (.225) (.244) (.262) (.219) 
Population Density -.003* -.003 -.004* -.001 -.003 -.004* -.001 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Average House Value -.056*** -.056*** -.056*** -.057*** -.052*** -.056*** -.046*** 
 (.008) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.006) (.007) (.006) 
Crime Suspects .005 .006 .005 .006 .004 .004 .003 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Voter Turnout .008 .002 .015 .017 -.003 .015 .021 
 (.070) (.070) (.068) (.068) (.072) (.070) (.068) 
Total Immigrants Share  -.138      
  (.112)      
Foreign-Born Share   .137     
   (.140)     
Second-Generation Share    -1.107***    
    (.249)    
Western Immigrants Share     -.763***   
     (.281)   
Non-Western Immigrants Share     .172   
     (.111)   
Foreign-Born & Western Share      -.233  
      (.313)  
Foreign-Born & Non-Western Share      .412**  
      (.189)  
Second-Gen. & Western Share       -3.762*** 
       (.659) 
Second-Gen. & Non-Western Share       -.312 
       (.200) 
Constant 9.08 11.36* 7.70 16.07** 15.42** 8.68 24.70*** 
 (6.57) (6.74) (6.56) (6.52) (7.06) (6.71) (6.69) 
Number of municipalities 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 
Observations 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352 
R-squared .880 .880 .880 .884 .883 .880 .892 




Table A2 Fixed Effects Estimates of Immigrant Inflows – Additional Control Variables 
Dependent Variable:  
Radical Right Votes Share 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Highly-Educated Share .006 .007 .006 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Pensioners Share .439*** .487*** .470*** 
 (.118) (.118) (.117) 
Unemployment Rate -.096 -.118 -.130 
 (.262) (.263) (.261) 
Population Density -.003* -.003* -.003* 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Average House Value -.056*** -.056*** -.057*** 
 (.008) (.007) (.008) 
Crime Suspects .005 .005 .005 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Voter Turnout .008 .013 .023 
 (.070) (.067) (.067) 
Total Immigrant Inflows Share  .658***  
  (.246)  
Western Immigrant Inflows Share   .065 
   (.443) 
Non-Western Immigrant Inflows Share   1.031** 
   (.450) 
Constant 9.08 7.79 7.39 
 (6.57) (6.36) (6.26) 
Number of municipalities 338 338 338 
Observations 1,352 1,352 1,352 
R-squared .880 .881 .881 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; two-





Table A3 Fixed Effects Estimates of Immigrant Shares – Excluding the Outliers 
Dependent Variable:  
Radical Right Votes Share 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
Highly-Educated Share .009 .009 .009 .006 .012 .010 .012 
 (.015) (.015) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.013) 
Pensioners Share .390*** .342*** .426*** .154 .327*** .407*** .236** 
 (.118) (.118) (.118) (.118) (.113) (.120) (.110) 
Unemployment Rate -.076 -.012 -.143 .332 -.071 -.169 .182 
 (.266) (.238) (.256) (.226) (.241) (.263) (.219) 
Population Density -.004* -.003 -.004* -.002 -.003 -.004* -.002 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Average House Value -.055*** -.054*** -.055*** -.055*** -.051*** -.055*** -.043*** 
 (.008) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.006) (.007) (.006) 
Total Immigrants Share  -.116      
  (.109)      
Foreign-Born Share   .170     
   (.126)     
Second-Generation Share    -1.103***    
    (.251)    
Western Immigrants Share     -.770**   
     (.319)   
Non-Western Immigrants Share     .183*   
     (.110)   
Foreign-Born & Western Share      -.123  
      (.333)  
Foreign-Born & Non-Western Share      .368**  
      (.185)  
Second-Gen. & Western Share       -3.922*** 
       (.668) 
Second-Gen. & Non-Western Share       -.255 
       (.201) 
Constant 10.76*** 12.25*** 9.74*** 18.31*** 15.89*** 10.39*** 27.56*** 
 (3.36) (3.79) (3.53) (3.98) (4.42) (3.79) (4.26) 
Number of municipalities 335 335 335 335 335 335 335 
Observations 1,340 1,340 1,340 1,340 1,340 1,340 1,340 
R-squared .884 .885 .885 .889 .887 .888 .898 




Table A4 Fixed Effects Estimates of Immigrant Inflows – Excluding the Outliers 
Dependent Variable:  
Radical Right Votes Share 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Highly-Educated Share .009 .011 .010 
 (.015) (.014) (.014) 
Pensioners Share .390*** .437*** .420*** 
 (.118) (.112) (.115) 
Unemployment Rate -.076 .107 -.115 
 (.266) (.266) (.263) 
Population Density -.004* -.004 -.004* 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Average House Value -.055*** -.055*** -.055*** 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Total Immigrant Inflows Share  .653***  
  (.243)  
Western Immigrant Inflows Share   .039 
   (.455) 
Non-Western Immigrant Inflows Share   .974** 
   (.418) 
Constant 10.76*** 9.94*** 10.30*** 
 (3.36) (3.35) (3.36) 
Number of municipalities 335 335 335 
Observations 1,340 1,340 1,340 
R-squared .884 .886 .886 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; two-





Table A5 Fixed Effects Estimates of Immigrant Shares – COROP Regions 
Dependent Variable:  
Radical Right Votes Share 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
Highly-Educated Share .037 .035 .045 .049 .036 .051 .012 
 (.119) (.116) (.111) (.119) (.120) (.115) (.013) 
Pensioners Share 1.562** 1.683** 1.699*** 1.298* 1.708** 1.703*** .236** 
 (.616) (.648) (.951) (.683) (.646) (.590) (.110) 
Unemployment Rate .354 .225 .201 .630 .027 .069 .182 
 (.532) (.527) (.545) (.546) (.523) (.564) (.219) 
Population Density .012 .009 .005 .015 .012 .006 -.002 
 (.011) (.012) (.012) (.010) (.012) (.013) (.002) 
Average House Value -.069** -.067** -.068*** -.066** -.062** -.068*** -.043*** 
 (.027) (.027) (.025) (.026) (.024) (.024) (.006) 
Total Immigrants Share  -250      
  (.315)      
Foreign-Born Share   .955*     
   (.502)     
Second-Generation Share    -.772    
    (.593)    
Western Immigrants Share     -.601   
     (.753)   
Non-Western Immigrants Share     .557   
     (.409)   
Foreign-Born & Western Share      .516  
      (.783)  
Foreign-Born & Non-Western Share      1.386*  
      (.706)  
Second-Gen. & Western Share       -8.973*** 
       (1.56) 
Second-Gen. & Non-Western Share       .138 
       (.464) 
Constant -17.23 -20.65 -22.356 -10.82 -17.71 -23.40 24.31 
 (16.29) (17.36) (15.80) (18.08) (17.68) (15.82) (12.47) 
Number of COROP Regions 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
R-squared .927 .928 .930 .929 .929 .931 .943 




Table A6 Fixed Effects Estimates of Immigrant Inflows – COROP Regions  
Dependent Variable:  
Radical Right Votes Share 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Highly-Educated Share .037 -.024 -.034 
 (.119) (.124) (.129) 
Pensioners Share 1.562** 1.521** 1.352** 
 (.616) (.620) (.579) 
Unemployment Rate .354 .617 .582 
 (.532) (.593) (.559) 
Population Density .012 .004 .005 
 (.011) (.012) (.011) 
Average House Value -.069** -.065** -.070*** 
 (.027) (.024) (.025) 
Total Immigrant Inflows Share  2.369  
  (1.603)  
Western Immigrant Inflows Share   .867 
   (1.905) 
Non-Western Immigrant Inflows Share   5.057 
   (3.021) 
Constant -17.23 -14.095 -11.94 
 (16.29) (16.18) (15.73) 
Number of COROP Regions 40 40 40 
Observations 160 160 160 
R-squared .927 .932 .934 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; two-















Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
 
In this doctoral dissertation, we have developed three empirical studies to investigate how 
immigration and cultural diversity have affected the economic, social and political life of 
European regions in recent years. In an increasingly diverse world where the total number 
of international migrants is growing, knowing the consequences of migration and the 
impact of diversity is extremely important. These two issues – international migration and 
cultural diversity – have therefore prompted a huge amount of scientific research, on both a 
conceptual and an empirical level.  
This dissertation has attempted to contribute to the existing literature by providing a 
better understanding of specific aspects of the impacts of international migration and 
cultural diversity on host societies in Europe. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 empirically investigated the relationship between cultural 
diversity and economic performance in 74 regions of 12 European countries. We also 
tested how the impact of cultural diversity on regional economic performance is affected 
by the level of generalized social trust and by the level of trust that individuals have in 
their public institutions. Chapter 3 examined public attitudes toward immigrants in 78 
regions of 16 European countries. More specifically, we explored whether the origin of 
immigrants’ and their skill level drive public sentiment to be more or less anti-immigrant. 
Finally, in Chapter 4 we investigated how the stock of immigrants and the immigrant 
inflows to 338 Dutch municipalities affect electoral support for the country’s radical right 
parties. 
In this concluding chapter, we first briefly summarize the main findings from our 




dissertation to the growing body of literature. We conclude by presenting the limitations of 
our research work and discussing several directions for future research. 
5.1 Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
This section summarizes the most important findings from our three empirical studies. In 
Chapter 2, we estimated a fixed-effects linear regression model to explore the impact of 
cultural diversity on economic performance in 74 European regions over the period 2004 
to 2012. In addition, we investigated the role of generalized social trust as a moderator in 
this relationship. We also examined whether the effect of cultural diversity on regional 
economic performance is influenced by the level of individuals’ trust in public institutions. 
Our empirical results indicated that it is not the size but the diversity of the foreign 
population that is positively correlated with regional income. With regard to the interaction 
effects of our analysis, we found that in regions with low levels of generalized social trust, 
the benefits of foreigners’ diversity are insignificant, while in regions with high levels of 
generalized social trust, the benefits are apparent. Our findings for individuals’ trust in 
institutions were similar. 
Chapter 3 investigated, on a fairly large sample of respondents from 78 European 
regions over the period 2004 to 2012, how the origin and skill level of immigrants affect 
natives’ attitudes toward them. Furthermore, we examined whether there is any interaction 
effect between the size and the skill level of immigrant population. Our results showed that 
the proportion of immigrants in a given region does not appear to be a significant factor in 
shaping attitudes toward immigration. However, we found that immigrants’ origin does 
seem to be a substantial determinant. Moreover, although our empirical results did not 
reveal any significant direct effect of immigrants’ skill level on attitudes toward them, we 
found some moderating effect between the size and the skill level of immigrant population 




positive effect of immigrants’ presence on natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes, with respect to 
the country’s economy and culture, is stronger in regions where the percentage of low-
educated immigrants is higher.  
In Chapter 4, we examined the impact of international immigration on electoral 
support for the radical right in 338 Dutch municipalities during the decade 2003-2012. This 
investigation concluded that, although an increase in the share of foreign-born immigrants 
within a municipality does not increase the vote share of country’s radical right parties, 
increases in immigrant inflows have a positive and statistically significant effect on voting 
in support of the radical right. Additionally, our results indicated that an increase in the 
share of second-generation immigrants within a Dutch municipality has a negative and 
substantial impact on voting for the radical right. Furthermore, our outcomes highlighted 
the importance of the country of origin of immigrants. In particular, we found a strong 
negative effect of growing shares of western immigrants on the support for radical right 
parties while an increase in the share of non-western immigrants within a municipality 
increases their electoral success. Similarly, our results indicated that the positive effect on 
electoral support for the radical right of an increase in immigrant inflows seems to be 
driven mainly by the influx of non-western immigrants. 
Consequently, the results of all three empirical studies seem to be quite consistent 
and move in the same direction.  Overall, the findings of this doctoral dissertation are that 
is not the size of the foreign population that matters in each case but the type of 
immigrants. 
5.2 Contributions to Existing Literature 
 
The three empirical studies of this dissertation have contributed to the corresponding 
literature in a number of ways. In this section we indicate what has been added to the body 




First, to answer what determines whether the economic outcomes of cultural diversity in 
the European regions are positive or negative, Chapter 2 empirically investigated the role 
of generalized social trust as a moderator in the relationship between cultural diversity and 
regional economic performance. To the best of our knowledge, Kemeny (2012) is the only 
previous study which examines the moderating role of generalized trust in the above 
relationship, but for the US metropolitan areas only. In addition, in this chapter we 
explored how the level of trust individuals have in their public institutions affects the 
impact of cultural diversity on regional economic performance. We know of no other study 
that examines the role of institutional trust as a moderator in this relationship.  
As regards operationalization of cultural diversity, following Alesina et al. (2016a), 
we decomposed our cultural diversity variable into a component that measures the share of 
foreigners over total population and a component which captures the diversity among 
foreigners. Whereas previous research that examines the impact of cultural diversity on 
macroeconomic performance in European regions has largely focused on the overall effect 
of diversity (Audretsch et al., 2010; Niebuhr, 2010; Brunow and Brenzel, 2011; Dohse and 
Gold, 2014), this chapter is among the few studies (Ozgen et al., 2011; Bellini et al., 2013) 
that distinguish between the size of the foreign population in each region and the diversity 
arising from the variety and the relative size of foreign groups. 
With respect to Chapter 3, while much existing research has tended to explore 
public attitudes toward immigrants with a focus on the individual characteristics of those 
holding the views (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2008; 
Pardos-Prado, 2011), our work considered characteristics of the immigrants themselves as 
a driving factor in attitudes toward immigration. More specifically, this chapter built on 
previous empirical research that examines the impact of regional factors on European 




and Longhi, 2013; Bridges and Mateut, 2014; Weber, 2015) and attempted to investigate 
how the characteristics of immigrants affect public sentiment. Our work in this chapter is 
similar to that conducted by Markaki and Longhi (2013), as both studies examine the 
impact of contextual factors, and more precisely immigrants’ origin (EU/non-EU) and 
immigrants’ skill level (low/highly-educated), on anti-immigrant attitudes in European 
regions. However, our study differs by distinguishing non-European immigrants living in a 
region into six different groups of origin, and this is our main empirical contribution to the 
literature.31 In addition, we extended our analysis by including an interaction term in our 
model to capture any moderating effect between the size and the skill level of the 
immigrant population. 
Regarding operationalization, some previous studies in the literature have used the 
regional percentages of foreign-born (Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Weber, 2015), while 
other studies prefer to use the proportions of non-nationals in a region (Schlueter and 
Wagner, 2008; Bridges and Mateut, 2014) in order to identify the size of the regional 
‘outgroup’ population. As both measures have pros and cons (Coenders, 2001), exploring 
the detailed information provided by the EU-LFS, we chose to base our measurement of 
the share of the foreign population in a region simultaneously on individuals’ nationality 
and country of birth. However, we also used the separate shares of foreign nationals and 
foreign-born as alternative measures. This comparison served to highlight the importance 
of operationalization for a better understanding of ‘ingroup-outgroup’ nexus in future 
studies. 
Finally, Chapter 4 contributed to the growing literature on immigration and 
political preferences by providing empirical evidence from Dutch municipalities. In the 
case of the Netherlands, as far as we know, no other study has been conducted that 
                                                             






empirically examines the impact of immigration on electoral support for the country’s 
radical right parties. Furthermore, the rich database of CBS enabled us to include in our 
analysis not only the stock of immigrant population in each municipality, but also the 
inflows of international immigrants. Therefore, in this chapter we differentiate ourselves 
from previous empirical research (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Halla et al., 2017; Harmon, 
2017; Brunner and Kuhn, 2018) by exploring and comparing both the short-term effect of 
immigration (immigrant inflows) and its longer-term impact (immigrant stock) on the vote 
share of the radical right. This distinction is important because it allows us to capture 
different effects of the same construct and thus provides us with a deeper and more 
comprehensive understanding of how international immigration affects voting behaviour. 
Lastly, in this chapter we also distinguish between first- and second-generation 
immigrants. This is the only empirical study of the related literature that makes this 
distinction. 
5.3 Limitations, Future Research and Implications 
 
Beside the various contributions described above, this doctoral dissertation has, of course, 
several limitations that offer opportunities for future research. Nevertheless, this 
dissertation also suggests some important implications for society.  
In Chapter 2, we assumed that all of the cultural groups we defined are equidistant 
to one another. Some could argue, however, that important dissimilarities exist between 
certain cultures compared to others. Therefore, an interesting extension of this chapter 
would be to find a way to account for cultural distances between cultural groups and 
control for the degree of their integration. In addition, further research could be conducted 
to explore how our results might vary across different segments of the labour force, 
especially when broken down according to skill level. Third, the fact that our analysis is 




representative for other geographical areas, which limits the generalizability of our 
findings. 
However, the empirical results of this chapter indicate that both the level of trust 
that people place in strangers and the trust that individuals have in political and social 
institutions can play an important role in catalysing the potential benefits of foreigners’ 
diversity. One straightforward policy recommendation we can draw from these findings is 
that culturally heterogeneous regions of Europe need to encourage individuals’ trust in 
other people in order to reap the benefits of diversity. Past research provides evidence that 
a high level of generalized trust is associated with less corruption (La Porta, 1997), better 
education systems and less ethnically fragmented societies (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; 
Leigh, 2006). We would therefore recommend that decision makers prevent corruption in 
public organizations, invest in education and promote the efficient integration of foreigners 
into local communities. At the same time, policy makers in European regions are advised 
to encourage people’s trust in public institutions, for instance by improving the general 
credibility of their country’s parliamentary bodies, the efficiency of their legal systems and 
the performance of their police authorities. 
With regard to limitations of Chapter 3, first, using the EU-LFS data we are not 
actually able to measure second-generation immigrants, neither by the share of foreign-
born nor by the share of foreign nationals in a region. However, many second-generation 
immigrants are not fully integrated into the local communities and might be discriminated 
against although they have been naturalized. Moreover, our study examines anti-immigrant 
attitudes without focusing on a specific segment of the native population. Thus, an 
interesting extension of this work will be to examine cross-level interaction effects and 
investigate how the origin or skill level of immigrants interacts with the education level, 




this chapter, future work may examine degrees of cultural distance and identify the factors 
that comprise cultural differences.  It may be interesting to know if it is ideology, 
traditions, experiences, religious practice or other traits that prove most important in the 
mind of the attitude holder who perceives cultural distance.  More in-depth knowledge of 
the immigrant traits that drive anti-immigrant attitudes could help to shape integration 
policies and strategies. 
An important insight from Chapter 3, however, emerges in the finding that the 
origin of immigrants living in a European region appears to be key in influencing natives’ 
attitudes toward immigration. For example, we find Middle East and North African 
concentrations of non-EU foreigners, which geographically represent the Muslim 
communities, to elicit the most negative attitudes toward immigrants. This 
suggests that a greater degree of perceived cultural distance and difference proves decisive 
in shaping anti-immigrant attitudes. In other words, Muslims are perceived as more 
divergent in values from European attitude-holders than are Asians or Latin Americans. 
The more that the values of the immigrants in a region diverge from those of the nationals 
of that region, the more an immigrant threat is perceived, and this produces a stronger anti-
immigrant attitude. These insights could be a useful tool for policy makers in the decision-
making process in European regions. 
Finally, Chapter 4 also suffers from some limitations. First, with respect to their 
country of origin, immigrants in this chapter are distinguished into western and non-
western immigrants. However, future work could break down the group of non-western 
immigrants further in order to investigate how our results might vary across different 
subgroups. For example, it would be of particular interest to examine the effect on electoral 
support for radical right parties of those immigrants who come from Islamic countries and 




Moreover, in terms of future research, it would be particularly helpful to systematically 
theorize and investigate how municipality characteristics moderate the impact of 
immigration on voting behaviour. For instance, it would be of interest to explore whether 
the prior political climate of the municipality affects the direction or strength of the 
relationship between immigration and the vote in favour of the radical right. Since our 
results seem to be explained by several different factors, a further exploration of the 
mechanisms linking immigration to the vote for the radical right could yield important 
insights into how our existing findings might be interpreted. Finally, an interesting 
extension of this work would be to additionally assess the impact of the recent refugee 
crisis in Europe on the vote share of the radical right. This is not captured in our sample. 
Nevertheless, the findings of Chapter 4 might have important implications for 
immigration policy. The Dutch government has a general integration policy framework 
which means that there are no specific strategies in place aimed at particular groups of 
immigrants or specific events (Fischler, 2015). Since our results indicate that it is mainly 
the non-western immigrants who lead to an increase in the vote for the radical right in 
Dutch municipalities, policy makers are advised to develop the existing immigration 
policies in a way that targets certain groups of immigrants, primarily those who are 
culturally different. We argue that this could not only facilitate integration of immigrants 
into Dutch society but also contribute to reducing xenophobia in local communities. In 
addition, as our findings show that increases in immigrant inflows lead to an increase in 
electoral support for radical right parties, we would recommend that policy makers 
reorganize the current system accordingly so as to be able to respond effectively to a 
potential large influx of immigrants in the future. 
To conclude, it is hoped that the three empirical studies that comprise this 




immigration and cultural diversity affect the life of the host societies in Europe. It is our 
wish that this doctoral dissertation will provide inspiration and new horizons for future 
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Deze doctoraatsthesis bestaat uit drie empirische studies (Hoofdstukken 2-4) in het domein 
van Internationale Immigratie.  
Hoofdstuk 2: Culturele diversiteit en economische prestatie: De modererende rol van 
vertrouwen 
Het doel van deze studie is om de relatie tussen culturele diversiteit en economische 
prestatie empirisch te onderzoeken in 74 regio’s tijdens de periode 2004-2012. Om 
contradictorische resultaten in voorgaand onderzoek te helpen uitklaren, introduceren we 
het concept van gegeneraliseerd sociaal vertrouwen als een moderator van deze relatie. 
Ook onderzoeken we de modererende rol van het vertrouwen van individuen in instituties. 
Onze empirische resultaten wijzen uit dat het niet de omvang van een buitenlandse 
populatie (aandeel allochtonen) is dat belangrijk is, maar de bredere variëteit van die 
populatie (diversiteit van de allochtone populatie), dewelke positief geassocieerd is met 
regionaal inkomen. We stellen ook vast dat in regio’s met een laag niveau van 
gegeneraliseerd sociaal vertrouwen de voordelen van diversiteit van de allochtone 
populatie afwezig zijn; terwijl in regio’s met een hoog niveau van gegeneraliseerd sociaal 
vertrouwen de voordelen van diversiteit van de allochtone populatie significant zijn. Onze 
bevindingen voor het vertrouwen van individuen in instituties zijn gelijklopend.  
Hoofdstuk 3: De origine van immigranten en opleidingsniveau als factoren in 
attitudes tegenover immigranten in Europa 
Deze studie neemt de publieke attitudes ten opzichte van immigranten in 78 Europese 
regio’s gedurende de periode 2004-2012 onder de loep. Specifiek onderzoeken we hoe 
karakteristieken van immigranten, zoals hun origine (EU/non-EU) en hun opleidingsniveau 
(laag/hoog opgeleid), publieke anti-immigratie gevoelens aandrijven. Deze studie bevindt 




bepalende factor is voor publieke attitudes tegenover immigratie. Onze empirische 
resultaten wijzen ook uit dat er geen significant direct effect is van het opleidingsniveau 
van immigranten op attitudes gericht naar hen. Desalniettemin nemen we wel een 
interactie-effect waar van de omvang van de populatie met het opleidingsniveau van de 
populatie op het vormen van de attitudes van autochtone inwoners ten opzichte van 
immigratie.  
Hoofdstuk 4: Immigratie en electorale steun voor radicaal rechts: Bewijs van 
Nederlandse gemeenten 
Het doel van deze studie is om te onderzoeken hoe het reeds aanwezige aandeel aan 
immigranten en de instromen van immigranten in Nederlandse gemeenten de 
verkiezingssteun voor de nationale radicaal rechtse partijen beïnvloeden. Onze dataset is 
samengesteld uit gegevens van 338 Nederlandse gemeenten en omvat de vier nationale 
verkiezingen die plaatsvonden in het land gedurende het decennium van 2003-2012. De 
resultaten van deze studie indiceren dat, hoewel een toename aan eerste generatie 
immigranten in een gemeente het aandeel aan stemmen voor radicaal rechts niet doet 
stijgen, een toename in instromen aan immigranten een statistisch significant positief effect 
heeft op stemgedrag ten voordele van radicaal rechtse partijen. Onze empirische analyse 
onthult ook verscheidene andere bevindingen, onder meer dat het aandeel aan tweede 
generatie immigranten het aandeel aan anti-immigrant stemmen negatief beïnvloedt, 
terwijl, in lijn met voorgaande studies, we vinden dat de culturele afstand tussen 
autochtonen en immigranten een significante determinant is van de verkiezingssteun voor 
radicaal rechts. 
 
